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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the reintegration of locaUties in Poland through foreign investment 
in general and transnational corporations, in particular. The focus of the research is on the 
relationships and interplay between incoming foreign firms, the corporate strategy of 
individual companies and the role of institutions and local actors. The region which is the 
focus of the empirical work is Wroclaw, which is located in the South West of Poland, 
and regarded as a relatively successful example of transformation. 
The analytical framework is radical institutionalist in emphasising the socially and 
politically embedded nature of economic behaviour and the existence of differentiated 
interests and power. Four dimension of embeddedness, structural, cultural, cognitive and 
institutional are used to examine how far and in what ways recent changes in the 
corporate strategy of firms have influenced the nature of firms' quantitative and 
qualitative linkages in the locality. 
The main conclusions are that although the multiplier effects through supplier linkages 
were modest, a process of cumulative causation was evident through the demonstration 
effect of incoming firms and the stimulation of a range of business services. Ambiguous 
and embryonic structures of local governance in Wroclaw meant that foreign investors 
were significant contributors to the building of formal institutions. The research findings 
emphasise the use of enabling myths by foreign investors in attempting to instill a set of 
values, beliefs and expectations viewed to be congruent with a market economy, in both 
the locality and the workplace, while displacing or circumventing what were regarded as 
the inappropriate institutional legacies of the previous regime. 
The overall conclusion is that there needs to be a radical break with the free market status 
quo and that change can only come fi"om below in the workplaces and local communities 
through participatory systems of local governance. 
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PROLOGUE 
PROLOGUE 
On my first visit to Krakow, Poland in April 1993 the legacy of the sclerotic and chaotic 
communist plarmed economy was still very much in evidence. As we arrived at the 
ramshackle railway station we could see the empty concrete shell of a high rise building on 
the edge of the town. We were told that it had been like this for ten years and had been left 
as a testament to the many prestigious projects that had run out of finance or raw materials. 
In the city centre many of the fine medieval buildings showed signs of decades of neglect, 
and other buildings were black with the pollution fi-om the nearby steelworks. 
The research imdertaken between 1993 and 1995 in collaboration with colleagues from the 
Krakow Academy of Economics focused on three workplaces. Rather than quickly 
adapting to the new conditions through the market mechanism, as predicted by the vast 
army of advisors who had descended on Warsaw, these firms faced a variety of difficulties 
in responding to international competition. The giant Huta Sendzhimira steelworks 
sprawled across five square miles on the edge of the city in the town of Nowa Huta. It had 
been a gift from Stalin in 1948 to inject an industrial working class into a city, which 
contained nationally renowned imiversities and was therefore considered to be over 
endowed with potential dissenters. In its heyday in the early 1970s the steelworks 
employed 40,000 people, however by 1993 this number had fallen to 20,000. Processes 
used were obsolete and environmentally disasfrous and the steel products were poor 
quality, and significantly lagging behind those of western competitors. There had been 
many visits by Western European steel producers between 1991 and 1993, but it was 
suggested that this was more to do with assessing the potential competition rather than 
serious consideration of making an investment. Restructuring this workplace would have a 
profound effect on the population of Nowa Huta. 
Whereas the steelworks was a bastion of male employment, the workforce of the Wawel 
chocolate factory was mainly women. By January 1994 food processing had attracted the 
second highest amount of foreign investment. Such was the scramble for Polish chocolate 
firms that Nestle had snatched the Goplana confectionery factory in Poznan from other 
foreign competitors the day before the deal was due to be signed. I was able to confirm that 
senior managers of Nestle had been to the factory with a megaphone and leaflets to 
persuade workers and incumbent managers that they had the better deal to offer. Wawel, 
however, had rejected the overtures of foreign transnational corporations (TNCs) in favour 
of taking the worker-management route to private ownership. The factory site was a run 
down building in the middle of the town. The quality of the chocolate was good but the 
machinery was old and unreliable and the production process extremely labour intensive. 
Further the lack of management experience, particularly in marketing, raised questions 
about the survival of the firm, in the light of foreign competitors such as Cadbury who had 
built a greenfield site in the city of Wroclaw. 
The third workplace was the ZPT tobacco factory, the largest cigarette producer in Poland. 
In contrast to the steelworks and the chocolate factory there was evidence of investment in 
new machinery as they increased their production of Marlborough cigarettes under licence 
from the giant US TNG, Philip Morris. The experience of Spain and Portugal was that the 
liberalisation of the tobacco sector had led to US firms dominating the market as domestic 
firms either closed or were relegated to the periphery, and a similar process appeared to 
underway in Poland. 
The experience of these three workplaces suggested that foreign investment and TNCs 
were going to be a central force in shaping the transformation process and organisational 
change, either through changes in ownership or by changing the nature of competition in 
particular sectors. The relationship between foreign investment, and the reintegration of 
localities into the international economy was to become the central focus of my thesis 
started in 1996, although the regional focus moved from Krakow in the South East of 
Poland to Wroclaw in the West. 
In April 2000 four years after my first fifty minute internal flight from Warsaw, I made my 
final research visit to Wroclaw. As the plane started its descent the dramatic impact of 
foreign investment on the landscape was clearly evident. To the North of the city we flew 
over the extension to the foreign owned bus and truck plant that was trebling in size and 
still under construction. Its major supplier of metal panels was also building a new factory 
on an adjacent site. To the West, and just outside the city, two large greenfield investments 
could be clearly seen, one a British confectionery manufacturer, the other a huge American 
transnational producing glucose. Both had been persuaded to locate there by a proactive 
local mayor who had been given an accolade in the Financial Times as an example of the 
new entrepreneur. Adjacent to these shiny edifices, and across the newly constructed 
motorway to Germany, was an out of town shopping Mecca, with a British hypermarket, 
Dutch discount cash and carry, a giant Swedish furniture store and a German DIY centre. 
As we flew over the city it was possible to see the medieval cathedral nestling between the 
two rivers on the small island of Ostrow Tumski, and the magnificent university building 
dating back to the seventeenth century. The rynek (town square) was also clearly visible as 
were the numerous other medieval churches. On the edge of the city and to the North East, 
two of the key industrial areas appeared as grey and sprawling blots. Both housed 
nationally known previous State Owned Enterprises that were now undergoing profound 
processes of restructuring as a result of foreign investments. All of these major workplaces 
had been occupied by their workers in 1981 as part of the political protest that swept the 
country. The factories had been attacked by tanks and the trade union leaders arrested and 
imprisoned. 
As the plane landed at 9.00 in the morning the airport looked very different from when I 
had first arrived in 1996. Gone was the austere concrete building with its large fifties deco 
sign. Gone also was the detritus of redundant military planes and equipment that had 
littered the edge of the airfield. Instead there was a modem and fiiUy equipped terminal 
that was handling increasing numbers of domestic and international flights. In the baggage 
hall large adverts for Cadbury, one of the first investors in Wroclaw, and a foreign 
consultancy firm welcomed me to Wroclaw. Outside there were large hoardings also 
advertising the presence and apparent predominance of foreign firms in the locality. 
The road from the airport passed a large plot of well tended dzialki (allotments), that 
served more to provide a retreat from the cramped and dismal housing than their intended 
practical purpose of growing food. The huge 1960s monolithic tower blocs on the edge of 
town showed few signs of refurbishment and battered old cars were strewn on the rough 
land that served as a car park. Neither did the beneficial effects of the fastest growing 
economy in Central and Eastern Europe seem to have reached the old women selling 
scraps of second hand clothes at the edge of the road. The hoardings along the route into 
town were dominated by adverts for four giant foreign food retailers, all of whom had 
arrived in the last two years, competing fiercely on the basis of the prices of their goods. 
As we entered the city it was clear that there had been massive investment in the 
infrastructure. This was much needed after several decades of complete neglect and 
compounded by the severe floods in 1997 that left much of the city under several feet of 
water. The Stalinist folly of a central station, Wroclaw Glowny, with its gothic mock castle 
facade and crenellations had been restored to its former glory. In the early days the free 
market had been synonymous with the flea market, and the station had acted as a magnet 
for a frenzy of entrepreneurial activity, but the number of traders had now been 
rationalised to a much smaller handfiil of licensed and legitimate sellers. The pavements, 
roads and framlines, previously in a state of disrepair, had now been ripped up and relaid. 
We passed several department stores that in the last two years had been completely 
overhauled by foreign buyers and now charged western prices. I noticed a pair of trainers 
for 350 zloty - two weeks wages for a nurse. The large scale renovations to the crumbling 
exterior of the huge and imposing opera house were still underway and it was difficult to 
discern much progress from my last visit, six months before. 
Opposite what had once been an enormous Prussian garrison and were now the law courts, 
was the Hotel Monopol, which had been my home on five visits. It is a large and imposing 
fin de Steele building, which counted Hitler, Marlene Dietrich, Picasso and Paul Robeson 
among its (in)famous guests. It was still a state owned organisation, part of the Polorbis 
chain, and had remained relatively immune from the dreary homogeneity of the ever 
growing number of international hotels by retaining its original character with it glorious 
sweeping staircases with wrought iron banisters, and art nouveau light fittings. The 
cavernous dining room with bordello velvet drapes and grotesque 1970s glass table 
decoration was by and large devoid of guests, only frequented by those who were too tired 
or infirm to go elsewhere. It can only be a matter of time until the decor, service and 
accommodation is changed to meet international expectations and the hotel loses its 
appealing quirkiness. 
As I walked the short distance to the ?ynek to get an early lunch I passed the tourist 
information service. I was reminded that Wroclaw was no stranger to change and if 
anything its second great transformation was much less dramatic than its first. Formerly 
Breslau, the city had been razed to the ground at the end of World War II and when it was 
ceded to Poland, and experienced one of the largest depopulations in European history as 
its German inhabitants left or were expelled. The city was rebuilt by Poles who arrived 
with their institutions (such as the university) from Lvov, or were driven by poverty from 
the small towns and villages of cenfral Poland. It was literally a tabula rasa with a mixture 
of people and institutions on which it was much easier to impose a Stalinist blueprint after 
1948 than other parts of Poland. 
Over the last three years the rynek had changed beyond all recognition. The tall elegant 
eighteenth century town houses that lined the square had been beautifiilly restored. 
Although the styles of the building were similar, each was painted a different colour and 
renovated individually. Some were relatively simple, others had ornate features such as 
trompe I'oeil. The rathaus (town hall) dated back to fifteenth century and was the 
centrepiece of the rynek and the symbol of the city for the last seven centuries. The ugly 
architecture of the 1970s had been eliminated with the exception of the modernist Bank 
Zachoni building on the comer. The rynek was the focal point of the city with a vibrant 
cafe culture and high class, high priced bijou shops selling mementos or jewellery to the 
mainly German tourists, who had come to visit or revisit their roots. You could eat and 
drink in the ubiquitous (but discrete) Macdonalds or Pizza Hut restaurants or in one of the 
myriad of restaurants, coffee houses or beer bars that had sprung up on the edge of the 
rynek or the small streets around it. I chose the vegetarian restaurant that was a cafe 
serving solid Polish food, mainly to students and pensioners. At weekends or on summer 
evenings the rynek would be packed with people on the pavement bars or simply 
promenading round the square. Drinking Polish beer and surrounded by large numbers of 
local people it would be very easy to think that the jury had unequivocally returned a guilty 
verdict on the dismal and repressive communist regime and vindicated the dynamic 
transformative powers of capitalism and market forces. 
At 1.00 o'clock I set off on to do interviews in two towns that formed a sharp and sobering 
contrast with Wroclaw city. Olesnica, the second largest town in the region showed few 
signs of the new times. After driving around the town it was difficult to discern any 
changes to the physical envirormient. Ugly and run down apartments dominated the town 
centre. The older buildings far from having been restored, were crumbling with huge holes 
in the rendering exposing large sections of poorly pointed bricks. The shops were drab, the 
displays fiinctional and uninspiring and the goods poor quality and cheap. The pavements 
were uneven and dangerous and the roads fiill of potholes. The people were visibly less 
affluent and lacked the chic of those who worked in the municipality. One of the main 
employers, a shoe factory, had shut with a loss of five thousand jobs in 1998. It stood 
derelict next to the only significant foreign investor - a western car components 
manufacturer. 
The next interview was at 3.30 in Brzeg Dolny - 'a one horse town'. The physical 
environment was grim and heavily polluted and employment was completely dominated by 
one giant chemical works that had produced Kyklon B during the Second World War. 
Decisions about its restructuring and future lie outside of the region and to some extent 
outside of the country. It is a major asset held by National Investment Fund Number 13, a 
holding company run by W.S Atkins (UK consultancy) and a Polish bank. In contrast to 
the sprawling buildings and dereliction of parts of the chemical firm, across the road stood 
two citadels of British foreign investment; one firm produces industrial gases and the other 
foam for fiimiture. These represent the only diversification of the economy and the 200 
jobs they had created would provide no cushion in the face of a large reduction of 
employment in the State Owned Enterprise. Physically the town is isolated and not on any 
of the main arterial routes, with accessibility further compounded by poor public transport 
and low levels of car ownership. The centre of the town comprised a cluster of high rise 
flats with a handfiil of shops. The sky turned grey and it began to snow. This place felt like 
as if it was on the edge of the world. 
The last meeting was early evening with the Solidarity representative from the foreign 
owned truck and bus factory. After reassuring him I was not a journalist he explained that 
they were in dispute with management over wages specifically, and a lack of consultation 
generally, ironic in a firm that professed to be people centred and was renowned for its 
worker friendly work organisation. As we walked back to the taxi he talked about how 
people were disarmed by the vagaries of the market and said that he would give their 
factory up to fifteen years before it moved elsewhere. He echoed the sentiment that I had 
heard over and over from workers and their representatives which was that they welcomed 
the dynamism of the market and its potential benefits but the other side of the coin was that 
the collectivity, certainty and security of the old system had gone. 
The transformative capacity of capitalism was evident both in the increasing physical 
presence of foreign investment and the rising standards of living, experienced by some 
sections of the population at least, manifest in Wroclaw city. However, beyond the 
international hotels, and beyond the tourist trails it was abundantly clear that the gains of 
the transformation process were highly differentiated, even within a region that was 
considered to be relatively successfiil. The loss of jobs in State Owned Enterprises as they 
closed or restructured, the battles (overt and covert) over employments levels, social 
provision and conditions of work were hidden from the gaze and eviscerated from the 
accounts of those that celebrated market driven transformation as a win-win game. 
In the following pages this study aims to explore and provide an analytical framework for 
understanding the role of foreign investment in explaining the confradictions and 
unevenness of transformation described in the foregoing account. 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 C A P I T A L I S T TRIUMPHALISM 
1.1.1 Background to research 
The collapse of the economies of Cenfral and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the late 1980s 
coupled with popular revolt released people from the politically repressive regimes of 
Stalinism. Economically two decades of piecemeal reforms had failed to rescue these 
economies from the stagnation and crisis that had resulted in an ever increasing gap 
between living standards in Western market economies and the planned economies of 
C E E . After the fall of the Berlin Wall the early 1990s was dominated by capitalist 
triumphalism, which drew on neoliberal assumptions to suggest that the fransformation 
process was one where market forces could be used to shift both the material and 
ideological trajectories of post-communist economies. However, in policy terms this 
process unfolded in different ways between economies. In Poland in January 1990 
transformation took the form of 'shock therapy', which comprised an overnight injection 
of macro stabilisation measures coupled with a far reaching programme of liberalisation, 
both deemed to be the only medicine possible for a sclerotic economy. While there was 
discussion in some quarters of a Marshall Aid type programme to reconstruct these 
economies such aid was not forthcoming (Mihalyi and Smolik, 1991; Haynes, 1992), and 
private capital in the form of foreign investment was accorded a central role in 
transforming post communist economies. 
From a personal standpoint, a first visit to Krakow, Poland in 1993 as part of the 
TEMPUS' programme revealed that there was a significant difference between the 
rhetoric and reality of the march to the market. It was evident that flows of foreign 
investment were going to play a critical role in the transformation process, however, the 
uncritical prognostications of the neoliberal economists failed to capture the complexities 
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and differential impacts of the arrival of foreign firms. It became clear that foreign 
investment was not unequivocally welcomed by Polish managers and workers, as some 
firms expressed a preference for a Polish brand of capitalism rather than one driven by 
fransnational corporations (TNCs). This was reflected in Wawel, a nationally renowned 
chocolate company in the region, rejecting overtures by large foreign confectionery firms 
and taking the worker-management buyout route to privatisation. In 1993 we held an 
interview with frade unionists from the ZPT Tobacco Company, where we were quizzed 
about the potential impacts of the proposed buyout by the giant Philip Morris TNC and 
the implications for jobs and working conditions. A year later once the investment had 
taken place the outcomes were mixed, and although wages rose to twenty per cent above 
the local average, the pace of and control over work intensified and social provision was 
reduced. Firms in some sectors (confectionery and tobacco) were regarded as the jewels 
in the crown and were snapped up quickly, while other firms and particularly those in 
heavy industry, proved to be much less attractive to foreign investors. 
In Krakow incoming foreign investment was accompanied by a plethora of institutions 
such as bilateral aid organisations, quangos and consultancies which flooded in to 
provide panaceas for restructuring. The Huta Sendzhimira steelworks had atfracted so 
much advice from the West that after one visit in 1994 we were summoned to a meeting 
by the Department of Employment who were trying to rationalise the bewildering influx 
of advisors, many of whom were UK based. 
Research into these three workplaces, the ZPT Tobacco company, the Wawel chocolate 
factory and the Huta Sendzhimira steel plant in the Krakow region, (Hardy and Rainnie, 
1996) provided the stimulus for this study. The overall conclusion was that the 
negotiation and impacts of foreign investment were both complex and contested, and that 
the transformation process was unfolding in ways that departed from the blueprints of 
policy advisors who had not set foot outside the Ministries in Warsaw. The broad aim of 
this thesis is to examine the process of the reintegration of localities in C E E with the 
international economy through foreign investment in general, and TNCs in particular. 
The focus of the research is on the relationships and interplay between incoming foreign 
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firms, the corporate sfrategy of individual companies and the role of institutions and 
actors in cooperating with, mediating or contesting these processes. 
These relationships raise important issues for the ongoing transformation process and 
restructuring of local economies in CEE. In the context of one of the world's most daring 
experiments, 'the construction of capitalism on the apparent deathbed of communism' 
(Smith, 1998:1) there has been no shortage of advice offered, with policy makers, 
academics, the business community and consultants falling over themselves to offer their 
particular recipe for transformation. Twelve years later what most people agree is that 
transformation has been much more costly, complex and uneven (Jackson, 1992; 
Gomulka, 1993; Fortes, 1994; Haynes, 1996; Nuti, 1996) than was anticipated at the 
beginning of the process. While the social engineering of capitalism, underpinned by 
unfettered market forces, has dominated prescriptions at a national level, millions of 
pounds from the World Bank, E U and bilateral initiatives have provided the finance to 
search for an institutional fix at a local level. Sayer urges us to examine social innovation 
'within processes of structuration, not as processes of contagion' (2000:152). These 
cautionary comments underline the necessity for providing an analytical framework and 
empirical research that goes beyond both the rhetoric of uncritical accounts of foreign 
investment and beyond advocating the fransfer of models deemed to be successfiil in 
other institutional settings, which may be unsuitable for rebuilding the economies of and 
governance in regions in GEE. 
1.1.2 The Wroclaw region 
Rather than the study of a regional economy, the region in question should be regarded as 
a discrete area in which we can examine the complex interplay of foreign investment, 
locality, institutions and transformation. In this way an empirical examination of the 
social, institutional, cultural and political embeddedness of firms in localities facilitates a 
discussion about the role of foreign investment in determining the possibilities for, or 
constraints on development. Focusing on this spatial level, therefore, allows the study of 
communities in the context of real history, and in their cultural and political setting. 
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The region which is the focus of the empirical work is Wroclaw, which is located in 
Lower Silesia in the South West of Poland (Figure 1.1), and was one of 42 voivodships 
(approximately equivalent to English counties) .^ In the context of marked regional 
disparities and uneven transformation (OECD, 1998) this area is regarded as relatively 
successfiil along with other areas of Poland such as Gdansk, Poznan and Krakow. 
These regions have already demonstrated the highest potential for restructuring and 
relatively quick adaptation to the new conditions (Gorzelak, 1996 and 1998). It has been 
suggested that these regions are the leaders of Polish transformation with relatively low 
unemployment, a well educated labour force and developed infrastructure, and a 
concentration of Polish scientific and academic potential. In these regions privatisation 
processes are the most progressed, the inflow of foreign capital greatest and the growth of 
the service sector fastest. Gorzelak (1996) points to a central European boomerang 
delimited by the following areas: Gdansk-Poznan-Wroclaw-Prague-Bmo-
Bratislava^ienna Budapest with the eastern wall becoming the dead end of Central 
Europe (OECD, 1998; Gartecki, 1998). The size, capital city status and cost of living 
ruled out Warsaw as the empirical focus of study and areas such as Krakow and Gdansk 
had aheady been the subject of scholarly activity by Western academics. Transformation 
in the Wroclaw region had not been the focus of studies by non-Polish scholars, and an 
initial interview in 1994 with local actors in the voivodship suggested a rich economic 
and institutional setting in which to examine foreign investment, institutions and locality. 
Unlike the monoculture which dominated many Polish cities and towns, Wroclaw had a 
diverse economic structure. Under Stalinist economic planning in the 1950s and 1960s 
the economy had moved into the production of white goods, food processing and light 
engineering. Among the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) which dominated the economic 
and physical landscape in 1990 were a number of firms regarded as national icons such as 
Pafawag (frains), Jelcz (trucks and buses) and Polar (white goods), whose privatisation 
was important politically and economically for the locality. The presence of an increasing 
number of flagship foreign investors such as Volvo, ABB and Cadbury also provided 
potential case study material to interrogate the corporate sfrategy of individual firms. 
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Figure 1.1 Map of Polish voivodship from 1975 to December 1998 
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fristitutionally Wroclaw was a tabula rasa in 1948 onto which Stalinisation could be 
easily grafted. Formerly, Breslau, the local community was fragmented with a mosaic of 
traditions and cultures which had resulted from the largest depopulation and repopulation 
in European history following World War H. As a result of the Potsdam agreement, 
Breslau was ceded to Poland and the entire German population left or were expelled from 
the city. Renamed Wroclaw the city was repopulated and settled by people from the 
eastern part of Poland, which had been ceded to Ukraine. Some networks of local elites 
and institutions such as the university arrived from Lvov, while other settlers arrived 
from small towns and villages in cenfral Poland driven by poverty and the draw of fresh 
opportunities in the 'new city'. In this sense we can understand the political and 
economic processes of restructuring as Wroclaw's 'second great transformation'. 
The next section shows the intellectual journey from broad research aims, to a more 
specific focus and the evolution of an analytical framework in which to examine the 
emergent research questions. 
1.2 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND P R O J E C T FORMULATION 
The original aim of the study was to engage with three sets of claims that had been 
advanced to support optimistic accounts of foreign investment in CE E . The first set of 
arguments emanated from the conventional literature which pointed to foreign investment 
as 'the engine of growth' (Lipton and Sachs, 1990) in post-communist economies. This 
claim was premised on the argument that, not only would foreign investment bring a vital 
injection of capital to economies where domestic individual and institutional savings 
were low, but also that there would be an automatic transfer of technical and managerial 
know-how to firms. Further, neoliberal accounts point to the role of FDI in bringing 
about a competitive stimulus that would force all firms to restructure both their 
management and production activities according to some sort of Darwinian survival of 
the fittest process. In Poland, as in other countries, FDI has acquired hegemonic status in 
many regional and local development sfrategies (Hudson, 1995; Phelps, 1997). 
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A second set of arguments supporting the increased potential of FDI for local 
development related to claims that new corporate dynamics have led to the emergence of 
qualitatively new and essentially superior forms of manufacturing investment by TNCs in 
Less Developed Regions (Amin et al, 1994; Fynes and Ennis, 1997; Rugman and 
D'Cruz, 1997). Such quality investments were seen as the product of a number of 
organisational changes, which included increased autonomy for firms, a shift from 
defensive strategies related to cost to offensive sfrategies associated with asset and 
knowledge seeking in the locality and the need for aftercare. This is linked to the post-
Fordist literature which suggested that the deverticalisation of large firms towards 
production characterised by 'flexible specialisation' had led to new and potentially more 
embedded reconfigurations of large firms and SMEs (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel, 1988; 
Sabel, 1994). 
Third, more recently attention has turned to the locality as an important source of 
competitive advantage for firms (Cooke and Morgan, 1994 and 1998; Scott, 1995), where 
firms could access external economies of scale through clustering (Porter, 1994; 
Krugman, 1995). Strong claims have been made that geographical proximity allows firms 
to access tacit knowledge from local networks that are cenfral to competitive advantage 
in a global economy, where knowledge is increasingly ubiquitous and codified (Maskell 
and Malmberg, 1999a and 1999b). The concept of institutional thickness (Amin and 
Thrift, 1995a) is used to describe governance in localities where a coherent and 
consensual alliance of formal institutions cemented by informal codes of practice is 
present. In the context of this debate, such a constellation of institutions is held to offer 
better possibilities for attracting and retaining foreign investors. In the face of increasing 
tendencies towards globalisation reflected in the powerfiil networks of large corporations 
implementing foreign investment decisions that are not 'regionally friendly', Amin and 
Thrift suggest setting up 'networks of intermediate institutions in between the market and 
the state to act as a counter to such decisions' (1995c:50). According to Amin (1999), 
however, less favoured regions (LFRs) (into which category we could place the 
transforming regions of CEE) face a different challenge in (re)constructing the social 
capital in which the benefits of foreign investment could be harnessed. For these regions 
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social capital has been damaged or distorted by two decades of crisis and economic 
decline, state dependency and elite domination, making the construction of an appropriate 
system of local governance a daunting challenge. Hausner et al (1997) describe the 
situation of regions in Poland in 1990 as one of a systemic vacuum (ibid: 191) and sees 
the creation of a stable group of economic and political agents capable of driving the 
reconstruction of the economy and local governance as a precondition for local economic 
development. Put another way it has been argued that emerging market forces need to be 
embedded in appropriate non-market institutions, to resolve the contradiction of 
globalisation and development of localities in C E E (Jessop, 1995a). 
With these concerns in mind initial interviews took place with managers and workers in 
thirteen flagship foreign investments and with a range of local actors and agents of 
change such as officials in the voivodship, development agencies, frade unions and 
consultants (see Appendices 1 and 2). The main conclusion to emerge was that the 
economic impact of firms had been modest in terms of employment and supply linkages, 
but their effect in terms of shifting collective understandings about economic behaviour 
within individual firms and the Wroclaw locality as a whole was substantial. Institutions 
that carried over from the previous regime in terms of expectations about business 
behaviour, managerial legacies, habits of employment, attitudes to redundancy and social 
provision were viewed by foreign investors as a particular way of thinking that needed to 
be circumvented or dismantled and replaced with a set of ideas and assumptions more 
appropriate to a market economy. 
This preliminary field work led to a refining of the research focus to try and examine the 
wider role of foreign investment in the locality and the workplace by posing the 
following set of interrelated questions. 
To what extent have past legacies and institutions influenced the process of 
transformation in the locality and led to the development of hybrid organisational 
forms and recombined social capital? 
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How far has foreign investment contributed to a process of cumulative causation in 
the locality, and to what extent has this gone beyond economic indicators to produce 
a shift in collective understandings and behaviour? 
Who have been the primary 'path shapers' and what are the key networks in which 
they are embedded? 
- How far has the process of cumulative causation been one of cooperation or 
contestation between 'imported' and 'existing' institutions? 
To what extent does the corporate sfrategy of incoming foreign investors affect their 
economic and institutional embeddedness in the locality? 
- How far do the cultural and cognitive processes embedded in the firm influence the 
extent and ways in which old institutions have been dismantled and new institutions 
instilled? 
Taken together these questions extend and deepen the focus on the role of foreign 
investment from concerns with economic impacts that have dominated conventional 
approaches, to viewing incoming firms as 'institution benders' in the sense that they 
influence the nature of formal institutions in the wider locality, as well as shifting 
informal understandings about the conduct of economic behaviour within firms. 
The fieldwork was divided into two parts. First, the research focused on thirteen flagship 
investments in the region to investigate why and how firms had arrived and the 
relationship between these factors and the impact of incoming foreign firms on the 
locality. These thirteen firms comprised all but two of the major foreign investments 
(outside of retailing) in Wroclaw in 2000, only Coca Cola (US) and Alfa Lavel (Sweden) 
declined to participate in the research. Interviews took place with at least one manager in 
the Wroclaw firms. To gain fuller answers to questions, where possible more than one 
interview took place in each firm. Interviews with senior managers from the parent 
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company in the UK in the cases of BOC, Cadbury and Tesco were invaluable in giving a 
deeper understanding of the corporate strategy and intemationalisation process from 
higher echelons of the organisation (see Appendix 2 for a complete list of interviewees). 
Interviews were based on the semi-structured schedule given in Appendix 3 and generally 
lasted between one and one and a half hours. 
The second part of the fieldwork examined two case study firms, ABB and Volvo, which 
provided in-depth material to examine the way in which corporate culture and cognitive 
processes are used to help firms cross national boundaries and inculcate behaviours 
appropriate to a market economy. These firms were selected for two reasons. First, they 
provided contrasting examples of sfrategies for restructiuing and operating in a new 
institutional setting. Second, in both organisations I was able to get access to all of the 
key senior and middle managers, as well as some limited access to frade union 
representatives and workers. Therefore while the first set of interviews in thirteen 
companies gave a broad overview of institution bending, the case study firms facilitated a 
deeper and richer investigation of these processes. 
Alongside these two stages interviews were carried out in three large and politically and 
economically important former SOEs in the locaUty, where access was initially gained 
through the Solidarity trade union (see next section). This provided insights into the role 
of foreign investment, either by its presence or absence, in organisations that had a high 
profile in the locality. These firms were deeply embedded as providers of employment 
and welfare provision, and as the base of important networks of actors, the nomenklatura 
and trade unions, which had been powerfiil in the previous decade. 
Interviews were also carried out with a wide range of agents of change in institutions 
such as local government, business organisations, frade unions, embassies and 
consuhancies. 
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Carrying out research in economies in transformation in the mid to late 1990s was not 
always straightforward and posed some specific problems and issues which are discussed 
in the next section. 
1.3 RESEARCHING ECONOMIES IN TRANSFORMATION 
There were issues which needed to be addressed in carrying out international research 
(Oyen, 1990) in general, and in CEE in particular, relating to gaining access to and 
gathering empirical data from firms and institutions. Initial attempts to begin research in 
Krakow in 1993 were based on incorrect assumptions about gaining access to 
organisations which almost led to the project being aborted. Initial overtures in the form 
of phone calls to managers of SOEs had met with negative responses ranging from 
indifference to hostility. A second attempt to gain entry through Solidarity yielded 
unexpected positive results. Not only were we able to conduct long interviews with 
Solidarity and their members on the shop floor, but in addition they were able to organise 
interviews with managers who had previously refiised. Our initial mistake in trying to 
gain access emanated from a complete lack of understanding about the passive function 
of management in SOEs and the specific role played by Solidarity and Workers Coimcils. 
The lessons of the years researching in Krakow were applied in Wroclaw. An overview 
of the main FDIs in the region along with contact names was provided by a firm of 
Western consultants. Interviews were then arranged either directly, or through the partner 
companies (many of which were in the UK). Solidarity opened up access to the two SOEs 
in which they were playing a key role in organisational restructuring. Access to regional 
officials and local actors were established through contacts made in the Wroclaw 
Academy of Economics and the University of Wroclaw. Previous experience suggested 
that most academics had a second (if not third) salaried job to supplement their low pay 
in higher education, and they were therefore often firmly linked into networks of firms 
and /or institutions of local governance. 
One major issue was the question of translation. Many of the interviews with both 
English and Polish managers were carried out in English. My Polish is rudimentary and 
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confined to a handfiil of pleasantries. This is a matter of regret and a shortcoming in the 
work, but resulted fi-om carrying out fieldwork in several short intensive visits. Many 
people interviewed, particularly managers and academics, had a sound grasp of English. 
In interviews with Solidarity representatives, workers and officials in local government a 
translator was needed. More important than a grasp of the finer points of English a good 
translator needed some familiarity with the topics under discussion. The legacy of 
communism meant that language was in the process of being (re)constructed, particularly 
for whole range of practices that are connected with western management. For example, 
in past interviews in Krakow Human Resource Management had been understood by the 
interviewee as 'making people redundant' and total quality management as 'total 
control'. The translators were both excellent with a rich and nuanced grasp of EngUsh, 
however, I was aware that where long answers were given to questions an inevitable 
filtering took place, and information that may have seemed irrelevant discarded along the 
way. 
Access to and interviews in Polish firms were hard work for two reasons. First, the 
culture of fear, suspicion and a lack of transparency were still very present and there was 
reluctance by all managers of SOEs to give interviews. Direct requests usually brought a 
negative response and I learned to use circuitous routes that involved calling in favours or 
using social and political contacts of other interviewees. A fiirther reason for the 
reluctance of SOEs to give interviews was that they were usually in a precarious state as a 
result of one of three scenarios. I f they had no foreign investment it was likely they were 
struggling and facing competition in the market and did not want to reveal how badly 
they were doing. Or i f they were in the course of negotiating with a foreign investor the 
situation was politically sensitive and in the case of post foreign investment there were 
usually a raft of problems relating to restructuring or redundancies. 
Doing research between 1996 and 1999 was also compounded by the fact that attitudes 
towards West Europeans had become somewhat jaundiced since my first visit in 1993. In 
the initial stages of transformation academics and consultants fi-om the West were 
welcomed as people who had valuable skills and information to impart regarding 'jump 
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starting' a market economy. However, the reputation of consultants was tarnished by the 
flood of firms and individuals who arrived for the rich pickings of contracts in the early 
1990s, dispensing what was regarded as often useless, but always very expensive advice. 
Further, the vision that many Polish people held of transformation was one of a sort of 
Polish entrepreneurial small business capitalism. The reality of integration with the global 
economy has been perceived by some as big foreign companies taking over the 'jewels in 
the crown' (Sinn and Weidenreider, 1997). At a national level the fact that 60 per cent of 
formerly Polish banks are in the ownership of foreign banks has been extremely 
contentious. At a local level the invasion of foreign retailers over the last three years 
fighting for market share on Polish territory are seen as the culprits of the demise of small 
businesses. Disillusionment with the market is manifest in increased cynicism towards 
the economies of Western Europe, and has been reflected in, among other things, 
dwindling support for EU membership which fell fi-om 75 per cent of the population in 
1997 to just 50 per cent by January 2000. 
The next section looks at the conceptual framework and analytical tools that underpin the 
study. 
1.4 T H E O R E T I C A L FRAMEWORK: AN INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH 
The literature which offers the most coherent analytical fi-amework for addressing these 
research questions could broadly be described as institutionalist. MacLeod (2001) sees 
the 'institutionalist turn' in economic geography as dating firom the late 1970s onwards 
when the role of economic and political institutions were taken more seriously to explain 
regional decline and economic crisis. In the forefi-ont of incorporating institutionalist 
insights into geography have been Amin (1999) and Amin and Thrift (1995a and 1995b), 
while others have drawn on institutionalist thinking in their analysis of the transformation 
process (Hausner et al, 1995; Smith, 1998; Smith and Swain, 1998). 
Whereas institutionalism could be regarded as a 'turn' in economic geography this 
approach to economic change was immediately adopted by a significant body of 
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academics concerned with understanding and analysing unfolding processes, as 
previously planned economies moved towards giving freer rein to market forces. In 
contrast to approaches based on neoliberal ideas, evolutionary and institutionalist 
approaches were able to offer an explanation as to why transformation processes had 
produced unexpected outcomes (Murrell, 1993; Chavance and Magnin, 1997), 
organisational hybridicity (Stark, 1996a and 1996b; Grabber and Stark, 1997) and slow 
change rather than jump starting a market economy by importing and implanting a 
preordained set of ingredients of a hypothetical capitalist economy (Pickel, 1992). 
Although institutionalist analysis is high on the research agenda of the social sciences, 
there is no consensus about what is meant either by institutions or institutional analysis. 
These terms are now widely used, but with different conceptualisations (Hollingsworth, 
2000). Neither do institutionalist approaches provide an all embracing theory or a single 
general model (Hodgson, 1998a), rather 'complex phenomena are approached with a 
limited number of conmion concepts and specific theoretical tools' (ibid: 168). While 
different synthesies may bend towards one branch of social science such as economics or 
sociology, institutionalism is inherently an interdisciplinary approach that draws from 
political economy, socioeconomics, organisational behaviour and psychology. This 
approach offered the possibility of analysis at different spatial levels. 
The institutionalist approach moves from general ideas concerning human agency, institutions, 
and the evolutionary nature of economic processes to specific ideas and theories, related to 
specific economic institututions of types of economy. Accordingly, there are multiple levels, and 
types, of analysis. Nevertheless, the different levels must be linked together, (ibid: 168) 
Essentially the approach could be described as socioeconomic in that it emphasises 
reality outside of economic factors. What unites all versions of institutionalism is an 
eschewal of the assimiptions and framework of neoliberal economics with its emphasis 
on equilibrium and the rationality of individual economic agents, as a way of explaining 
economic change and behaviour. Rather, economic behaviour is seen as being embedded 
in complex networks of relationships, and markets rather than being exogenous, are seen 
as being actively shaped by institutions. Emphasis is given to formal institutions in 
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shaping economic change and history (Polanyi, 1944; Lazonick, 1991) and habits, 
routines and imderstandings are seen as central to shaping individual and collective 
attitudes (Veblen, 1899; Hodgson, 1988). 
Therefore formal organisations and official institutions such as the legal system all serve 
to impose social coherence on human activity. Behavioural habits and institutional 
structures are mutually reinforcing in a process of cumulative causation (Myrdal, 1957). 
In reviewing Veblen's contribution, Hodgson (1998b) and Rutherford (1998) suggest that 
the evolutionary paradigm provides the basis for encapsulating historical continuity and 
change, and inertia and novelty, where learning is part of a tiansformative and 
reconstitutive process involving the creation of new habits and propensities. Nielsen et al 
(1995) cast the problem of structure and strategic action in the context of transformation 
in terms of path contingency and path shapers. Path contingency comprises past legacies 
and formal institutions which fi-ame the repertoire of possibilities in which economic 
agents can actively shape social and economic activity. 
The framework developed in this thesis aims to build on current institutionalist accoimts 
(Hausner et al, 1995; Smith, 1998; Smith and Swain, 1998), and evolutionary accounts 
(Pickel, 1992; Murrell, 1993; Chavance and Magnin, 1997; Grabber and Stark; 1997) of 
transformation processes. However, the aim is to enrich and deepen these accounts by 
drawing on the American institutionalist literature which has its origins in the old 
institutionalism and can be traced back to Veblen (op.cit), and contemporary writers in 
the same tradition such as Dugger (1989 and 2000) and Waller (1989), and the new 
institutionalism in organisational analysis (NIOA) approach (Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991; Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). Taken together they add two important insights. The 
first addresses a criticism of 'soft institutionalism' levelled by MacLeod (2001) for 
'telescoping onto non exploitative horizontal relationships of networking and reciprocity 
within particular localities' (ibid: 1153) by placing concerns regarding asymmetrical 
power as central to an analysis of institutions. Furthermore, these approaches are 
concerned with the normative content of informal institutions, which it is argued have to 
be understood in the context of perpetuating and stabilising a particular set of ideas to 
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encourage the belief that certain social and economic arrangements are self evident. 
Following the rejection of a harmony of interests in favour of an account that has power 
at its apex, the thesis emphasises the role of foreign investment as institution bending. It 
is argued that TNCs have the capacity to instil a set of behaviours and beliefs through 
'enabling myths' (Dugger, 2000) at all levels of spatial analysis from global down to the 
level of the individual workplace 
The second lacuna addressed, is to provide the analytical tools for an elaboration of the 
nature of embeddedness of the firm. The NIOA approach invites a much richer accoimt 
of the social and political structure of firms with their emphasis on organisational change 
and internal reorganisation. They suggest that while political economy approaches 
recognise the existence of differentiated stakeholders and fractured interests within firms, 
there is little discussion as to how firms achieve hegemony internally. They argue that the 
corporate strategy of firms is not homogenous but that they pursue a variety of 
mechanisms, both deliberate and implicit, which may meet with either contestation or co-
operation. This wi l l have important implications for the nature and form of 
embeddedness of firms in localities. 
1.5 T H E S T R U C T U R E O F T H E THESIS 
This chapter has identified the primary aim of the study as being to examine the 
relationship between foreign investment, institutions and locality from an institutionalist 
perspective. The empirical focus is the Wroclaw regional economy, regarded as a 
relatively well-progressed example of fransformation in the context of Poland. Broadly, 
this perspective attempts to go beyond conventional accounts that have focused on fairly 
narrow economic impacts to look at the role of incoming firms in influencing formal 
institutions and collective understanding about economic behaviour in economies in 
transformation. 
Chapter Two contextualises the debate about foreign investment and locality by 
reviewing the main theories that have been advanced to examine the transformation 
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process of previously planned economies. It begins by examining theoretical approaches 
to transformation, which could broadly be described as constructivist in terms of 
advocating the transfer of economic models of development, in particular either idealised 
versions of market economies or the state led industrialisation models of South East Asia. 
The ways in which the transformation process has unfolded in ways that are uneven, 
unexpected and unintended, have left the door open for non-teleological accounts based 
on institutionalist or evolutionary thinking. It is argued that the main strength of the 
evolutionary perspective is that it is able to map how and why social change has been 
incremental and divergent as a result of deeply inherited economic and social 
relationships and historical legacies. 
However, there are several shortcomings in this approach which centres on endogenous 
processes to the exclusion of the wider institutional, economic and political framework in 
which they unfold. Further, while this school of thought advocates the saliency of 
informal institutions in economic processes, asymmetrical power and differentiated 
interests are largely eviscerated from their accounts. The alternative framework 
developed in Chapter Two comprises three interrelated sets of concepts. First, the notion 
of path contingency and path shapers captures the relationship between structure and 
strategic action and frames the repertoire of possibilities in which agents make active 
choices and in turn shape fixture paths. Second, the framework draws on socioeconomics, 
which emphasises the socially embedded nature of social and economic change, and the 
importance of informal conventions in bridgmg the gap between agency and structure, 
and historical continuity and change. The persistence of informal institutions and mental 
residues from the previous regime are cenfral to understanding why the entry and impact 
of foreign investment has been both complex and contested. Third, institutions are not 
seen as neutral constructs and the importance and role of enabling myths and circuits of 
intellectual capital are examined. The importance of enabling myths, as special 
institutions and habits of thought, are identified as a way of shifting 'inappropriate' ways 
of thinking and instilling and maintaining new conventions to maintain particular 
interests. The notion of a transnational capitalist class to transfer and diffiise a particular 
set of understandings with regard to businesses is elaborated. 
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Chapter Three focuses on theorising the embeddededness of firms in general, and foreign 
investment in particular. The impact of incoming firms wil l depend on quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of their linkages in the locality. In line with radical institutionalist 
thinking, it is argued that institutional and organisational variables produce a range of 
different outcomes, as firms are part of a complex web of relationships at different spatial 
levels. The approach developed here is to rescue the analysis of the firm from 
undersocialised accounts. In line with the NIOA approach, a point of departure is to 
introduce the notion of institutions serving to maintain asymmetrical power and 
differentiated interests. In line with radical institutionalist thinking, negotiations about 
entry and establishing production and restructuring workplaces are seen as potentially 
conflictual and contested rather than consensual. Central to this process is the way in 
which incoming firms need a set of formal and informal arrangements to operate and 
become competitive in different institutional settings as they cross national boimdaries. 
Therefore concerns go beyond studying the economic impacts of the firm to examine 
their 'institution bending' effects. 
Rather than seeing economic and non-economic factors as dichotomous, a taxonomy is 
presented which analyses influences on embeddedness in four groups of factors: 
structural, cognitive, cultural and institutional. Far from being hermetically sealed 
categories these groups of influences are all interrelated, however the taxonomy 
presented provides a usefitl device for exploring recent theoretical and empirical 
literature on firms and organisations. 
The focus of Chapter Four is the relationship between institutions and the Wroclaw 
regional economy. The two previous chapters have argued that the impact of foreign 
investment in terms of its embeddedness in socioeconomic relations wi l l be strongly 
influenced by the nature of governance in the locality. Sfrong claims have been made for 
the resurgence of regional economies as the locality becomes an important source of 
competitiveness for firms. However, in 1990 the regions of CEE were simply local 
organs of national government. The first part of the chapter looks at the process of 
27 
reinventing and reconstructing governance in the Wroclaw regional economy. It 
examines the emerging base of formal institutions, but looks at barriers to constructing 
coherence, congruity in the context of enduring networks that are carried over from the 
past, and emerging new interests. The second part of the chapter focuses on path shapers, 
those agents of change who are forging the new institutional landscape. First, the 
nomenklatura is seen as having reorganised social capital in local power bases such as 
SOEs and local government to influence the restructuring of the economy. Second, this 
account identifies Solidarity and organised workers as a potentially powerfiil group, for 
cooperating with or contesting change, particularly in some of the larger firms with 
traditions of worker participation. Finally imported institutions from western Europe and 
America have been influential in terms of infroducing new ways of thinking about 
economic behaviour in the workplace and the wider locality thought to be consistent with 
the demands of the market. 
Chapter Five interrogates the concepts of structural and institutional embeddedness in 
relation to foreign investment in the Wroclaw regional economy. The empirical work is 
based on thirteen interviews with managers in flagship incoming investments drawn from 
sectors predominant in national patterns of foreign investment. The nature of competition 
and motives for locating are explored and related to the impact of the investments on the 
labour market, supply linkages, technology transfer and competition effects. The second 
part of the chapter takes as its starting point firms as being reflexive and political in 
crossing national boundaries and locating in new institutional set-ups. The nature of the 
relationship between firms, institutions and actors at various spatial levels is explored to 
examine the implications for embeddedness in the region. The final part of the chapter 
focuses on the specific embeddedness of SOEs in CEE, as distinct from firms in the 
established market economies. The focus of the empirical work is the case study of Polar, 
a white goods producer and flagship Polish company, where fiiction between the old 
legacies and new conditions are explored to explain the specific outcomes of the 
restructuring process. In particular, the critical role of the Solidarity trade union in 
tempering the pace and substance of change is central to the argument. 
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Chapter Six continues the theme of the previous chapter by looking at the role of firms as 
'institution bending'. However, the aim is to provide a richer account of how firms 
establish hegemony in the workplace through an exploration of cultural and cognitive 
embeddedness. These aspects of embeddedness look at how firms attempt to shift 
organisational trajectories and collective understandings in the workplace, as well as 
attempting to access tacit knowledge through cognitive processes. The empirical material 
is drawn fi-om two case study firms, Volvo and ABB, that exhibit contrasting example of 
strategies for disembedding old (inappropriate) legacies and instilling new (appropriate) 
understandings and work practices compatible with Western competitive practices. The 
second part of the chapter teases out the implications of influences on cultural and 
cognitive embeddedness in terms of technological upgrading, labour market impacts and 
competition effects. 
Finally, Chapter Seven reflects on the main themes of the radical institutionalist analysis 
and embeddedness of firms developed in Chapter Two. The notions of path contingency, 
path shapers and cumulative causation, enabling myths and circuits of intellectual capital 
and the differential effects of cumulative change are revisited in the light of the findings 
of the empirical work. 
We now turn to examining the competing theoretical frameworks which have dominated 
the analysis of and policy formulation for transforming economies. 
ENDNOTES 
1 TEMPUS, an abbreviation for Trans European Mobility Programme for University Studies, 
was an adaptation of the ERASMUS programme. It financed exchanges between academics 
from Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe from the early to the mid 1990s. 
2 Regional government between 1975 and December 1998 was organised on the basis of 42 
voivodships. These arrangements were changed in January 1999 with the number of 
voivodships reduced to twelve much larger regional units to conform to E U NUTS regions. 
Dolnoslaskie includes the former voivodships of Wroclaw, Walbrzych, Legnica and Jelenia 
Gora. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PARADIGMS AND PANACEAS: THEORISING 
TRANSFORMATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to contextualise the debate about foreign investment and 
locality by reviewing the main theories advanced to analyse the transformation process in 
the previously planned economies of CEE. The first part of the chapter examines the 
contribution of neoliberal, state-led industrialisation and evolutionary schools of thought 
that have dominated academic debate and policy prescriptions on the restructuring of 
post-communist economies. In reviewing these approaches it is argued that while 
evolutionary theories in particular contribute to an understanding of economic change in 
previously plarmed economies, they only provide a partial framework. The second part of 
the chapter draws on various sfrands of institutionalist thinking to elaborate analytical 
tools and concepts with which to understand the process of transformation and the role of 
incoming foreign investment. In particular, the account emphasises the historical 
contingency of change, the importance of informal institutions and differentiated interests 
in economic processes. 
2.2 T H E O R E T I C A L APPROACHES TO TRANSFORMATION 
2.2.1 Capitalism by design 
Two schools of thought have advocated a constructivist path to transformation. 
Constructivist approaches can be understood as those that posit particular forms of 
economic organisation as blueprints which can be transferred to other economies. While 
the neoliberal approach has advanced the market as a mechanism for restructuring and 
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transformation, others have advocated state-led industrialisation based on the experience 
of South East Asia as a developmental path for post plarmed economies. 
The neoliberal project 
Prescriptions for transformation in Poland, in the initial stages at least, were underpinned 
by neoliberal ideas and a completely uncritical faith in the properties of the free market. 
This was translated at a policy level into the Balcerowicz programme (January 1990), 
which comprised a dose of draconian deflationary IMF policies and rapid liberalisation 
aimed at creating the conditions for the emergence of competitive markets (Blanchard et 
al, 1991). Shock therapy was justified on the grounds that the cure for the disease of the 
economic sclerosis of the previous regime required drastic and painfiil surgery (Lipton 
and Sachs, 1990; Komai 1990a and 1990b; Brada 1993; Lloyd, 1996). Lipton and Sachs 
(ibid) wrote the seminal article summarising the neoliberal position, which argued that 
the goal of reforms was to produce an economic system comparable to those in Western 
Europe. The legacy of institutions in CEE was viewed as a problem that had to be 
sidestepped and circumvented to ensure that existing structures and interests could not 
derail the reforms. The infroduction of a market system was seen mainly in terms of the 
destructive dismantling of the old, after which technocratic solutions would be fairly easy 
to implement to fill the gap. 
Therefore the neoliberal school advocated little less than the complete reconstruction of 
economic arrangements with top down policy. In other words an attempt to jump start a 
market would involve measures which were intended to free up entrepreneurship, abolish 
barriers to entry and exit to the market, and abolish central price controls, with 
privatisation lying at the core of the policy (Pickel, 1992). History and society were 
viewed as being impediments to the design of the fransformation agenda, and at best of 
secondary importance. Thus the 'economists consensus' advocated a package of policies, 
which could be transferred unproblematically from the very varied experiences and 
institutional set-ups in developed and developing countries (Gowan, 1995; Kozul-Wright 
and Rayment, 1997). 
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Restructiiring was therefore to be accomplished by the market and the task of policy 
makers was to ensure that the necessary conditions for the efficient allocation of 
resources existed. Thus the priority was to set the framework for the pursuit of 
equilibrium and getting the price right. The emphasis on immediacy, comprehensiveness 
and simultaneity was also intended to side step and replace the old (inefficient) 
institutions and to undercut the power of insiders, both workers and the nomenklatura 
(Lipton and Sachs op.cit; Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994). The role of the government 
was to be confined to that of providing the physical and institutional infrastructure of a 
market economy. Komai (1990a: 38) argued that 'unambiguous and emphatic statutory 
force should be given to the principle that the private sector has unrestricted scope in the 
economy'. 
The neoliberal approach emanated from the view that the market and market economies 
are some sort of self evident and natural mechanism from which societies can only 
deviate for a short time and at their peril. Komai (ibid) in advocating a free market 
approach suggests that units of the private sector needed no stimulation, agitation or 
direction to act along the lines of the market, as this was their natiu-al mode of existence. 
The intervention of the state in the process of transformation was deemed to be 
appropriate only in cases of market failure. Past experience of'excessive' state 
intervention dictated that enterprises should be largely left the task of reorganising their 
own activities and active industrial policy was rejected (Gomulka 1992). Lipton and 
Sachs (op.cit) were even more emphatic suggesting that the legacy of communist 
bureaucracy made the state incapable of intervening even in cases of market failure, 
where economic theory suggested a more nuanced policy. In their view existing 
institutions and structures must then be either sidestepped or circumvented, i f not 
abolished altogether, because 
...the existing bureaucracy as equipped, professionally or temperamentally cannot be relied upon 
to implement sophisticated policies, based on Western style theories of welfare economics of the 
second-best (Lipton and Sachs 1990: 88). 
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In the neoliberal analysis economic laws are seen universal and well understood, as are 
the ingredients of a successful economy, namely that they are based on the free market, 
unambiguous property rights, underpiimed by theorems of welfare economics, and the 
unassailable relationship between competition and static efficiency. In this context it is 
suggested that new institutions and laws can be transferred unproblematically from one 
domain to another. 
The state-led industrialisation model 
There is a second school of thought which has put forward a transferable developmental 
strategy in CEE that can broadly be described as state-led industrialisation and includes 
Lo (1995), Chang (1995), Henderson (1998) and Kozul-Wright and Rayment (1997) but 
finds its clearest expression in the work of Amsden et al (1994). Amsden et al argued 
that the activities and prescriptions of the Bretton Woods institutions, such as the World 
Bank and the IMF, allied to a mistaken commitment to the free market based on 
simphstic eighteenth century liberalism have been little short of disastrous in places such 
as Poland. They conclude that this was quite simply the 'wrong capitalist model' (ibid: 
4). The aim of the institutionalist approach is to encourage the development of a 
'Western-style corporatist social order' (ibid: 209). Plarming has to reinvented and 
capitalism embedded into societies in which, it is argued, for decades it has been unable 
to fit. 
A l l of these writers draw on notions of 'late industrialisation' and in particular the 
experience of the East Asian NICs. Chang (op.cit) argues that these countries are not a 
special case and fiirther that the lessons of adopting a long term industrial strategy are not 
only desirable for, but also transferable to the economies of CEE. In the case of South 
Korea, the role of the state involved nurturing an effective domestic capitalist class, and 
compelling foreign capital to conform to a national development strategy, through 
appropriate ovmership, pricing, financial and exchange rate policies. Late 
industrialisation was held to involve a number of essential elements; firstly, that large 
firms were bred by deliberate government policy in order to compete internationally 
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against the oligopolies of industrialised countries; and secondly, that this process is 
mediated by the state, in particular by an autonomous bureaucracy embedded in the 
society at large. The outcome was semi-autarchic development, state driven, with a high 
degree of protection from international competition playing a pivotal role in restructuring. 
In the state-led industrialisation view, CEE comprised a series of separate and largely 
uncoordinated decision making arenas, with a mixture of departures from, and continuing 
features of, the previous system. Kozul-Wright and Rayment (op.cit) described this 
situation as an institutional hiatus between the old and the new regimes, and between 
transition and more advanced industrial economies. In this view, the lessons of late 
industrialisation are that backward economies can only instigate a catching up process i f 
such actions are mediated by the state and the institutions of an autonomous bureaucracy. 
State owned enterprises (SOEs), for example, could not be expected to restructure 
themselves unaided. Amsden et al (op.cit) argued that, for the economies of CEE, 
common sense dictated the following course of action; creating conditions under which 
viable state enterprises could self select themselves into growth; giving these state 
enterprises (as they turn into privately owned enterprises) adequate institutional support 
to generate saving, aid investment, and further technical advance; and empowering a 
government bureaucracy that could harmonise political democracy with the degree of 
economic governance that modem capitalism requires. On this reading, shock therapy 
may have had a role to play in signalling a shift in the trajectory of the economy, but it 
was entirely unsuited to the task of capitalist construction. This view argues that i f the 
economies of CEE had reinvented planning and put into place appropriate institutional 
structures, recognising the centrality of the state in any process of restructuring, then 
outcomes could have been different. 
The focus of both the neoliberal view and the state-led industrialisation approach were on 
transformation at a national level. The primacy accorded to macroeconomic stability by 
the neoliberal view meant that little or no attention was given to the increasing 
manifestation of regional inequalities. Neoliberal economics is devoid of history, 
institutions and place and the problem of regional disparities are seen only in terms of 
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market failure and rectified by 'getting the price' right. Their logic suggests that fiilly 
functioning markets wi l l allow wages to fall in peripheral areas, this wi l l attract mobile 
foreign investment which wil l augment comparative advantage leading to factor 
equalisation. Although the state-led industrialisation view is highly critical of the 
neoliberal agenda the focus of institution building is also at a national level. Both 
perspectives can therefore be regarded as constructivist in the sense that both their 
theoretical approaches and the prescriptions that flow from them are predicated on 
circumventing existing institutions and inserting new structures. Whether designer 
capitalism (Stark 1995) is instituted through laying the foundations of institutional 
structures for markets to do their job (neoliberal) or as a bulwark against the forces of 
international competition (state-led industrialisation) both of these views can be criticised 
for ignoring historical processes and realities. 
In both accounts incoming capital plays a central role in the transformation process. In 
the neoliberal view FDI is invested with talismanic powers (Dobosiewicz, 1992; Hunya, 
1992; Donges, 1992; Dunning, 1993; Hunya, 1992) and seen as the 'engine of growth' 
(Lipton and Sachs, 1990) and TNCs as agents of change. It was claimed that foreign 
investment would bring a vital injection of capital to economies where domestic and 
individual savings were low. Advanced technology was assumed to be forthcoming with 
the transfer of production and research and development activities, thereby diffusing 
technical and managerial know how and expertise throughout the wider economy. 
Further, neoliberal accounts point to the role of FDI in bringing about a competitive 
stimulus that wi l l force firms to restructure according to some sort of Darwinian survival 
of the fittest process. The state-led industrialisation view emphasises the role of managed 
and guided domestic investment and cautions against the illusion of automatic benefits 
from foreign investment. In this view governments should make a careful assessment of 
the costs of premature flows of FDI, which may result in the possibility of market 
domination and predatory behaviour where economic and social institutions are weak. 
Further, they point to the possibility of the capture of domestic policies by foreign 
companies which would undermine the objectives of competitive markets, fundamental 
to the transformation process (Kozul-Wright and Rayment, 1997). 
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2.2.2 Evolutionary approaches 
The process of transformation between and within countries unfolded much more 
unevenly and in ways that were unexpected and unintended (Ksiepolski, 1991 and 1992; 
Gora et al, 1993). This left the door open for non-teleological accounts of social change 
based on evolutionary accounts ' to explain why the move to the market diverged from 
the blueprints of the IMF and its advisors (Stark 1990, 1995 and 1996a; Pickel, 1992; 
Murrell, 1993). This perspective provides a critique of constructivist approaches in 
general, and the neoliberal analysis in particular, by suggesting that the focus on 
allocative efficiency and competition within a general equilibrium framework is 
misleading. The evolutionists are highly critical of the predictive and prescriptive 
capacity of economic theory for being reliant on a set of theoretical propositions known 
to be true only under highly stylised circumstances. Policy recommendations are thus 
oblivious to history and the specific local conditions in which these prescriptions are 
applied (Pickel, 1992). Offe (1995) suggests that fictitious notions of imitation and 
transplantation were posited that served to play down the differences that existed between 
sectors and countries, to create a deceptive clarity about some evidently and easily 
acceptable superior solution. Institutions from the West, he argues, 'were not invented in 
order to extricate an entire group of societies from state socialism and its ruins' (ibid: 57). 
The evolutionary perspective is comprised of two main sfrands; firstly, it is argued that 
the cenfre of attention should be on processes and mechanisms producing growth and 
change, focusing particularly on innovation at both the level of technology and 
institutions, rather than equilibrium processes. The main concern of the evolutionary 
school is how to reorganise the institutional and organisational structures of these 
economies such that their ability to respond to unpredictable changes in the environment 
is enhanced; and, secondly, that economic theorising should begin with a realistic 
description of economic agents. The evolutionary paradigm considers change on the one 
hand and some form of bounded rationality on the other as the main building blocks of 
economic analysis. Bounded rationality helps to explain that routinised behaviour is an 
37 
important determinant of the (dis)ability of an economic system to change, and path 
dependency determines the scope and incentives to change (Van Ees and Garretsen, 
1994). 
According to evolutionary thinking, the behaviour of economic agents is a product of 
both present and historical social processes. Reformers are criticised for taking as their 
starting point what they assume to be current economic incentives rather than taking 
account of the way that historical processes and past behaviour have shaped economic 
institutions and the response of economic agents. In the context of CEE Tsang refers to 
these informal collective understandings regarding economic behaviour as the 'impUcit 
contracts of socialism' (1996:184). Evolutionary thinking is highly critical of any notion 
of a blueprint of a market economy or of the market institutions which comprise it. They 
point to the irrelevance of text book economic theory when compared to the vividness 
and variety of arrangements present in functioning capitalist economies, where the 
institutional matrix produced is idiosyncratic and contingent (Murrell, 1993; Hodgson, 
1996). The evolutionary view suggests that although institutional homogenisation might 
foster adaptation in the short run, the consequent loss of institutional diversity wi l l 
impede adaptability in the long run. Limiting the search for effective institutions and 
organisational forms to the familiar Western tried and proven arrangements locks in post 
socialist economies to exploiting unknown territory at the cost of forgetting (or never 
learning) the skills of exploring new situations (Grabber and Stark, 1997). Offe suggests 
a solution of 'institutional gardening' (op.cit: 59) whereby rather than engineering social 
solutions, agents of change should draw from the rich crop of inherited institutional 
practices which ab"eady enjoy the allegiance of all relevant actors. 
In contrast to the neoliberal view which suggests that exploration is costly, inefficient and 
unnecessary, evolutionists argue that institutional legacies embody not only the 
persistence of the past but also resources for the future. According to the evolutionists 
organisations that learn too quickly sacrifice efficiency at the expense of exploration 
thereby locking themselves it is suboptimal routines and strategies (Grabber and Stark, 
op.cit.). In these recombinant emerging institutional forms it is envisaged, and indeed 
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desirable, that the new eUte of entrepreneurs wil l substantially overlap with the old 
nomenklatura (Levitas and Strzalkowski, 1990). Strong connections are seen between 
managerial and technocratic positions in the state sector and success in becoming 
entrepreneurs in post communism. In this view the legacy of the previous regime is that 
the former elite are well endowed to convert their cultural capital of education and 
training acquired in the old order to achieve prominent positions in the new. 
At a regional level the evolutionary argument begins from the premise that the proper 
analytic unit is not the isolated firm but networks that link firms and connect economic 
agents within them. As such, attention shifts from the strategies and motivations of 
individuals to the properties of localities and networks in which entrepreneurial activity is 
reproduced. The economic unit to be restructured is therefore not the isolated firm but 
networks of individuals. The emerging localised governance structure based on 
horizontal rather than hierarchical or market coordination can contribute to mobilise 
resources in the formation of entrepreneurial units. Evolutionists argue that local 
networks woven with ties of kinship and friendship can reduce the uncertainties of 
economic change. Thus institutional legacies produce the fiiction that grinds against 
smooth fransition but preserves diversity for fixture recombinant strategies, and legacies 
linkages and localities wi l l forge pathways from state socialism (Grabber and Stark 
1997). 
Evolutionary accounts have been associated with schools of thought that see a resurgence 
of regional economies, local networks and endogenous development processes owing 
their renewed importance to innovation, local linkages, local interfirm relationships and 
local exchanges of information. This stands in contrast to that school of thought which 
sees regional development as more sfrongly influenced by exogenous developments, 
where the possibilities of regional transformation are set in the context of changes in the 
global economy (Tickell and Peck, 1995). Therefore the evolutionary school argues that 
institutions should be allowed to emerge in a path dependent way and that this process 
wil l be slow and incremental. Essentially it is coricemed with the process of institutional 
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innovation and learning rather than end points or outcomes, which could be any number 
of configurations of state, market and networks. 
Van Zon (1992) and Hausner et al (1997) also draw on the evolufionary paradigm but 
differ in two ways from the conceptualisation of Grabber and Stark (op.cit.). Firstly, there 
is a more explicit acknowledgement of the imperatives of competition and global forces 
and the necessity of inserting the local into the global. Secondly, in common with 
Grabber and Stark (op.cit) their view is predicated on the assumption that the 
transformation of regions should emerge from below and that endogenous development is 
possible. However, Van Zon and Hausner suggest that policy makers cannot simply wait 
for these institutions to emerge or evolve, and therefore a more proactive approach to 
institution building is advocated. Van Zon argues that local systems of innovation are 
required to act as a counterweight to the devalorisation and deterioration of the scientific 
potential of CEE economies. Specifically the foundation of innovation centres, business 
incubators and technology parks are advocated in that these may bring about new modes 
of cooperation between local authorities, new entrepreneurs and universities. A regional 
innovation system is characterised as a flexible socioeconomic system with some 
coherence, exploiting distinctive traits, adjusting production processes and products to the 
local market and local specificities. Regional policy in his view should not primarily be 
aimed at attracting foreign capital, but exploiting endogenous development potential 
using local resources and characteristics. Foreign capital could be tapped by indigenous 
firms i f TNCs can be embedded in local networks. Therefore the importance of regional 
innovation policies over those initiated at a national level are that they can exploit 
diversity, in that the specificities of the region must be turned into assets in economic 
development. 
Hausner, et al (ibid) emphasise the notion of systemic vacuum, defined as the lack of a 
stable configuration of political and economic agents, at both a national and regional 
level. At the heart of the strategy is the notion of restructuring with the participation of 
the state approach where institutions are created which are complementary to the 
mechanism of the market and adminisfrative co-ordination while ensuring social control 
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over these mechanisms. The state should design, protect and stimulate certain institutions 
and local systems should be encouraged to take on the role of independent economic 
agents. Hausner et al (ibid) claim an observable correlation between the degree of 
advancement of restructuring processes at a regional level and the development of the 
relevant institutions in Poland. Therefore the task is to develop a coherent system of 
agents in regional restructuring at intermediate regional and local levels. The main 
strength of the evolutionary perspective's analysis of post-communist economic 
transformation is that it is able to map the way in which social change is incremental and 
divergent because of deeply structured inherited economic and social relations. I have, 
however, a number of concerns about this approach. 
The evolutionary paradigm provides a powerful attack on the neoliberal argument where 
markets are exogenous and institutions peripheral, however the difference between the 
two views should not be overstated. The end state, the particular combination of market 
and hierarchy, wi l l ultimately be determined by the market, with the most efficient 
institutions gradually emerging (Lo, 1993). This draws on Veblen's notion of 'blind drift' 
and the dynamic and contingent concept of process as a fundamental constituent of 
economic life (CuUenberg, 2000: 82). Therefore evolutionary thinking explicitly focuses 
on the process and is agnostic about the outcomes and endpoints (Klein, 1987). Murrell 
(1993) acknowledges that the divergence between the neoliberal analysis and the 
evolutionary approach is smaller than anticipated. The debate between the shock 
therapists and evolutionary perspective could be reduced to one in which the former 
emphasise the immediacy, speed and simultaneity of reform, and the latter ultimately 
argue for gradualism, seeing the seeds of change coming from within existing institutions 
and prepared to tolerate a wider number of configurations of state, firms and other 
economic agents. 
While acknowledging that institutions limit the field of action, precluding some 
directions and constraining certain courses, the evolutionists fail to provide a framework 
of analysis that offers any explanation of the constraints and limitations in which the 
economic processes in localities operate. According to Jessop (2001) institutions caimot 
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be meaningfiilly or productively analysed, without locating actors, identities, interests 
and strategies or tactics in a wider context. Exogenous pressures in the global economy 
and the importance of macroprocesses of political and economic power have been 
obscured in terms of their influence on the reinsertion of these regions into the global 
economy (Nielsen et al, 1995; PoUert, 1999). At the level of individual agents while there 
is an extensive evolutionary literature on rules, habits and routines to investigate the 
cognitive dynamics within firms stemming from the work of Nelson and Winter (1982), 
according to Lazaric (2000) this is divorced from the social and institutional foundation 
of individual behaviour inside organisations. Further there is a tendency to imderplay the 
role of agency and view individual actors as passive bearers of routines and norms, or 
'cultural dupes' as Jessop (2001: 1228) suggests. 
A related concern is the overuse of the notion, 'path dependency' (Grabber and Stark, 
op.cit.) which has a tendency towards determinism in underplaying political agency and 
choice. As Nielsen et al (1995) point out this biological metaphor implies lock-in to a 
stable path of development involving incremental change that tends to reestablish itself 
when diverted by strong positive feedbacks. Although leads and lags and reversals are not 
excluded they are nevertheless seen as pre-given possibilities, which detracts from the 
radical indeterminacy of behaviour and outcomes. History and conjunctural analysis 
matter but these are not synonymous with the notion of path dependency, which is now 
used widely in a range of social science literature. Divorced from its origins, which draw 
on biological metaphors, the concept is usually taken as a proxy, for what should be more 
accurately described as historical or path contingency. 
A final lacuna in the evolutionary thinking on fransformation is that although the focus on 
process indirectly addresses uneven development, there has been little interest in the 
outcomes of these processes and little concern regarding the differentiated impacts and 
inequalities manifest in the restructuring of these economies. In particular, power and 
hierarchy have been largely absent from these accounts which see economic change as 
consensual rather than contested or conflictual. The notion of friction, when it appears, is 
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conceived of in ambiguous and unspecified ways rather than in terms of vested interests 
by particular powerful social groups. 
The next section draws on evolutionary thinking in recognising that history matters and 
that current behaviour is profoundly influenced by past legacies. However, in addressing 
the concerns discussed in this section the main points of departure are to give greater 
weight to a recognition that the choices open to and made by economic agents are 
influenced by exogenous factors and that change may be less incremental than the 
biological metaphor suggests. The following section also attempts to take seriously the 
existence of unequal asymmetrical power in the evolution and maintenance of informal 
institutions. With these concerns in mind I wish to identify a set of concepts and 
analytical tools based on institutionalist thinking with which to analyse foreign 
investment in the locaUties of CEE. In line with Hodgson's (op.cit) argument that 
institutional analysis takes place at multiple levels which must be linked together, the 
foregoing account attempts to provide a framework in which to understand both the broad 
changes that set the limits and parameters for action and the microprocesses and 
relationships between institutions and actors which make outcomes indeterminate. 
2.3 A R A D I C A L INSTITUTIONALIST SYNTHESIS 
The approach developed in this section draws on sfrands of literature which can broadly 
be termed as institutionalist .^ The framework is underpinned by socioeconomic 
approaches (Granovetter, 1985, Smelser and Swedberg, 1994) and current institutionalist 
thought on transformation (Nielsen et al, 1995; Chavance and Magnin, 1997; Grabber 
and Stark, 1997) which emphasises the notion of path contingency. The point of 
departure is to draw on the old institutionahsts (Veblen, 1899; Myrdal, 1957) in general, 
and the American school in particular (Dugger, 1989, and 2000; Zukin and DiMaggio, 
1990; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Samuels, 1995). The old instihitionaUsm belongs to 
that social science fradition based on a strategy of seeing people as a product of culture, 
whereas the new institutionalism (Williamson, 1975; North, 1990) favour a view of 
people as 'rational choosers' (Mayhew, 1988). 
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The analytical framework developed here conforms most closely to what could be termed 
a radical institutionalist approach. Although this school of thought shares an analysis of 
economic change as processual with non-radical institutionalists, it is differentiated by 
concerns with the asymmetry of power and its perpetuation (Hall and Taylor, 1996; 
Klein, 1987) which are largely missing from the current European tradition. Further, 
radical institutionalists are concerned not only with the process, but the outcomes of 
economic change and activity. Although there are disagreements and differences in 
emphasis within the school, Dugger (1989) offers a shared definition of radical 
institutionalism as being; 
A processual paradigm focused on changing die direction of cultural evolution and changing the 
outcome of social provisioning in order to promote the full participation of all (ibid: 126). 
The following sections go on to elaborate the salient analytical tools which comprise the 
conceptual framework. 
2.3.1 Path contingency and path shapers 
Nielsen et al (1995) cast the problem of structure and sfrategic action in the context of 
ti-ansformation in terms of 'path dependency' and 'path shapers'. They suggest that 
institutional innovation can be represented as a continuum of possible conditions ranging 
from a voluntarist to a creationist pole. In the latter, those that emphasise the present to 
the exclusion of the past imply that agents have unbounded possibilities of intervening in 
current conditions and actively influencing them to forge new trajectories. An extreme 
version of path dependency suggests that institutional legacies of the past limit the range 
of current possibilities for institutional innovation. Models which draw on biology leave 
unexplained how a given path came to be locked into and whether this process occurred 
due to blind evolution, conscious intervention and/ or some other factor(s). 
A radical institutionalist analysis argues that history matters, in that past developments 
constrain the set of feasible current choices of possible frajectories. However, in confrast 
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to what is described as the 'snakes and ladders' approach of path dependency, the path 
shaping approach implies that, within specific, historically given, and potentially 
malleable limits, social forces can redesign the 'board' on which they are moving 
(Nielsen et al, op.cit.). However, this is not to suggest a simple dichotomy between 
structure and action, rather the framework here corresponds with Jessop's (2001) 
strategic-relational approach where institutions are 'recursively reproduced sets of rules 
and resources that both constrain and enable social action' (ibid: 1216). Therefore actors 
not only engage in action within a given institutional matrix, but in certain circumstances 
can 'reflexively reconstitute institutions and their resuhing matrix' (ibid: 1226). 
While capitalism is underpinned by specific and universal characteristics (Screpanti, 
1999; Meiksins Wood, 1997) individual capitalist systems, in their historical and national 
development, have all been characterised by a high degree of institutional and 
organisational diversity (Zysman, 1996; Boyer, 1995; Whitley; 1997 and 1998). Similarly 
the economies of CEE have exhibited a rich variety of different institutional matrices that 
depart from the models of designer capitalism (Stark, 1995) posited in the early days of 
transformation. Chavance and Magnin (1997) point out that post communist 
transformation has produced complex developments that cannot be reduced to market 
forces or blueprints of privatisation and emphasise the historical and path dependent 
character of systemic change. Thus specific and evolving configurations of post-
communist economies are characterised by their composite, combined or mixed features, 
which cannot be viewed as stageposts as the economy moves from one end point (the 
command economy) to another (the market economy). 
Chavance and Magnin (ibid) suggest that emerging structures in CEE are the result of 
both common trends and national specificities. Similarities shared by CEE economies, 
would include the move towards an emphasis on market forces and its discourses, the 
globalising frends of FDI and the influence of international organisations. However, 
communist economies were not homogenous with a single logic and there are important 
dissimilarities. First, there is diversity in the starting point and initial conditions of these 
economies in terms of the legacies of their industrial structures, the nature and depth of 
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the crisis that pertained in the late 1980s and the degree of integration with the West. A 
second dissimilarity relates to the 'path of extrication' (Altvater, 1998) taken by these 
economies in response to the economic stagnation that was apparent by the late 1960s 
(Maddison, 1991). Hungary, for example, instituted widespread and relatively successful 
market reforms in 1968 and became more integrated with West European economies, 
whereas Poland had two decades of disastrous economic reforms. The third factor 
influencing nationally specific paths of transformation after 1989, was the balance of 
political forces and the unique political and economic routes taken. In Poland, the central 
role of Solidarity in bringing about the demise of the previous regime and its massive 
popularity at the outset of fransformation gave the government a unique opportunity to 
implement a drastic set of reforms (Ost, 1989 and 92; Rainnie and Hardy, 1995). 
With regard to the potential impacts of foreign investment on locality in CEE the notion 
of path contingency is important in understanding the restructuring of firms and the 
importance of existing legacies. Stark (1990; 1996a and 1996b) looks at emerging new 
forms of property and corporate structures in the former state sector in Hungary and 
argues that a process of recombination has been evident in organisational innovation as a 
reconfiguration and rearrangement of existing institutional elements. The fransformation 
of property relations, for example, is a complex process characterised by a combination 
of the newly emerging private sector, incoming FDI and the privatisation and 
restructuring of SOEs to produce hybrid organisational structures (Bim et al, 1993; 
McDermott, 1997). These emerging structures were, therefore, infused with the old habits 
and routines of soft budget constraints, aversion to change, rent seeking and maintaining 
old networks of contacts with the national and local state (Winieckie, 1992). Despite the 
introduction of both formal and informal institutional change through foreign investment 
and Western management techniques deep structural characteristics in the economy and 
business such as continuities with the previous period have limited the scale and speed of 
corporate change (Czaban and Henderson, 1998; Czaban and Whitley, 1999). 
The notion of path contingency has been extended to localities (Van Zon, 1992; Grabber 
and Stark, 1997; Hausner et al, 1997) who argue that local specificities should be built 
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upon to ensure embedded and adaptive economies. Grabber and Stark argue that in the 
dominant view localities are irrelevant in constructing strategies, because the focus has 
been either on the individual firm or policies at a national level regarding monetary 
policy, legal frameworks, or regulatory institutions. 'Place, the problem of localities, is 
out of place in this perspective' (ibid: 540). It is argued that globalisation does not 
displace the properties of localities but makes them all the more salient. Greater market 
volatility shifts stiategic action from economies of scale to economies of scope, and in 
this context local knowledge, local culture and local networks give shape to new 
organisational forms of flexible specialization. 
2.3.2 Socioeconomics and informal institutions 
A cenfral tenet of the old institutionalist analysis is that it is highly critical of that large 
part of social reality which is left outside economic analysis by the abstraction from 
'non-economic factors'. While Marx and Weber produced the first sociological studies of 
society, the origins of socioeconomics draws its fradition from Karl Polanyi (1944) in 
emphasising the institutionally embedded nature of social change. According to Polyani, 
economic action without 'the societal element' would be 'bare bones'. Such ideas were 
echoed in the work of Myrdal (1957) who saw markets not as exogenous but as socially 
constructed; 
The market does not just happen. It is not a natural phenomenon. The market is a set of instituted 
social relations, a set of rules determining what things can be exchanged, who can exchange them, 
who will benefit from the exchange, and whom will bear the burden of the exchange. (Myrdal, 
1957: 8) 
Other work has emphasised the way in which local and national economies are shaped by 
enduring collective forces (Hodgson, 1988). Old institutionalists sfressed not only the 
role of formal rules and institutions, but also informal conventions, habits, norms and 
values in bridging agency and structure, and historical continuity and change. For Veblen 
(1899) institutions were: 
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prevalent habits of thought with respect to particular relations and functions of the 
individual and the community The situation of to-day shapes the institutions of 
tomorrow through, selective, coercive processes, by acting upon men's habitual view of things, 
and so altering or fortifying a point of view or a mental attitude handed down from the past 
(ibid: 118). 
Institutional set ups thus define the qualities of networks, their stability, their degree of 
coherence, their collective efficacy and above all their governance structure. Institutions, 
both hard and soft, constitute the webs and nodes of networks, the channels of collective 
organisation and communication as well as the points of intersection and encounter. 
Therefore institutions are regarded as imposing form and social coherence upon human 
activity partly through the continuing production and reproduction of habits of thought 
and action (Hodgson, 1998a: 180). In other words, people are sociahsed by a 'hidden 
curriculum' as accepted values, norms and rules are embodied in institutions and these 
are regarded as second nature. 
Concerns about the absorption of a certain set of values that made a particular state of 
affairs self evident were central to the work of Bourdieu (1972, 1981). His concept of 
habitus emphasises the doxic (taken for granted) elements of action, social classification 
and practical consciousness. Importantly his contribution is a recognition that 
understandings and values may be fractured or differentiated by social group. 
The habitus is an analytic construct, a system of "regulated improvisation" or generative rules that 
represents the (cognitive, affective and evaluative) intemalisation by actors of past experience on 
the basis of shared typifications of social categories, experienced phenomenally as "people like 
us". Because of common histories, members of each "class fraction" share similar habitus, 
creating regularities of thought, aspirations, dispositions, patterns of action that are linked to the 
position diat persons occupy in the social structure they continually reproduce" (Bourdieu, 
1981:309 [quoted in Powell and DiMaggio, 1991: 26]) 
It is important to elaborate on the notion of social capital and its relationship with 
informal institutions. Bebbington and Perrault (1999) note that the notion of social capital 
has entered into usage in social science more rapidly than any agreement as to a precise 
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definition. In this context it is taken to mean the norms and values that collectively exist 
in particular networks. Networks are based on some form of shared identity and concern 
(Durston, 1998) and repeated action through participation in networks means that actors 
are caught up in sets of rules, understandings and bodies of mutual information. The use 
of capital is important because it refers to properties that facilitate productive activity 
when combined with other forms of capital. Bebbington and Perrault (op.cit) cite a World 
Bank report (1996) that pushes the analogy further arguing that social capital, like other 
capital, is both an input to and output of development. Importantly, social capital can 
have either positive or negative effects on other types of capital. 
Therefore formal and informal institutions and social capital are important to the 
transformation process in general, and the relationship between FDI and locality. There is 
a sfrand of literature that suggests that the degree to which the global can be 'pinned 
down' in terms of the potential impact of FDI is related to the quality of local institutions 
(Amin and Thrift, 1995b). In this view, the politics of place requires the construction of 
local regulatory frameworks with appropriate institutional thickness. The aim of local 
regulation is to balance the forces of cooperation and competition and therefore act as a 
positive force atfracting increasingly mobile FDI and embedding it in the local economy. 
In the case of CEE, institutional failure is viewed as a primary reason for failing to 
harness the developmental potential of FDI. In the context of Poland, Hausner et al 
(1997) see a correlation between the development of institutions and the progress of 
transformation at a local level. 
Informal institutions and social capital can facilitate or impede economic growth and 
integration. Van Zon (1998) argued in his study of the Zaporizhzhya area of the Ukraine, 
that habits and norms that persisted from the previous regime, in terms of a climate of 
kleptocracy by the elite and general distrust, constrained the repertoire of alternative 
development paths. Fragmentation and atomisation of society inhibited information flows 
and hampered open debate. In the context of examining a border region Kosonen (1997) 
looks at the way in which Vyborg border region (Finland/Russia) transformed from an 
agent managing its development in the pre-communist era to a patient incapable of 
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generating self sustained economic processes due to a lack of critical institutions. In 
contrast to these pessimistic accounts, Uhlir (1998) gives a more sanguine accoimt of a 
case study in the Czech Republic, whereby incoming FDI combines with networks in 
which the social capital of nomenklatura is based, to produce a successful and embedded 
foreign investment. The notion of informal institutions have aided an understanding of 
the transformation process in terms of explaining the diversity of outcomes and problems 
in imposing a set of solutions at the level of the nation, locality or firm. 
With regard to SOEs the continuation and persistence of informal institutions have been 
central to explaining why the restructuring of individual firms has been slower than 
expected. Winieckie (1992), Swaan (1996) and Swaan and Lissowska (1996) have 
analysed the slow adaptation and adjustment of SOEs by suggesting that the stock of 
existing routines, behavioural patterns and expectations reflect historical experience and 
are not suitable for the new environment. 
A radical institutionahst approach not only acknowledges the importance of informal 
institutions but goes further in arguing that they need to be understood in terms of their 
content, their creation and recreation and in whose interests they operate. 
2.3.2 Power, enabling myths and circuits of intellectual capital 
This section draws on a second notable feature of old institutionalism which is the 
prominent role of power and asymmetrical relations of power as being cenfral to 
understanding economic change and processes (Hall and Taylor, op.cit; Samuels, op.cit., 
Dugger, op.cit., Klein, op.cit.). This approach is especially attentive to the way in which 
institutions distribute power unevenly across groups. 
it is clear, particularly in the work of Veblen, that the impact of economic power on the 
system has always been a basic tenet of institutionalist thought, conditioning the entire manner in 
which economic activity unfolds Economic power emerges from comprehending the changing 
technology and deliberately manipulating the institutional response, often in the interest of a 
narrow group. (Klein, 1987: 1358) 
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Therefore Klein identifies Veblen's major contribution as his emphasis on the 
commanding and pervasive role played by what he called vested interests. 
Rather than positing scenarios of freely contracting individuals, for instance radical 
institutionalists assume a world in which institutions give some groups or interests 
disproportionate access to the decision making process. Rather than emphasise the degree 
to which an outcome makes everybody better off, they tend to sfress the way in which 
development may be a zero or negative sum game (Hall and Taylor, 1996). In contrast to 
consensual accoimts a distinctive feature of the radical institutionalist accovmt is the 
rejection of the harmony of interests, 'We are not all in the same boat, some of us have 
been thrown overboard so a rising tide affects us differently' (Myrdal, op.cit: 111). 
Birchfield (1999) suggests that the ideological dimension of globalisation and the market 
consistent with deregulation and liberalisation has not been adequately exposed or 
problematised. The importance of private property, competition for scarce resources and 
the assumption of individuals motivated by self interest are presented as unchallengeable 
assumptions of economic life. Whereas inequality is a necessary feature of neoliberal 
analysis, the starting point for radical institutionalists is that inequality whether between 
individuals within an economy or between regions and states (Myrdal, op.cit) is an 
undesirable state of affairs. 
.. .the equality doctrine is not merely an abstract formulae propounded in books and speeches. It is 
also an expression of a living ideal and as such part of social reality: a valuation partly perceived 
by people to be morally right. (Myrdal: 111) 
Waller (1989) and Samuels (1995) draw our attention to institutionalist thinking as a 
critical body of thought that challenges the implicit conservatism of neoliberalism which 
takes for granted a structure marked by inequality and hierarchy. Samuels argues that: 
This pliurahsm is manifest in the propensity of institutionalists to call attention to that obfuscation 
and reinforcement and the implications of the conduct of economic theory. It arises from explicit 
concern for the fate of the working class and the masses and their institutional values, especially 
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their participation in the process through which reasonable value is established. It is manifest in 
the institutionalists' focus on the economy as a non-deterministic and non-mechanistic decision 
making process, in contrast for example, to tendencies to treat the formation of preferences and 
working rules as if governed not by power butby transcendent mechanisms. It surfaces in the 
willingness of institutionalists to pay attention to the views and ambitions and values of the 
masses. It especially arises in the tendency to maintain some distance from established powers so 
as to maintain their sense of perspective. (Samuels: 1995: 574). 
Concern with the formation of 'preferences and working rules' raises crucial questions as 
to how particular groups maintain their privilege and power. There is a long lineage of 
those who have tried to explain the way in which those with power and wealth have 
convinced those that have not that this state of affairs is a self evident fact and part of the 
natural order of things. Fundamental to the work of Polanyi (1944) and Lazonick (1991), 
was a critique of the myth of the self regulating market. According to Marx individual 
socialisation in a stratified society was a powerful form of coercion and he argued that 
workers suffered from 'false consciousness'. Veblen, however, was critical of Marx's 
assumption that workers, in particular circumstances, would come to a true understanding 
of their objective circumstances, whereby false consciousness would be replaced by class 
consciousness. Veblen coimterposed the notion of 'emulation' which he elaborated in 
'The Theory of the Leisure Classes' (1899), and which he saw as being promulgated in 
the notion of ceremonial processes or institutions: 
Ceremonial aspects of behaviour are characterised by commands or rules that are sanctioned by a 
higher authority This behaviour is also characterised by legends. These legends tell of the 
mythical testing that demonstrated the efficacy of this behaviour in the mythical past.. .This 
process serves as a justification for existing systems of status and privilege, which in tum give the 
force of authority to the commandments. (Dugger, 1989: 42) 
This is echoed in the work of Bourdieu (1972) who argues that every established order 
tends to reproduce, in different ways and to different degrees, the naturalisation of 'its 
own arbitrariness' (ibid: 164). 
The instruments of knowledge of the social world are in this case (objectively) political 
instruments which contribute to the reproduction of the social world by producing immediate 
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adherence to the world, seen as self evident and undisputed, of which they are a product and of 
which they reproduce the structures in a transformed form, (ibid: 85) 
Enabling myths, in particular, amount to a fiction which plays down differences in 
institutional conditions to create a deceptive clarity that a specific ways of organising 
things is self evident. Dugger (2000) talks about the way in which enabling myths are 
deeply embedded in standards, structures and beliefs and the meanings of cultiu-e. The 
market, for example, becomes an important enabling myth whereby the invisible hand 
produces a particular set of results which are outside the control of human agency and is 
therefore impartial in its operation. These enabling myths do not appear spontaneously 
but are promulgated by a particular group of social and moral agents who create 
institutions in terms of normative and cognitive rights and duties. In the context of CEE 
Offe (1995) emphasises the importance of fi-ameworks of regulations to develop the right 
understanding of situations, in particular the market and points to the socialisation 
capacity of those in privileged situations who reflexively and recursively attempt to 
institutionalise ultra stability. 
It was Gramsci (in Hoare and Nowell-Smith ^ 1971), however, who elaborated this idea 
by suggesting that elites achieved hegemony through their control of the ideological 
apparatus of the state, and pointed to the existence of 'organic intellectuals' whose role 
was to justify the status quo. 
If not all entrepreneurs, at least an elite amongst them must have the capacity to be an organisesr 
of society in general, including all its complex organism of services, right up to the state organism, 
because of the need to create the conditions most favourable to the expansion of their own class; 
or at the least they must possess the capacity to choose deputies (specialized employees) to whom 
to entrust this activity of organising the general system of relationships external to the business 
itself It can be observed that the "organic" intellectuals which every new class creates alongside 
itself and elaborates in the course of its development are for the most part "specializations" of 
partial aspects of the primitive activity of the new special type which the new class has brought to 
prominence." (Gramsci, 1971: 6) 
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This notion of a group of people who create and promulgate a set of ideas to justify a set 
of actions and conditions, is elaborated by Thrift (1998,2001) who points to the advent 
of 'soft' or 'knowledgeable' capitalism with intellectual capital as being central to the 
new competition. Intellectual capital can be understood as comprising the tacit and 
codified knowledge of individual firms (Klein, 1998), and also the particular 
understandings of the business community collectively. One important element of 
intellectual capital is managerialist discourses or enabling myths which legitimate certain 
kinds of constructs, positions and affective states over others (Thrift, 1998). In the 
context of foreign investment and crossing national boundaries, circuits of intellectual 
capital are not only necessary to smooth the path of circuits of productive and financial 
capital, but also to effect rapid change in situations where managers have to react swiftly 
and turn businesses around within ever shorter time fi-ames. 
In a similar vein, Sklair (1997) identifies a transnational capitalist class who perpetuate 
and spread ideas. There are three elements of the transnational capitalist class that are 
important for the role of foreign direct investment in the transformation of CEE: first 
globalising bureaucrats (the World Bank, IMF and WTO), second TNC executives and 
third professionals, and in particular consultants, who Thrift (2001) refers to as 
unacknowledged legislators in the sense that they produce and disseminate current 
notions of best practice. Globalising bureaucrats are important for laying the conditions 
for the intemationalisation of capital. HoUingsworth and Boyer (1997) note that the 
competitiveness of a country's dominant social system depends, at least in part, on the 
international rules of the game. Further, Harmes (1998) points to the role of institutional 
investors in the reproduction of neoliberal ideas. Within certain limits powerfiil countries 
can create international regimes that favour particular firms and sectors by setting the 
rules of engagement. Powerftil nations and the supranational organisations they dominate 
may seek to alter productive systems in their own image and establish some sort of 
ideological hegemony. This is established through a combination of coercion and 
conditionality '* and 'winning hearts and minds' through replacing old habits and norms 
with new discourses. 
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It is important not just to understand how Poland and its regions are fitting into the 
emerging international division of labour, but also the role played by supranational 
organisations in framing the emerging material and discursive practices in Poland and 
other countries in transformation. With its focus on endogenous change it has been 
suggested that the evolutionary account underplays the role of exogenous institutional 
props. Baker and Welsh (1999) suggest that these instruments of 'rational', Western 
modernisation operating in CEE include some of the most perfectly honed instruments of 
global governance that have evolved in the post war period. Most notable these include 
the World Bank, IMF, G7 and the EU. These organisations have precluded some paths of 
transformation and narrowly limited choices, in the case of the EU for example, in terms 
of positing particular models of local governance (Hardy and Smith, 2002). Significantly 
these organisations have affected the restructuring processes of firms and in particular the 
form and content of the privatisation process .^ 
The arrival of foreign investment, TNCs and their executives have been to the fore in 
instilling new material and discursive practices through deep restructuring of workplaces 
and workplace behaviour, and the institution bending effects of foreign investment may 
have greatly exceeded their immediate economic impacts (Hardy, 1998). There are 
different corporate strategies for instilling new discourses and Schoenberger (1997) 
drawing on Bourdieu (1984) identifies the divergent sources that this group use to create 
hegemony and maintain power. Material sources of power derive from position, incomes 
and wealth, while differential access to educational capital confers social acceptability. In 
the context of foreign investment this means socialising local managers into the corporate 
culture of the company 
They had to engage with the soul (Lewin and Regine, 1999). This means investing the community 
with a sense of purpose and common ownership through dehberate working on relationships. The 
idea was that the management body would be sensitized to the social dynamics of the organisation 
and could achieve continuous modulation rather than bureaucratic control (Deleuze, 1990). The 
management body could go with the flow, providing smaller but more effective interventions as 
and when necessary, the heavy bureaucratic hand was replaced by the light touch of the change 
agent. (Thrift, 2001:419) 
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As important as the new managerialist discourse itself, has been the growth of agents 
responsible for its spread across the globe who form an emergent and increasingly 
powerfial class. This class is now self organising and responsible for the production and 
distribution of managerial knowledge and includes such means of dissemination as the 
popularity of studying business, seminars, and texts by management gurus. Thrift (2001) 
identifies three main functions of these agents; first, they provide ' a kind of grammar of 
business imperatives' (ibid: 416) that is the general principles of business life; secondly, 
information on how to attain certain goals; and third, intelligence gathering as they 
continually monitor new organisational innovation and what is working, thereby 
providing a relentless critique of the status quo. The link between corporate strategy and 
regional restructuring is increasingly being influenced by this growing use of consultancy 
expertise used by large companies to access technical knowledge (Antonelli, 1999) but 
especially to bring about the 'management of change'. Consultancies operate through the 
corporate networks of clients, thus exerting national and global influence on patterns of 
geographical industrialisation (Wood, 2000). Creating the right attitudes and institutional 
conditions has been at the heart of assistance and aid from the western market economies. 
The aim of these programmes was to 'win hearts and minds' with the overriding aim of 
disembedding the old ideas and instilling a set of assumptions, norms, habits and rules of 
behaviour that were compatible with a capitalist economy. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the various theories posited to understand the current processes 
of transformation in CEE. Neoliberal analysis and the model of state led industrialisation 
have both been criticised for their mechanical approach, which take what are deemed to 
be successful recipes from other institutional settings to transplant or jump start 
capitalism into the previously planned economies of CEE. Drawing on evolutionary 
analysis it is posited that economic processes are embedded and not exogenous, and a 
conceptual framework was put forward which suggested that change was path contingent. 
Institutionalist analysis in general opens up the possibility of a non-teleological analysis 
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of the restructuring of CEE economies and enables an understanding of why 
transformation has been uneven and idiosyncratic both between and within individual 
economies. 
Radical institutionalist thinking is concerned to look not only at the networks in which 
economic activity is embedded, but at power relations within those relationships and in 
particular to focus on the 'institution bending' properties of TNCs. Further, the legacies 
of not only formal, but also informal institutions, were highlighted as critical to 
understanding why the process and outcomes of foreign investment were complex and 
contested. An important departure in the radical institutionalist approach therefore, is to 
accord power a central role in explaining economic change, and to problematise the 
perpetuation and maintenance of differentiated interests through the use of enabling 
myths. 
Although this conceptual framework facilitates a broad understanding of foreign 
investment in the transformation process, in order to understand the impact of incoming 
firms in localities, it is necessary to open up the black box of the frnn and to examine 
how far recent changes in corporate strategy have influenced the nature of firms' 
qualitative and quantitative linkages at different spatial levels. It is to this I turn in the 
next chapter. 
ENDNOTES 
1 Some schools of thought would see evolutionary thinking as a sub set of institutionalist thinking. 
Indeed one of Veblen's major contributions was to produce an essay in 1898 on 'Why Is 
Economics Not An Evolutionary Science'. As Hodgson (1998) points out evolutionary economics 
is a vague and ill defined term, which does not necessarily imply drawing directly on biology. 
Evolutionary theory in this section, should be imderstood as those theorists who lean more heavily 
on the use of biological metaphors. 
2 It is not the intention of the thesis to provide a detailed history of institutionalist thought or a 
taxonomy of the various strands within it, both of these have been done extensively elsewhere (see 
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for example, Mayhew, 1988; Samuels, 1995; Hall and Taylor, 1996; DiMaggio, 1989; Hodgson, 
2001; Nielsen, 2001). 
3 Hoare and Nowell-Smith (1971) assembled and translated Gramsci's writings from 1917 to 1923, 
which are collectively known as the Prison Notebooks. 
4 There has been a strong element of conditionality. A whole range of other organisations have 
championed the cause of deregulation and liberalisation (see Amsden et al, 1994 for a full 
discussion of the Bretton Woods organisations, conditionaUty and restructuring). Organisations 
such as the World Bank and IMF, have not had to rely on exhortation alone, the conditionality of 
stand-by loans and loans for infrastructural development have been inextricably linked to progress 
on the privatisation front. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
which has had the task of promoting global privatisation, has made large resources available in 
C E E to allow direct US investment in privatise assets. 
5 For example, while public debates about mass privatisation were taking place in Poland, behind 
the scenes the World Bank was responsible for back door privatization. This circumvented both 
the Sejm (parliament) and individual firms, by introducing a debt equity swap whereb,y in effect 
Polish banks took ownership of individual firms. 
58 
CHAPTER T H R E E 
THEORISING THE L O C A L 
EMBEDDEDNESS OF FOREIGN 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORISING THE LOCAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter presented a radical institutionalist framework in which to 
understand the transformation process and the broad role of foreign investment within it. 
In order to examine the influence and impacts of incoming investment on a region, it is 
necessary to develop a richer understanding of the way in which firms are embedded or 
nested in complex relationships at a number of different levels. The aim of this chapter is, 
therefore, to identify recent organisational changes and tease out their implications for 
localities. 
There have been several contributions to understanding and conceptualising the 
relationship between firms, localities and regional enviroimients (Dicken and Thrift, 
1992; Oinas, 1995; Dicken, Forsgren and Malmberg, 1995; Dicken, 1998). Chapter One 
outlined three sets of claims that had been put forward to support a positive role for 
foreign investment in the transformation process in Central and Eastern Europe. To 
summarise briefly, the first view was based on a neoliberal analysis that saw foreign 
investment as the stimulus for competition that would automatically bring about growth 
and development. The second view was that changes in the corporate strategies and 
organisational structures of firms offered less developed regions better developmental 
possibilities, a view consistent with Dunning's (1997) analysis of the move from 
hierarchical to flexible capitalism. The third set of arguments derive from the new 
regionalism which emphasises the centrality of locality as a source of competitive 
advantage. 
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The analysis in this chapter draws on the new economic sociology or socioeconomic 
approach which elevates the firm from the realms of the economic to produce a more 
socialised account of firm behaviour. Beginning with Polanyi's (1944) seminal work and 
its reconstruction by Granovetter (1985) the concept of embeddedness has made 
significant impact on the new economic sociology (see Dacin et al [1999] for a ful l 
review of embeddedness and organisational behaviour). Undersocialised accounts of the 
firm in neoclassical theory, relegate agents insofar as they appear, to the role of vessels of 
ahistorical and acultural rationality. The tendency of some post-Fordist theorists has been 
equally mechanical in falling back on abstract ideal-type constructs, which presume that 
generalised patterns of structural change have inexorably pushed firms in the direction of 
irreversible organisational tendencies. Mass production and flexible speciahsation were 
presented as two ideal-typical models of individual firms, and it followed that all sectors 
and national economies, should be viewed as being at some point on this trajectory ^ 
(Lipietz, 1987). 
The approach taken here attempts to rescue analysis of the firm from imdersocialised 
approaches, to produce a theoretical account whereby firms are spatially entangled in 
webs of social relationships, and take on cognitive, cultural and social forms. This 
relational view of the firm rather than focusing on exchange, emphasises the relationship 
and interaction between different economic agents and institutions which are continually 
constructed and reconstructed (Grabber, 1993). Concepts of embeddedness and relational 
views of the firm have undoubtedly made an important contribution to studying economic 
behaviour and offer much richer potential for capturing the wide variety and complexity 
of linkages, in all their social, political and economic dimensions. 
In order to understand the impact of foreign investment on a particular region, it is 
necessary to rethink and sharpen the notion of embeddedness. Rather than supplanting 
economic categories with non-economic categories which might include 'social', 
'cultural' and 'political', and viewing them as mutually exclusive and dichotomous, 
economic and non-economic aspects are merged to offer a more integrated and richer 
way of looking the influences of firms on locality. Further, in order to open the black box 
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and examine current literature on organisational change, the approach taken is necessarily 
inter-disciplinary and draws on insights from political economy and economic 
geography, as well as studies of organisational behaviour and the labour process. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: In order to interrogate the current theoretical 
and empirical literature on the firm and to discuss its implications for the nature and form 
of connectivities the foregoing discussion centres on a taxonomy based on four influences 
on embeddedness, broadly adapted from a categorisation posited by Zukin and DiMaggio 
(1990). Although recognising that processes never exist alone, but occur in particular 
configurations with other processes, influences on embeddedness are grouped for 
discursive convenience into structural, cultural, cognitive and institutional influences. 
First, structural influences we can understand as external constraints, in the short term at 
least, related to the economic context in which the firm operates. Second, cultural factors 
are those shared understandings that pervade all aspects of the firms corporate strategy, 
which may be influenced by individual idiosyncracies, management fads or country of 
origin. Third, the increasing emphasis on the notion of the learning firm and innovation 
place cognitive processes at the centre of firms' corporate strategies. Finally institutional 
influences are central to the behaviour of firms. This includes a focus on firms as 
reflexive actors who need to actively engage with national and local states. Equally 
important is the way in which firms' behaviour, particularly as it crosses national 
boundaries, is shaped by and shapes the informal institutions of the host economy. Table 
4.1 (overleaf) suggests a taxonomy for imderstanding these four influences on 
embeddedness each of which is then discussed in relation to recent literature on the firm. 
A further section examines the particularities of the embeddedness of State Owned 
Enterprises which emanate from a distinct institutional set up. The final section of the 
chapter reflects on what is distinctive about a radical institutionalist approach to the 
embeddedness of firms. 
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3.2 STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES ON EMBEDDEDNESS 
Structural factors are the first set of influences on embeddedness. By this we mean 
parameters that limit the field of action in which agents formulate sfrategy, and broad 
imperatives which ultimately push firms towards particular ends, albeit via a number of 
diverse routes and managerial strategies (Schoenberger, 1994). These structural 
influences relate to factors such as the competitive features of the sector, which wi l l be a 
function of the number and concenfration of firms, and the degree and form of 
regulation/deregulation. Further, the nature of the product or service, the labour/capital 
ratio, the level of technology and nature of the market are structural aspects of the context 
in which the firm operates. This is not to suggest a mechanical and one way causal 
relationship, where conduct and performance can be read off the market structure of the 
firm, because structures are paradoxically both consfraining and generative. Firms have a 
huge repertoire of tactics and strategies that can be deployed in response to exogenous 
opportunities or problems that wi l l depend on the cognitive, cultural and institutional 
factors explored in the following sections. The cumulative effect of the collective 
response of firms wil l change the structural features of the competitive environment in 
which they operate, so in this sense we can regard firms as both the subject and object of 
a wider imperative. 
An understanding of structural influences is important in terms of gauging the potential 
of foreign investment for regional development. The range of options and degree of 
latitude that firms have in making decisions about their own future, for example, may be 
overstated by underplaying factors that are exogenous to the region. Two structural 
influences are identified as being salient for understanding the relationship between the 
firm and the locality: the nature of competition, and the existence of networks, 
particularly the relationship with suppliers. 
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3.2.1 The nature of competition 
Ilinitch, Lewin and D'Aveni (1998) suggest that firms now operate in a situation of 
'hypercompetition' and 'disorder' where CEOs are quoted as describing the new situation 
with adjectives such as 'brutal', 'intense' 'bitter' and 'savage' where 'only the paranoid 
can survive'. Schoenberger (1997) and Mytelka (1996) identify the compression of time 
as critical to the new competition and argue that firms compete in terms of their ability to 
reduce time in the development of new products, order cycles and time to market in order 
to gain a significant advantage over competitors. The shaping of sectoral relationships 
and the acquisition of external reputation for unique competencies has emerged from an 
initial period of architectural turbulence and often, internal strife within existing and 
nascent organisations (Loveridge, 1996). 
The nature of competition is related to stability and turbulence in the global economy in 
general, and the characteristics of individual sectors in particular. This issue had received 
little discussion in the neoliberal literature which assumes a steady state, rather than the 
radical institutionalist position which sees a world of indeterminacy. It is argued that the 
intensity of competition has impUcations not only for the location of firms in time and 
space, but also for the permanence of a firm's operation and the time horizon over which 
it operates. This may depend on the income elasticity ^ and the pace of technological 
change. For example, those firms for whose goods demand is relatively income elastic, 
for example food and other consumables such as domestic chemicals, wi l l face the steady 
market demand which characterises classic oligopolistic non-price competition. Further, 
the production of these goods has a relatively low technological content and competition 
is mainly through product differentiation and marketing. Therefore these types of firms, 
may have less of an impetus to move than other firms because location is based on the 
servicing of specific markets and competition is relatively stable. 
On the other hand firms that produce goods for which demand is income and price elastic 
and where competition is characterised by the constant need to upgrade products and 
processes, wil l be continually under pressure to lower costs and seek new sources of 
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knowledge. Under these circumstances the pace of restructuring is likely to be more rapid 
as managers constantly review what, where and how they produce. Therefore these firms 
are likely to be sensitive to downturns in the world economy and problems of 
overproduction. Localities that contain such firms in their portfolio of investment are 
more likely to be involved in inter-regional competition either to retain firms or win new 
roimds of investment. Finally the durability of investment wi l l be subject to the vagaries 
of mergers and acquisitions, which wil l be conditioned by the point in the merger 
restructuring life cycle that a firm (or subsidiary) finds itself 
The nature of competition in terms of how far it is driven by accessing low costs or 
gaining market access wil l have an impact on the locality. Firms locating on the basis of 
low labour costs, locking firms into low value added operations have been assumed to 
bring fewer benefits than 'bridgehead' investments associated with market access which 
may demand a wider range of quality fimctions (Grabber, 1992). In particular, it is 
suggested that the labour process of firms who locate on the basis of seeking low labour 
costs wil l bring poorly paid, routine and repetitive work involving low levels of training, 
which would bring few linkages with suppliers in the region. By contrast, firms locating 
on the basis of market access or to gain know-how from a locality are likely to bring 
qualitatively superior employment opportimities that involve training and development 
and wil l enhance the human capital of the region. 
3.2.2 Networks 
A second dimension of structural influences on embeddedness is the way in which firms 
are part of a complex web of interrelationships. Recent literature suggests that there 
should be a shift in the focus of analysis from individual units of capital to networks 
(Grabber, 1993). Castells (1996) suggests that this intricate web of relationships is so 
important that that 'networks are the fundamental stuff of which organisations are made' 
(ibid: 168), and that rather than talking about TNCs we should talk about international 
networks to capture the myriad of firm's relations across borders. Teece (1998) suggests 
that changes in internal structures and the proliferation of interfirm agreements have 
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produced new hybrid organisational arrangements which ' may well represent a new 
and dramatic organisational innovation in business history' (ibid: 158). Although 
networks are ubiquitous in capitalist (and other) economies and have taken a wide variety 
of forms since the industrial revolution, recent changes in industrial restructuring have 
elevated networks to a level of new importance and put them at centre stage of industrial 
complexes. 
The purported increasing importance of networks has crucial implications for the 
potential impact of FDI on regional development. Sabel (1988 and 1994) suggests that 
the vertical disintegration of large TNCs has resulted in autonomous small and medium 
firms, where subsidiaries now come to represent quasi-independent companies. The 
argument suggests that the reorganisation of large firms in the past two decades has 
encouraged regional embeddedness by creating opportunities for small and medium sized 
firms to cuhivate long term supply relationships. Scott identifies, 
.. ..the tendency for internal economies to give way before a progressive extemalisation of the 
structure of production under conditions of rising flexibility, [which] leads at once to a revival of 
proclivities to locational convergence and reagglomeration (Scott, 1988: 175) 
According to Best (1990) the new competition is manifest in a variety of interfirm 
complexes which range fi-om groups of Italian firms linked by cooperative associations 
for joint marketing to giant Japanese organisational structures. The vertical disintegration 
of large firms through outsourcing and subcontiacting opens up the possibility of 
permutations of large, medium and small firms in cooperative and competitive 
relationships. These interfirm networks are endowed with many benign properties. First, 
they are inextricably linked to the notion of the new competition in that they offer the 
possibility of developing learning within the network, where there is consultative 
coordination of mutually dependent firms, as both suppliers and buyers are a source of 
ideas. This production network is best viewed as a learning system which minimises 
transaction costs by fostering high trust relations typical of clans, socially constructed 
markets and productive communities. 
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It is argued that the possibility of firms adapting and innovating is enhanced, and market 
forces can be stimulated, propelled and harnessed for the common good. Technological 
and decentralised learning are facilitated and encouraged by decentralised supplier 
networks. Formal and informal associations between the parent and supplier firms are a 
means of transferring organisational innovation such as JIT, which requires consultative 
and sustained coordination across producing units. Further, networks and interfirm 
competition and their institutions offer liberatory possibilities for workers as there is now 
a blurring of the role between workers, technicians and managers (Sabel, 1994; Cooke 
and Morgan, 1998). Therefore, it is argued that the participation of small and medium 
firms with an emphasis on coordination and competition embed firms in the locality 
offering the possibility of regional competitive advantage or regeneration. 
However, the claim that networks offer developmental potential for localities needs to be 
treated with some caution (Lovering, 1999). Markusen (1999) identifies the agenda as 
being one that needs to address the missing social relationships, and identify these 'fuzzy' 
relationships and the power relations within them, in order to unpack what their 
implications might be for local and regional development. 
.. ..in regional accounts, networks are presented generically and extolled without examining the 
motivations of participants, mapping who might be included and excluded, analyzing unequal 
power relationships among members, or gauging the durability or fragility of relationships' (ibid: 
878). 
In line with this thinking, supplier networks are singled out for further discussion 
because of their potential contribution to employment in a locality. 
3.2.3 Supplier linkages 
The literature that focuses on deverticalisation and the importance of locality as a source 
of learning, claims that this has made for more extensive and qualitatively superior 
linkages between firms and their suppliers (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). It is the case that 
the tendency towards lean production has led to a fairly general shedding of firms' non-
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core activities and in house operations, both along and between value chains, to specialise 
in those areas in which firms perceive they have a competitive advantage. Managers have 
vigorously pared down the mix of activities central to the firms existence and relegated 
the rest to positions at a greater distance fi-om corporate headquarters. A range of 
activities fi-om the manufacture of components and peripheral products to computing and 
payroll services have been increasingly outsourced. While this has spawned a whole new 
series of networks, it has not necessarily created circumstances in which small and 
medium firms can take up the slack. As part of the drive for efficiency in logistics firms 
have aimed to rationalise their supply chains by seeking longer term relationships with 
fewer first tier suppliers with preferred status, which in many cases are equally large 
TNCs (Amin and Dietrich, 1990; Rainnie, 1993; Mytelka, 1998). Demands for quality 
often require levels of investment that preclude smaller firms fi-om participating in the 
game. This is not to deny the existence of networks involving small and medium 
suppliers but it does not imply an equal or symbiotic relationship because big firms are at 
the apex of these partnerships and wield a disproportionate degree of power and control, 
in what Mueller and Loveridge (1997) refer to as the extemalisation of coercion. 
Recent studies of suppliers in the automotive sector suggest that there are emerging 
trends that do not work in favour of local embeddedness. First, there has been an 
increased tendency towards specialisation (Sadler, 1999) with the result that a small 
number of components manufacturers command a very high share of the world market, 
with some branches in the sector dominated by between three and six firms. Aller et al 
(1999) suggest that cost cutting requiring suppliers to assume responsibility for system 
development has demanded economies of scale which in turn has driven mergers and 
acquisitions. Second, there has been a tendency towards intemationalisation whereby 
firms have sought to expand their production of components outside of Europe to access 
low costs with an estimated reduction in employment in the European components 
industry of 25 per cent by 2010 (Sadler, 1999). The result of this has been to undermine 
relationships with local suppliers, for example in the German auto industry the search for 
competitiveness and intemationalisation of some sectors led to the abandormient of long 
term domestic supplier relationships (Mueller and Loveridge, op. cit). 
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In their comprehensive review of recent studies, Young et al (1994), report a remarkable 
degree of similarity in the impact of FDI on suppliers in localities. They find no evidence 
of dense local linkages or extensive relationships between firms and suppliers fi-om FDI. 
They conclude that the direct effects of FDI on recipient firms in the host country have 
been positive, with improved availability of funds, improved financial techniques, 
technical help and marketing skills which tended to be on balance favourable to the 
acquired companies. On the other hand the spillover effects, especially with respect to 
local sourcing have been very disappointing. 
Therefore structural factors wi l l have important direct and indirect effects on the labour 
market. The nature of competition wil l affect the number of jobs and the stability of 
employment, the type of work on offer, wage levels, training and factors relating to the 
upgrading of human capital. Further, the importance of multiplier effects in the local 
economy wil l depend on the extent to which first and second tier suppUers are local, how 
far new suppliers have arrived in the area and the quality impact on local suppliers. 
Changes in the nature of competition may also have negative impacts on employment 
levels depending on whether the arrival of foreign investment brings competition that 
provides a stimulus and demonstration effect or whether an uneven playing field 
emanating firom the accrued ownership advantages of incoming firms, results in job loss 
elsewhere in the local economy. 
3.3 C U L T U R A L INFLUENCES ON EMBEDDEDNESS 
The second set of factors influencing a firm's embeddedness in a locality are cultural. A 
firm's culture can defined as 'shared collective understandings in shaping economic 
strategies and goals' (Zukin and Dimaggio, 1990). It is that set of social conventions 
embracing behavioural norms, standards and customs and the rules of the game 
underlying social interaction within the firm (Schoenberger, 1994). The cultural 
embeddedness of the individual firm wil l be an amalgam of management techniques 
(coloured in the short term term by various management fads), institutional conditioning 
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of the country of origin (Kristensen, 1997), the idiosyncrasies of agents within the firm, 
and contestation by local workers and managers as they cross national boundaries. The 
main concern here is the process of entering new institutional contexts, where the 
incoming firm has to negotiate with or around existing established behaviours and 
understandings. In other words as firms cross national boimdaries they need to introduce 
and establish new material and discursive practices in the firm through restructuring 
management practices and changing workplace habits and norms. 
Firms have also sought to restructure various aspects of their internal organisation to 
become more responsive and react quickly to changes in the market. As firms operate 
increasingly across national boundaries, there are important issues relating to entering 
new markets and acquiring new assets, and how to manage operations over wider 
geographical areas embracing different institutional and cultural set ups. As we saw in the 
previous chapter Thrift (1998) explains this new learning in terms of the notion of 
intellectual circuits of capital by which he means that set of discourses that underpin 
circuits of production and financial capital promulgated by the transnational capitalist 
class (Sklair, 1997). However, while it is possible to identify some general elements that 
comprise such discourses, such as competitiveness, globalisation, deregulation and so on, 
each firm wil l have its own distinct corporate culture. 
3.3.1 Internationalisation strategy 
The first dimension of cultural embeddedness relates to intemationalisation strategies, 
that is how firms cross national boundaries to establish new production or sales. Firms 
have exhibited different preferences for greenfield developments or brownfield 
acquisitions, and the mode of entry may influence the extent to which past legacies and 
linkages are preserved and buih on. Greenfield investments enable incoming firms to 
import production and management methods fi-om the home country or elsewhere in the 
global network, which may circumvent or rupture existing linkages, while brownfield 
entry via privatisation methods may build on and develop old networks (Grabber, 1994 
and 1997). Further, the process and outcomes of negotiations at a local and national level 
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regarding entry (greenfield) or the acquisition of existing assets (brownfield) affect the 
nature of local embeddedness. 
The second aspect of intemationalisation strategy relates to the methods used by firms to 
establish their corporate culture and collective understandings in a new context. In the 
case of brownfield acquisitions the restructuring of the existing firm may need to be 
undertaken to bring its organisation and norms into Une with those of other subsidiaries. 
The extent to which firms transfer existing models, how far they consciously attempt to 
replace existing behaviours and methods used to effect organisational change wil l have 
implications for their sensitivity to local institutions. Also important for embeddedness is 
how far firms draw on local tacit knowledge which wil l be influenced by whether agents 
of change are locally recruited or 'imported' in the form of foreign consultants or 
expatriates. External expertise such as consultants or agents of change fi-om elsewhere in 
the company may be used to identify best business practice within the organisation which 
is then cascaded to other parts of the company. Techniques such as benchmarking allow 
firms to quantify their relative efficiency in any process and this resuhs in internal 
performance league tables and best practice transfers which may push in the direction of 
homogenising managerial and work practices. Even where local personnel are used 
central management programmes involving training, meetings and social events to build 
managerial networks are used to inculcate middle and senior managers with loyalty to the 
corporate culture of the firm, while distancing locally recruited personnel fi-om the 
general concerns of the local community. 
3.3.2 National business systems 
While the last two aspects of embeddedness may be viewed as the idiosyncrasies of 
particular corporate cultures, a broader aspect of cultural embeddedness relates to how far 
transnational firms are imprinted with the habits, norms and routines from their country 
of origin. Whitley defines national business systems as " distinctive configurations 
of hierarchy-market relations which become institutionalised as relatively successful 
ways of organising activity in different institutional environments" (1994). However, 
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firms are not merely transmission belts for new forms of business and work organisation 
across national boundaries, and in recent years a significant body of analj^ical literature 
has strengthened the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the notion of the 
distinctiveness of'national business systems' (Sally, 1994; Whitley, 1997 and 1998; 
Lane, 1998). It is argued that different elements of business systems interrelate in a 
complex whole, giving characteristic patterns of business behaviour in different countries 
which persist over time in such areas as corporate governance, managerial structures and 
labour market issues. Lane (ibid) looks at the way in which TNCs have moved along a 
continuum between being nationally embedded and globally oriented TNCs, and how the 
degree of implantation in national policy networks influences the intemationalisation 
strategies of companies, the degree of foreign investment and the nature of competitive 
advantage. According to Femer (1997) the key analytical question is how far such 
national differences in business systems inform the behaviour of TNCs from different 
countries. 
Although the development of the characteristics and attributes of firms is path contingent, 
Pollert (1999) criticises the notion of 'national business cultures' for being static. 
There are a number of constraints on the assimilation of the home business culture by the 
host country and reasons why the correspondence between features of national business 
systems and TNC behaviour is likely to be incomplete. First, some elements of the 
national business system make little sense in isolation from the constellation of features 
in which they are integrated in the home nation. In other words some norms, habits and 
conventions are not exportable because they are rooted in cultural assumptions. Second, 
'local isomorphism', that is resembling and reflecting the local environment, is more 
likely in certain areas of HR because of the constraints of host country regulations and 
practices. On the other hand issues such as wage determination, hours of work, job 
contracts and redundancy procedures are highly subject to local institutional 
arrangements and are therefore less likely to be stamped with the influence of the home 
country. Other aspects of industrial relations and HRM such as payments systems, 
management development or employee communication are generally less likely to be 
regulated by the local system and are more susceptible to country of origin factors. 
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Third, elements of the 'home' culture may be contested by various actors from the host 
country, for example governments may negotiate local sourcing agreements as a 
condition of entry and local management may consciously or unconsciously resist 
particular work practices or arrangements (Hibino, 1997; Sharpe, 1997). Fourth, firms 
may have located abroad precisely to avoid institutional factors in the home market 
where conditions may appear to be overly restrictive, such as a high social wage or rigid 
regulatory structures. Fifth, national culture is not static and firms change as a result of 
moving across boundaries and this adaptation may itself be a source of learning and 
adopted by the parent plant in the home country through an iterative process. Therefore 
international competition and the globalisation of production systems may lead to 
increasing convergence between TNCs of different origins. Indeed TNCs by transmitting 
practices across national borders, may be seen as key actors in the homogenisation of 
national systems and the erosion of the country of origin difference, through a process of 
'denationalisation' Whitiey (1994) or 'coercive isomorphism' (Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991). Although technologies of production and work are not dictated by a movement to 
some sort of globally optimal best practice, it may be the case that (some) sectoral 
specificities of competition may outweigh national characteristics. 
The imprint of national business systems on firms investing across national boundaries 
may have implications for their embeddedness in localities. Nationally derived corporate 
policy on supply strategy and the extent to which home based corporatist views towards 
local communities and trade unions are imported for example, wi l l affect the nature and 
extent of linkages with the local economy and institutions. The extent to which foreign 
investors tiansfer practices may relate to the depth and spread of intemationalisation of 
the individual firm and the closeness of its institutional ties in the home coimtry. Those 
firms which have a long history of intemationalisation, are more likely to have developed 
characteristics, strategies and practices different fi-om those firms which have developed 
closely with national institutions. 
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3.4 C O G N I T I V E FACTORS INFLUENCES ON EMBEDDEDNESS 
A recurring theme in previous sections has been a shift in emphasis in the literature 
towards the notion of the learning firm with a focus on corporate renewal, knowledge 
management and the development of core competences. The focus on the learning firm 
represents a convergence of literature fi-om organisational behaviour, strategic 
management and economics as well as geography and evolutionary thinking. Learning, 
rather than being seen as the accumulation of pieces of information, is viewed as a 
process of problem formulation and solving. Recent HRM (Human Resource 
Management) practitioner literature is replete with articles on the learning firm and 
accessing knowledge from employees (MacLachlan, 1998; Mayo, 1998) and there is an 
explicit recognition of tapping into the local; "The trick is to achieve a balance; to 
combine the strength of local knowledge with global reach." (FT Oct 8 1997). 
Although reservations have been expressed regarding the notion of the learning firm 
(Hudson, 1999), two issues related to cognitive processes are pertinent to how foreign 
investors embed themselves in new situations across national boundaries. The first set of 
arguments relates to the notion of regions as a source of tacit knowledge to enhance the 
competitive advantage of firms. The second set of issues relates to how firms can 
stimulate and generate learning and innovation within the organisation fi-om changing 
patterns of governance. 
3.4.1 Regions as a source of tacit knowledge 
Amin and Cohendet (1998) point to a strand of literature which claims the superiority of 
relational and geographic proximity (industrial clusters and districts) over formally 
constituted networks of knowledge and learning based on ubiquitously available products 
of education, science and technology. Thus while highly specialised knowledge relating 
to applied technology appears to be mobile and can be decoupled fi-om location, tacit 
knowledge involves a large number of actors within a local cluster and is path dependent 
to local circumstances, unique relationships and accumulated routines. This strand of 
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thought is focused on the rediscovery of regions as a source of localised knowledge and 
in particular, tacit knowledge. According to this view highly dynamic local regions draw 
extensively upon localised assets for competitiveness (Saxenian, 1994; Asheim, 1997; 
Kirat and Lung, 1999; Maskell and Mahnberg, 1999a and 1999b). This literature points 
to the conclusion that in a global economy in which the codified knowledge offered by 
science and technology is increasingly easy to access, uncodified knowledge rooted in 
relations of proximity gives an advantage in deriving and maintaining competitive 
advantage (Amin and Cohendet, 1998; Porter and Solvell, 1998; Zanfei, 1996). Thus 
firms need to take root in different contexts, in order to gain access to local resources and 
competencies, and to absorb stimuli deriving from local applications. Local relations and 
proximity open up the possibiUty for frequent and intensive interactions and shared 
understandings that derive from similar cultural norms, beliefs and practices leading to 
easy communication and trust based relations. These 'untraded dependencies' include the 
industrial atmosphere of a place such as local networks, local institutions and culture 
(Storper, 1995). Deep knowledge of a locality may highlight technical and organisational 
constraints and bottlenecks to be solved. Therefore placing roots in local contexts 
requires that subsidiaries develop extensive networks of relations with industrial, 
economic and institutional agents, based on mutual trust and on the creation of intense 
information flows. 
There have been extensive critiques regarding the existence and properties of 
agglomeration and industrial districts. Studies which show a high degree of local learning 
and trust are criticised for being regionally and sectorally selective (Grabber, 1993; 
Baker, 1996; Markusen, 1996). There are three sets of arguments that can be advanced to 
challenge this view of localised learning. The first set of arguments see firms as 
adversarial rather than cooperative in the sharing of knowledge and learning. In her 
criticism of Saxenian's (1994) study of SiHcon Valley, Markusen (1998), in confrast to 
'fuzzy' boundaries between firms, sees a highly competitive regional economy with 
strong property rights reflected in a high incidence of law suits. Further, in contrast to the 
cooperative learning milieu painted by Best (1990) and Sabel (1994), Pottier (1988) 
investigates the linkages and synergies brought about in the Greater Grenoble district in 
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micro processing and electronics where he concludes that informal networks do not 
translate into cooperative relations. Large firms, in effect disembed small firms fi-om the 
locality by watching the creation of innovative units, taking control of them and then 
terminating or diminishing their ties with the local area. 
The second set of arguments relate to the intemationalisation of research and 
development. In their review of recent literature Blanc and Sierra (1999) provide a rich 
and nuanced account of locality and the search for knowledge across national boundaries. 
The following arguments advanced are salient. While acknowledging the importance of 
relational proximity in a locality, they suggest that extemal proximity, which is not 
reducible to geographical proximity, forms the basis of the transnational firm's extemal 
organisation that is designed to scan and absorb foreign R&D. In addition, they highlight 
sectoral differences in the devolution of R&D fimctions and the way in which research, 
development and customisation are different processes. The development stage of 
software and pharmaceuticals, for example, are labour intensive, routine and can be 
outsourced (Lakha, 1994). Further, they suggest that although it is not a substitute for 
geographical proximity, organisational proximity in the form of technology (electronic 
mail, video conferencing and work stations) can achieve the organisational advantages of 
centralisation on a decentralised geographic basis. 
The third set of arguments relates to the use of strategic alliances as a way of accessing 
knowledge now viewed as central rather than peripheral to the global strategies of firms 
(Dicken, 1998). These alliances are different fi-om the traditional form of cartel and other 
oligopolistic agreements in that they concem specific times, markets and products and 
processes and do not exclude competition in other areas. They are particularly relevant in 
high tech industries as the cost of research and development have risen sharply and where 
access to privileged information is increasingly difficult in industries where innovation is 
the main weapon. Strategic alliances are driven by increasing financial and political 
barriers to market entry, the need to accelerate product development times and accessing 
know how embedded in competing organisations. 
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Therefore issues related to trust and cooperation, the literature on the intemationalisation 
of R&D and the increasing importance of strategic alliances temper the claims of the new 
regionalists, which suggest a correlation between localised learning as a source of 
competitive advantage and the increasing propensity for firms to be embedded in 
localities. 
3.4.2 Organisational change and learning 
While firms have looked to localities to access tacit knowledge, they have also focused 
on internal organisational change to elicit tacit knowledge embedded in employees at all 
levels of the firm's structure. It has been argued that traditional hierarchical structures are 
a block on learning and innovation and that there are therefore limits to classical modes 
of organisation. Intemationalisation means a quantum jump in uncertainty and change 
which makes freezing stmctures more difficult and the M form firm requires freeing from 
the restrictions of the divisionalised stmcture. It is suggested that M form firms are not 
good at capturing what goes on in TNCs in that knowledge changes much more quickly 
than stmcture (Hagstrom and Hedlund, 1998). As local contexts become richer in terms 
of the potential contribution they can offer to a transnational firm's competitiveness, the 
cenfraUsation of information and sfrategic decision becomes unfeasible and ineffective 
and impacts negatively on the number and variety of learning pattems. Giving greater 
autonomy to subsidiaries, it is argued, would instead create a stmcture of incentives that 
is more conducive to experimentation and innovation (Lindquist, Zander and Solvell 
1996). 
Organisational change is reflected in a menu of arrangements which include special 
business units, micro new ventures departments and profit centres, and Teece (1998) 
suggests that these designs imply smaller, flatter and more specialised stmctures within 
which to conduct activities where speed and responsiveness are critical. Amin and 
Cohendet (1998) and Hagstrom and Hedlund (1998) suggest that the problem associated 
with hierarchy on the one hand and decentralisation on the other has led to the 
development of parallel stmctures composed of stmctures of decenfralised reflexive and 
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interactive centres to advance core competences and learning, overlaid upon a more 
traditional hierarchical structure for the regulation of non-core activities. Thus strategy is 
the prerogative and responsibility of the positional top, but because knowledge is so 
diffused and concentrated further down in the positional structure, strategies and action 
have to be initiated in the middle. 
The archetjTjical action unit becomes the multiskilled, multiknowledgeable and temporary project 
team these need to be protected from the influence of the line and led by strong people. Indeed 
here we find a flat and temporary - but very strong mini hierarchy (Hagstrom and Hedlund 
1998:180). 
Therefore it has been argued that in this more turbulent and competitive environment we 
are witnessing the emergence of a new type of TNC which differs fi-om those which 
predominated earlier periods (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Dicken, 1998). This complex 
global model is characterised by an integrated network configuration and a capacity to 
develop flexible coordinating processes. These capabilities apply both inside the firm 
which, it is argued, displace hierarchical governance relationships, as networks of 
relationships which comprise social capital become more inclusive and egalitarian. These 
changes have been translated by some as heralding a uniform move from hierarchy to 
heterarchy, for example Cooke and Morgan (1998) suggest that HQs have relinquished 
their role as monitoring devices to become 'architects of communications' in order to tap 
subsidiaries as a source of product, process and organisational innovation. Similarly 
Dunning (1997) argues that the head office has become less a centre of control and more 
a means by which the constituent parts of the organisation make their inputs into the 
decision making process. 
A second aspect of accessing knowledge that has implications for the locality relates to 
the role and autonomy of subsidiaries. It has been suggested that autonomous, flatter 
structures coupled with the 'empowerment' of employees have been manifest in moves 
towards the increasing use of global subsidiary mandates (Roth and Morrison, 1992). In 
this case the subsidiary assumes a greater autonomy, being given worldwide 
responsibility and strategic control for a product or product line. Thus rather than 
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centralised control being exerted over subsidiaries, the control is segmented by product 
line and distributed amongst different subsidiaries, depending on their particular 
capabilities and competencies. In what Forsgren and Pahlberg (1992) refer to as multi-
centred governance, the locus of control is shifted while interdependency remains. The 
role of the parent company is altered, as headquarters devolves direct control of its 
products that are to be managed by subsidiaries with mandates. Thus, the role of the 
parent company shifts to managing dispersed strategic processes, ensuring that subsidiary 
strategies fit the overall corporate goals, and provide the freedom required to support the 
mandates. 
Therefore the literature does not suggest a unidirectional tendency fi-om hierarchy to 
heterarchy, rather a complex tanghng of formal hierarchical and less formal stmctures. 
The overall conclusion of this literature is that the need to tap into local knowledge 
suggests an increased tendency for the restructuring of firms to go in the direction of 
increased local autonomy, local embeddedness and engagement. However, a closer 
examination of the specific and concrete forms that restmcturing has taken which have 
been interpreted as indicators of increased autonomy may be less propitious than some 
accounts suggest. 
3.4.3 Innovation as consensual or coercive 
Innovation is portrayed in much of the literature as a consensual process, however this 
may underestimate how far learning within firms may take place as result of a significant 
degree of coercion from the market. Certain types of learning, at least, are driven by 
organisational irmovation which may distinctly limit the parameters of leaming. 
Birkinshaw (1998) and Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) link the move towards global 
mandates with the increasing role played by competition within the firm in an attempt to 
create an intemal market mechanism. Galunsic and Eisenhardt (1998) look at how 
charters are used in fast paced environments such as high technology to bring about 
change. In the start up phase of a new initiative, charters are used to stimulate intensive 
competition between divisions to create viable businesses. In the maturity phase, once 
81 
dominant divisions who had lost touch with their market were involved in "a wrenching 
charter battle between competing divisions". Phelps and Fuller (2000) note that the focus 
of interest has mostly been on inter regional competition for mobile and greenfield 
investment, whereas the majority of investment by TNCs continues to be repeat 
investment which involves firms and regions in different sorts of locational tournaments. 
These repeat investments are the main mechanism through which restmcturing and the 
corporate division of labour are defined and redefined. Mueller and Loveridge (1997) 
suggest that when corporate management employed new investment decisions plant level 
actors were left with little choice but to embrace radical change. Learning was 
accelerated because of the force exerted through the intemalisation of competitive 
markets which dismpted existing institutional arrangements. 
Benchmarking is a mechanism that allows firms to quantify their relative efficiency in 
any given process or activity, and internally this results in performance league tables, and 
best practice transfers. In this case freedom for manoeuvre from HQ is replaced by the 
despotism of the market and a different form of competition, which Mueller and 
Loveridge (1997) refer to as internal coercion. The implications for local autonomy are 
that rather than giving flexibility and room for manoeuvre in the locality, the managerial 
performance of each division is measured in terms of a rate of return on capital from each 
division. The fimction of central management is to monitor performance and allocate 
resources, labour and managerial skills and finance and to award contracts in relation to 
the present or estimated fiiture profitability of each division. 
Coller and Marginson (1998) highlight the importance of 'unobtmsive' channels of 
influence or coercive pressure. First, Marschan, Welch and Welch (1996) suggest that 
TNC control can be centralised through the use of expatriates who have internalised 
corporate norms and values. Thus transferring expatriates, who may be tmsted to 
implement corporate policies and procedures, are de facto cenfralising mechanisms. The 
second 'unobtmsive' pressure on subsidiaries is the system for fransferring best proven 
practice (BPP) across plants. A group of internal consultants identify successful practices 
(BPP) within the organisation and these are then made available across the TNC and 
82 
regarded by local management as part of the menu of options to address local problems. 
Third, the building of managerial networks, underpinned by a central programme for 
management recruitment, training and development, reinforces conformity and corporate 
loyalty. These networks not only serve the purpose of developing managerial skills, but 
also of socialising managers into the company way of doing things, initiating newcomers 
in the firm's discourses and including them in the new and changing social capital of the 
firm. 
Moves towards less hierarchical structures and networked relationships between different 
divisions have been interpreted as opening up the possibility for firms to be more deeply 
embedded in localities. However, accounts purporting that changes in the internal 
organisation of firms, either in the direction of flatter structures or more autonomous 
subsidiaries, have either been oversimplified or failed to pay sufficient attention to the 
details of the form they have taken. The frend towards pushing responsibility further 
down the organisational structure of firms, particularly reflected in the move to profit 
cenfres, has underestimated the extent to which innovation has been heavily directed 
towards cost reduction and increased efficiency. Rather than talking about the 
embeddedness of a firm in the locality, the survival of subsidiaries in the context of 
ongoing internal competition may depend not only on tapping into local sources of tacit 
knowledge, but also an intensification of work within the organisation. 
3.5 INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES ON EMBEDDEDNESS 
Institutional factors wi l l have a direct bearing on the economic direction and policies of 
firms and their propensity for local embeddedness. In this context we are interested in the 
manner in which economic institutions and decisions are shaped by a struggle for power 
that involves economic actors and non-market institutions, such as the state at a national 
and local level, and different social groups. This section looks at the way that the 
sfrategies of industrial sectors and individual firms take account of, among other factors, 
the policies of the national and local state, the balance between regional employers and 
the willingness of the local labour force to tolerate change. 
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3.5.1 National and local states 
In some quarters it has been suggested that the globaUsation of economic coordination 
and control has heralded the decline of the nation state and its national institutions as 
influential agencies in the structuring of economic systems (Ohmae, 1990 and 1996; 
Kobrin, 1997). At the other extreme there are those that posit the resurgence of regions in 
the context globalising trends and as we saw earlier it has been suggested that the 
intensification of competition has led to firms needing to be embedded in localities in 
order to access tacit knowledge that is central to the new competition. It follows that this 
demands an enhanced role for local and regional authorities in providing the appropriate 
physical infi-astructure and institutional cement in which to embed firms. Thus intelligent 
and learning regions are imbued with an increased potential to interact with incoming 
foreign investment and pin down the global (Morgan, 1997). However, HoUingsworth 
and Boyer (1997), Jessop (1997) and Hollingsworth (1998) argue that the dramatic 
increase in societal complexity, means that capital needs to be coordinated and nested in 
all spatial levels simultaneously. The nation state is only one element among several 
spatial scales where no one level dominates and where no one level should be privileged 
in explaining the embeddedness of capital. Jessop suggests that, 'The state is no longer 
the sovereign authority for meta-govemance, merely one element' (1997:117). 
This process of nestedness is complex and contradictory and there are distinct variations 
in the way in which companies have managed the pressures and tensions of globalisation. 
Different sets of capitals need different sets of organisational arrangements and rules in 
which to operate on a sectoral basis depending on the size of the market, governance of 
the sector and relative strength of the firm. Strong states are likely to push for the 
liberalisation of trade, whereas other states wil l try to protect weaker sections of their 
national economy fi-om what they see as the predatory designs of stronger capitals. 
Therefore governments are not undifferentiated and coherent monoliths and their 
regulatory structures wi l l be determined by the presence and nature of development 
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strategy, the salience of the investment and the intensity of competition for investment 
(Phelps and Fuller, 2000; Tewdr-Jones and Phelps, 2000). 
Despite the need for firms to engage with institutions at different spatial levels the role of 
the nation state remains central. There is an extensive literature which looks at capital and 
its embeddedness in national institutions. Sally (1994), Whitley (1997) and Lane (1998) 
locate firms in their institutional environments, and argue that they are embedded in 
networks of relations with a number of important institutional actors at a national level. 
Any capitalist state must perform certain fimctions in order to facilitate capital 
accumulation (from within or outside of its boundaries) which in turn legitimises its 
existence and enhances its position. The strength of the economy and the prestige of 
states lies in the scale and competitiveness of capitals, both domestic and foreign that lie 
within their ambit. Yeung (1998a and b) suggests that the question is not whether the 
intemationalisation of capital has brought about the demise of the nation state but, rather 
how the state continues to participate in capital's intemationalisation. As Stopford and 
Sti-ange (1991) point out this implies not a diminished but a different role for the state as 
the number of linkages multiplies. Murtha and Lenway (1998) suggest that paradoxically 
a home base is more important to companies in the era of heightened global competition 
because this is where essential competitive advantages of the enterprises are created and 
sustained. Finally, because the appropriation and domination of markets is not a natural 
or automatic process, but rather socially and politically constructed, firms require a range 
of policies with respect to international trade and expect the government to negotiate the 
rules of the game in their interests. 
Therefore as far as foreign investment goes we need to understand that firms are reflexive 
and strategic in their negotiations with states, and that these relationships need to be 
forged and cultivated at a number of different levels. Crossing borders is a fiindamentally 
political act that requires negotiation and interaction with a series of economic actors and 
political stakeholders manifest in direct political activities such as lobbying (Coen, 1999). 
Mytelka (1998) suggests that there are three new features characterising contemporary 
locational tournaments and competition which have a bearing on localised learning and 
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innovation potential. Firstly, a widening range of incentives are offered to non local 
investors by an increasing number of industrialised countries. Secondly, that this 
competition extends to all levels of government. Thirdly, there has been a diversion of 
attention from the promotion of locally based activities towards the use of local, state and 
national funds to attract foreign investors. 
What this suggests is that TNCs and their affiliates have become much more sensitive to 
opportunities for influencing and exploiting the disposition of local and national systems 
of governance towards attracting and embedding major inward investment. There is 
growing evidence that these major projects are conceived and negotiated in a politically 
sensitive way that has not been the case before. The increasing intensity of competition 
for mobile investment coupled with the increasing ability and desire of inward investors 
to read local policies highlights some of the limits of local institutional capacity building 
to effect local economic development (Phelps 2000a). Policy initiatives aimed at 
embedding incoming foreign investment entail a commitment of local capital and public 
resources in the service of the competitive goals of the incoming company, and TNCs 
wil l actively seek out social and cultural settings that shift the cost of reproducing labour 
power onto local societies and states (Hudson, 1995). 
With regard to the implications for embeddedness negotiations where local actors are 
centrally involved are more likely to produce an outcome that is sensitive to local 
development than those where only national considerations predominate. In some cases 
local participation has been illusory, for example in the case of the location of Lucky 
Gold in South Wales Phelps et al (1998) suggest that what appeared to be a negotiation 
between the locality and the firm was a decision heavily influenced by national 
government. Further, coalitions at a local level need to have a degree of autonomy both 
politically and financially, with regard to the centre. Bargains between firms and 
politicians or bureaucrats at the national level are less likely to be concerned with local 
issues, because national actors wi l l be attuned to competing claims by different pressure 
groups that may outweigh regional considerations. With the caveat that localities are not 
homogenous or without conflict, it is more likely that there would be a coincidence of 
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interests of the local arm of the transnational capitalist class, workers and local 
government officers rather than coalitions that lie outside of the region. 
3.5.2 The importance of non-state institutions 
The importance of institutions in the locality extends beyond the role of the local state to 
what Amin and Thrift (1995a) refer to as institutional thickness. On one level this refers 
to; 
a plethora of institutions of various kinds (including firms; fmancial institutions; local 
chambers of commerce; tiaining agencies; trade associations; iimovation centres; clerical bodies; 
unions; government agencies providing premises, land and infrastructure: business service 
organisations; marketing boards), all or some of which can provide a basis for the growth of 
particular local practices of local representation. (Amin and Thrift, 1995a: 14) 
The existence of these institutions is a necessary but not sufficient condition to embed 
firms, and according to this view these bodies need to be cemented by cooperation, 
fi-equent interactions, trust and cohesion. Where these institutions are collectively able to 
establish trust and shared goals and direction, they are more likely to have the capacity to 
attract foreign investment and retain it into the locality. The overall effect is to construct 
and deepen a pool of knowledge that is both formal and tacit, and therefore these 
institutions are a repository for a range of collective and economic practices in a locality. 
However, there is no automatic correlation between institutional thickness, economic 
development and attracting and embedding firms. This 'thickness' where it expresses a 
past trajectory or set of trenchant power relations may be an obstacle rather than an aid to 
new processes and structures. 
Beyond non-state formal institutions, the extent and nature of linkages of foreign 
investors wi l l be shaped and mediated by the predominant informal institutions of the 
host economy. While these might include the legal fi"amework and regulatory structures 
concerning competition, ownership and labour, also of concern are informal institutions 
and in particular the prevailing collective understandings about the nature of economic 
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action. Informal institutions may be important for explaining how the actual conduct of 
business differs form official versions enshrined in the legislature. Negotiating entry for 
foreign firms may have much more to do with politics and speaking to the 'right' people 
than formally laid out procedures. Whitley (1990) identifies two key groups of 
characteristics used to define systemic differences. First, those that reflect general and 
underlying principles of trust, cooperation and coordination which have become 
institutionalised, either through being codified in law or as they form part of collective 
understanding about economic behaviour. These are usually derived fi-om: a) the 
preindustrial political system, b) the traditional elite attitudes towards privately controlled 
concentrations of wealth and, c) the organisational control of industrial activities 
(Whitley, ibid: 21). Second shared social responses to these exercises in power break 
down into six dimensions (i) Degree and trust between non-kin (ii) Commitment and 
loyalties to collectivities beyond the family (iii) Importance of individual identities rights 
and commitment (iv) Depersonalisation and formalisation of authority relations (v) 
Differentiation of authority roles and (vi) Reciprocity, distance and scope of authority 
relations. These background and proximate institutions wi l l have both a national 
dimension and a local character which results fi-om a territorially constituted group of 
actors. 
Uncodified understandings about the conduct of economic behaviour are important to 
associative life and business activity, which could take the form of informal networks 
between large firms and the business community in general. I f firms locate to draw on the 
industrial atmosphere then local developmental potential could be enhanced in a number 
of ways. The benefits firms derive from external economies of scope and scale and 
untraded dependencies wil l increase their competitiveness and reduce their transaction 
costs through the trust that is fimdamental to such networks, thereby reducing the 
incentive for firms to move to another location. Norms, habits and conventions are not 
static and hermetically sealed and the presence of incoming foreign firms wil l enhance, 
augment and change the nature of social capital in locality. Shifting the collective 
understandings about the nature of economic action through bending informal institutions 
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may increase the attractiveness of the locality for other potential investors and contribute 
to a process of virtuous cumulative causation (Myrdal, 1957). 
The view that suggests a strong relationship between institutional thickness, social capital 
and the embeddedness of firms is underpinned by the assumption that incoming firms 
wil l be locally integrated on a consensual and semi-corporatist basis. However, foreign 
investors, individually and collectively, through their own networks may bring a different 
set of understandings about economic behaviour that do not necessarily coincide with the 
prevailing habits and norms of the locality. This may be particularly manifest in 
understandings about the formal and informal institutions of the workplace, to which we 
turn in the next section. 
3.5.3 Workplace institutions 
It has been suggested that the role of workers, both organised and unorganised, plays an 
important role in shaping and responding to the increasing intemationalisation of 
production systems (Herod, 1995, 1997 and 1998; Swain, 1998; Wills, 1996). Herod 
(1997) argues that the literature on globalisation has been marked by its absence of 
discussion of organised labour. While this may be true of economic geography, labour 
process literattu-e offers important insights into the governance of firms and in particular, 
localisation as a contested process (Elger and Smith, 1994). 
Most of the literature associated with the notion of 'learning firms' not only paints a 
coherent view of management but much is made of increasingly consensual relationships 
and trust between employers and employees (Best, 1990). Morgan (1998), for example, 
suggests that Taylorism produced work relations of low trust where workers had a 
minimvmi commitment, grudging calculation and measured performance. 
Experimentation in post-Taylorist social organisation such as lean production is held to 
be built on learning characterised by an ethos of reciprocal obligation between 
management and workers. According to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1997) 'Top managers 
serve as the sponsors of an entrepreneurially minded fi-ont line'. 
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Elger and Smith (1994) suggest that rather than seeing global localisation as a formula 
which resolves the relation between the global corporation and the local transplant, we 
need to investigate how the uncertainties and dilemmas of localisation are addressed and 
the specific forms and combinations of policy which are pursued. In this respect the 
stages often depicted in celebration of 'global localisation'- the development of local 
supplier networks, the extension of research and development activities, the 
customisation of products, the promotion of locals to managerial positions, increasing 
independence of management pohcy formulation, local cash generation and retention, 
and ultimately business diversification are best regarded as foci of potential conflict and 
contestation in the operation of transplant factories, rather than as a coherent trajectory. 
Elger and Smith (ibid) argue that those views which emphasise the resilience of national 
institutions and their capacity to modify transplant practices have often downplayed the 
contradictory and contested features of such national configurations. On the other hand 
those which celebrate the dissemination of innovative best practice have often worked 
with an idealised and over-coherent conception of the practices involved, glossing over 
their internal divisions and limitations. In contrast, Elger and Smith (ibid) highlight the 
problematical character of the managerial repertoire of the parent company, and the 
tensions and uncertainties in the institutional matrix surrounding the operation of the 
subsidiary. Rather they suggest that the transplant workplace must be seen as a site of 
active initiative, uncertainty and contestation, through which company practices are 
reproduced and transformed. The leverage foreign investors exercise over the 'conduct of 
conduct' in any institutional arrangement depends on their capacity to secure compliance, 
through a combination of coercion and cooperation, on the part of other actors to operate 
in such a maimer that is compatible with that of the foreign investor (Swain, 1998). This 
would include selective recruitment, training, remuneration schemes, internal labour 
markets and the organisation of work generally. 
A central component of the radical institutionalist analysis is the existence of differential 
power relations within the actor networks that construct the discourses and discursive 
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practices in the firm. Spencer (2000) argues that the negotiation of order in the workplace 
takes place through both coercion and cooperation, because there are practical limits to 
how far a workforce can be subordinated, as well as disadvantages in terms of worker 
creativity. Bowles and Gintis (1976; 1981) suggest that employers need to organise the 
labour process in order to foster desired beliefs, attitudes and values and knowledge 
(1981:15) in order to 'make the authority relation appear at best just, or at least 
inevitable' (1976:82). In establishing and maintaining their competitive position 
managers engage in enabling myths, in this case discursive constructions, representation 
and practices to advance particular actions (Yeung, 2000). As we saw in the previous 
section Mueller and Loveridge (1997) view the trend towards internal markets, whereby 
operating units are increasingly competing with each other for new investment, as 
intensifying internalised coercion. Local managers use enabling myths of inter-plant 
competition and the battle for survival to justify pressure on workers to introduce new 
labour practices. These arguments become incorporated into the beliefs of workers and 
their unions, what Burawoy (1985) referred to as hegemonic despotism. Thus hegemony 
is achieved at plant level not through the participation of the workers in the regulation of 
employment, but through persuading them to accept the logic of the management system 
it has established, under which the threat of closure, disinvestment or transfer of 
production to other more efficient plants is ever present. 
These enabling myths, however, may not be acceptable to other social actors in the firm 
and the workers may pose a counter discourse. For example, Marschan, Welch and 
Welch (1996) quote surveys which suggest that when employers suggest the enabling 
myths of'delayering' and 'empowerment', employees perceive such organisational 
change in terms of downsizing and cost cutting. Employees in many of the organisations 
studied referred to past management fads and their implementation failures by suggesting 
that management would always resort to the use of legitimate power to maintain overall 
direction. In their study of Japanese transplants in the UK Elger and Smith (1994) talk 
about 'unveiled management hegemony'. They look at the way in which management 
had a large degree of success in structuring tasks, instituting flexibility and sustaining low 
wages by employing a young, inexperienced and pliable work force. However, even in 
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the light of a disorganised and ununionised workforce, management was forced to modify 
corporate behaviour in response to ingrained habits and unconscious resistance. 
The degree to which firms want to shift or bend institutions in the workplace wil l depend 
on their corporate strategy. How far incoming firms are actually able to influence or 
change collective understandings in the workplace, depends not only on the enduring 
nature of employee habits and norms at an unconscious level, but the role of organised 
workers as cooperators with or contestants of change. In terms of the impact on locality 
the outcome of overt and covert conflict over workplace practices wi l l have implications 
for the number of jobs, the level of wages, the extent of social provision, the intensity of 
work, security of employment and workplace representation. 
In order to explore the enduring nature of employee and managerial collective 
understandings and the way the global-localisation process might unfold in localities in 
CEE it is necessary to examine the legacies of State Owned Enterprises, which are now 
discussed in the next section. 
3.6 T H E EMBEDDEDNESS O F STATE OWNED E N T E R P R I S E S 
The previous sections have looked at influences on embeddedness in relation to firms 
fi-om market based economies, particularly in Western Europe and the USA. State Owned 
Enterprises in CEE emanate from very different institutional set ups (Smith and 
Thompson, 1992). A separate analysis of the embeddedness of these firms is necessary in 
order to understand the role of foreign investment in their transformation. 
Institutionalist approaches have contributed to an imderstanding of organisational transformation 
at two different levels of analysis. First, the notion of path contingency has been used to explain, 
why rather than transforming according to some formula, the economies of Central and Eastem 
Europe have been characterised by rich and varied institutional matrices. Chapter Two discussed 
how structural and institutional innovations have involved complex and incremental 
reconfigurations of institutional elements through a process whereby old legacies recombine with 
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the new (Stark, 1995). The particular form and content of transformation in the countries wil l 
depend on their institutional assets at the beginning of the period (Chavance and Magnin, 1997), 
their paths of extrication (Altvater, 1998; Stark, 1995) and the strategic choices of agents. Thus 
emerging forms of property and corporate structures are the result of the reconfiguration and 
rearrangement of existing institutional elements. In particular, there has been the emergence of 
interwoven forms of ownership with networked modes of coordination and hybrid forms which 
are neither market nor hierarchy. Rather than a linear process fashioned according to some pre-
ordained model, privatisation has given rise to a rich variety of different forms both within and 
between countries and a wide repertoire of coordination modes. 
Second, institutionalists have extended their analysis to the restructuring and 
transformation of individual enterprises and the reorganisation of corporate arrangements. 
Modifications in the institutional set-up are two fold. There are changes in the formal 
institutions in which markets are embedded (legal provision, property rights and so on). 
In addition, there is the ongoing transformation of the behaviour of agents with the 
emphasis on informal institutions such as individual habits, collective rules and social 
conventions (Hodgson, 1988). According to institutionalists the behaviour of economic 
agents is a product of both present incentives as well as historical processes. Winieckie 
(1992), Swaan (1996) and Swaan and Lissowska (1996) have analysed the slow 
adaptation and adjustment of SOEs by suggesting that the stock of routines, behavioural 
patterns and expectations reflect historical experience and are not suitable for the new 
environment. These ongoing patterns may have been entirely appropriate for the old 
world, but do not match the new competitive conditions. 
Swaan and Lissowska (1996) identify two influences that may be competing. On the one 
hand structural impact leads agents to consider a new repertoire of actions, while on the 
other hand there are factors which discourage a change of routines in the short and 
medium term. Human constraints put limitations on the speed of learning, and 
organisations tend to follow routines developed in the past. However, although some 
have stiessed the positive possibilities of recombining local assets and foreign investment 
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(Grabber and Stark, 1997; Uhlir, 1998) there is a significant consensus among foreign 
investors that past behaviours constitute a barrier to successful restructuring. 
Table 3.2 gives a brief summary of influences on the embeddedness that are specific to 
State Owned Enterprises. First, the main structural influence on the embeddedness of 
SOEs at the beginning of the transformation process was their status as monopoly 
producers. Lack of competition and a shortage economy coupled with the soft budget 
constraint meant that there were no incentives to efficiency. Further, a high degree of 
vertical integration meant that although these firms were large, they were unable to 
benefit from specialisation. A lack of focus on core production and high levels of social 
provision meant that production was unable to reap the benefits of economies of scale. 
Cultural legacies also presented problems for restructuring and change processes, in 
particular as a result of informal institutions that carried over from the previous decade. 
In the chaos of the 1980s decentralisation and increased autonomy for SOEs provided 
opportunities for rent seeking by the nomenklatura. At the same time ambiguous 
structures of governance had evolved as workers were given increased rights to 
participate in decision making processes in the firm as part of the post martial law 
reforms of 1981. The existence of these Workers Councils ,^ which could fire managers, 
meant that there were conservative attitudes to change and a predisposition to 
maintaining the status quo predominated. A fiirther continuity of collective 
understandings was found in the commitment to fiiU employment. Making redundancies 
was seen as an anathema, in that workers were not only deprived of a salary but also 
access to important social benefits in terms of the routines of production supplied by the 
SOE. 
In terms of cognitive processes, inappropriate knowledge of market concepts existed 
across a range of management fimctions such as HRM, financial reporting and marketing. 
However, the tacit character of organisational knowledge restricted both the ability of a 
new owner to transfer work and managerial practices and the ability of the existing firm 
to absorb new knowledge. The ability of firms to adopt new techniques, the existing 
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legacy of human capital and organisational capabilities in post communist economies 
presented a special problem, since tacit knowledge develops through experience and is 
closely related to the institutional structures in which it developed. Experimentation and 
innovation were blocked by hierarchical and paternalistic management and few 
incentives or autonomy for shop floor workers. 
Table 3.2 Influences on the embeddedness of State Owned Enterprises 
Influence on Embeddedness Description Impacts and Outcomes 
Stmctural influences Nature of competition Monopoly 
Networks Formal and informal 
Supplier networks Move from high degree of integration 
to limited deverticalisation 
Cultural influences Continuation of rent seeking 
behaviour 
Personal gain rather than maximising 
efficiency of profits 
Emphasis on supply and quantity Poor quality production 
Bermuda triangle of trade union, 
workers council and board of 
management 
Ambiguous governance and resistance 
to change 
Full employment Tendency to hoard labour and 
reluctance to make redundancies 
Cognitive influences Absence of knowledge about HR 
techniques 
No wage driven incentives, little 
fraining 
Absence of knowledge of accounting No understanding of cost structures at 
different points of production 
Engineering rather than business 
training 
Lack of exposure to fiiU range of 
management functions and techniques 
Institutional influences Connections with and control from 
Ministries at centre 
Limited ability to make decisions at 
local level 
Linkages with nomenklatura Involvement in rent seeking activities 
Source: Author 
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The important axes of power for SOEs were twofold: first through vertical lines of 
authority where SOEs were conveyor belts for the investment and production decisions of 
national level government ministries; and second, through the triangle of trade unions. 
Workers Councils and managers which resulted in ambiguous governance structures. The 
overall impact of the specific embeddedness of SOEs is that while they were central to 
employment and social provision in the locality, local actors had little participation in 
decisions regarding these monoliths. Therefore these SOEs could be viewed as being 
economically but not institutionally embedded in localities. 
3.7 CONCLUSION: A RADICAL INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH TO T H E 
F I R M 
This section draws together threads from the discussion in this chapter and combines 
them with insights from the general radical institutionalist approach elaborated in Chapter 
Two to outline the main conceptual tools that inform a radical institutionalist analysis of 
the firm. 
A radical institutionalist approach is underpinned by a number of assumptions. First, that 
economic change is path contingent and influenced by political, social and institutional 
factors. Path contingency is invoked to captiu-e the relationship between structural 
constraints, and the role of institutional innovation and agency within the firm. In this 
sense firms are understood to be path shapers within broad consfraints. However, this 
does not imply a simple determinism and frnns have multiple logics (Block, 1990), in 
that there are a range of sfrategies and tactics that can be deployed in response to 
uncertainty or a change in conditions. 
Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) suggest that although structure is the expression of 
determination by forces that are larger than life and outside an individual's control, it is 
necessary to emphasise the variability of institutions that are formed by conscious action 
(path shapers) or historical accretion (path contingency). Though capital is a driving force 
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and a major resource in the political economy view, it is implicitly embedded in the 
social-organisational approach to the economy. Therefore while individuals and 
organisations act within macroeconomic, cultural and societal frameworks, it is 
institutional and organisational variables that enhance their capacity to produce different 
outcomes. As we have seen this relates to the cultural and cognitive aspects of firms' 
behaviour. 
The second set of the arguments derive from old institutionalism and radical political 
economy that focus on power and vested interests that have been slighted topics in 
institiitional analysis (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Wallerstein, 1990; Pot, 2000). 
Grabber (ibid) suggests that asymmetrical power relationships are an essential feature of 
networks, others point to the existence of coercive processes within the firm, as well 
more subtle pressures for conformity (Burawoy, 1985; Spencer, 2000). According to 
Powell and DiMaggio (1991) efforts to incorporate power into institutional analysis 
begins with two key assumptions: 1) that actors in key institutions realise considerable 
gains from the maintenance of those institutions and 2) that when organisational fields 
are imstable and established practices i l l formed, successful collective action often 
depends upon defining and elaborating widely accepted rules of the game. Therefore the 
acquisition and maintenance of power within organisation requires that dominant 
organisations continually enact sfrategies of control either through socialisation of 
newcomers or via the support of the state and the judiciary. The fundamental idea that 
characterises this position is that the work setting is seen as a 'contested terrain' with 
various parties vying for control (Edwards, 1979) and therefore the firm incorporates 
inherent conflict between workers and employers. 
Third, while the tradition of political-economy posits the notion of domination by 
management, it does not promote a subtle understanding of social control. By confrast the 
radical institutionalist tradition views the establishment of control as highly problematic. 
Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) suggest that overall hegemony has little everyday meaning 
when organisations are complex, environmentally uncertain, and information is in short 
supply. Radical institutional economics has recognised organisational forms result, not 
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from an implicit logic of economic domination, but as a pragmatic solutions to problems 
of control that may vary considerably within a single regime. Although capital is viewed 
as central to the analysis of political-economy, this approach does not have much to say 
about capital's role in constituting power relations, or about how that role may be 
modified by sociocultiu-al and political constraints. 
In this way we draw on the notion of 'enabling myths' (Dugger, 1989 and 2000) and 
'circuits of intellectual capital' (Thrift, 1998 and 2001) which were identified in the 
previous chapter as an important element of radical institutionalist analysis, particularly 
salient in transferring new discourses across national boundaries. It was argued that 
'enabling myths' are a special form of institution and confrol mechanism to consolidate 
or justify a particular set of ideas by legitimating certain kinds of constructs, positions 
and affective states over others. As firms cross national boundaries circuits of intellectual 
capital are not only necessary to smooth the path of circuits of productive and financial 
capital, but also to effect rapid change in situations where managers need to react within a 
short time scale. Specifically in the context of CEE firms need to develop strategies to 
disembed and dismantle old legacies of the planned economy and supplant them with a 
set of ideas viewed as being consistent with the market and global competitive practices. 
A corporate culture is a shared set of beliefs and values inculcated in the corporations employees. 
The corporate culture reinforces and reshapes the employees desire to get ahead, through loyalty 
to and hard work for the corporation. Corporate culture is an intemahsation of corporate control. 
So it is a tool of social control (Dugger, 1989: 39). 
Therefore radical institutionalists have paid attention to the way in which firms establish 
corporate culture and their concern is how the values of the firm are internalised and 
accepted by employees 
Before operationalising the taxonomy of the influences on embeddedness posited here, 
the next chapter contextualises the arrival and impact of foreign investment by outiining 
the institutional setting of the Wroclaw regional economy. The rebuilding of governance 
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in the regional economy is examined to gauge how far institutions in Wroclaw are able to 
'pin down the global' and harness the potential benefits of foreign investment. 
ENDNOTES 
1 There have been extensive criticisms of the notion of Fordism as a universal template (Glick and 
Brenner, 1991; Williams et al, 1987) and for its inability to capture the unevenness and diversity 
of economic development (Jessop, 1995b; Painter and Goodwin, 1995, Storper, 1997). 
2 Income elasticity refers to the responsiveness of demand to changes in income, calculated by the 
following formula; 
Elasticity of demand = the percentage change in quantity demanded 
the percentage change in price 
Where this value is greater than one, demand is income elastic, where it is less than demand is said 
to be mcome inelastic. 
3 Workers self-management is strongly rooted in the PoHsh radical trade union tradition. The seizure 
of factories in 1945 resulted in the formation of Factory Councils, and again after the uprisings of 
1956. After the political and economic crisis of 1981 workers self-management was conceded as 
part of the measures to give SOEs more autonomy. This remained on the statute book and was 
strengthened by the Employee Self govermnent law of 1989. Under the terms of the self-
management legislation, the general meeting of employees elects members of the workers coimcil, 
and the director and all high- and medium level managerial staff are excluded from miming from 
the council. The council has broad powers which include, among other things, drawing up the 
annual plan, auditing the annual balance sheet, making resolutions concerning investment, 
approving cooperation or partnership arrangements with other economic entities and approving the 
acquisition of fixed assets. Furthermore, die workers council, together with the minister 
responsible for the enterprise, has the power to appoint and dismiss the director, and the decision 
of the council are binding on the director (Dzwonczyk and Sobczyk, 1993). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INSTITUTIONS AND T H E TRANSFORMATION OF T H E 
WROCLAW REGIONAL ECONOMY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
It has been argued that the emerging institutional and economic arrangements in a 
locahty will be path contingent in exhibiting continuities with past legacies as well as 
actively shaped by current actors. An examination of the specificities of the Wroclaw 
regional economy in terms of both formal and informal institutions is central to an 
understanding of the potentiality and impact of foreign investment. Whether firms 
consider a locality in the first place, the outcome of entry negotiations and the 
economic and institutional linkages forged on arrival wi l l depend, to varying degrees, 
on the institutional set up in the region. The degree of cohesion and cooperation of 
institutions beyond local government are what Amin and Thrift (1995b) refer to as 
institutional thickness, which could lead to lock-in behaviours that discourage the 
arrival and retention of foreign investment or contribute to the local industrial 
atmosphere in a way that is propitious for the arrival and retention of incoming fmns. 
The purpose of this chapter is to use the radical institutionalist fi-amework developed in 
the two previous chapters to analyse the relationship between the emerging institutions 
of the region and their relationship with foreign investment. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of reconstructing local governance in the 
Wroclaw region, which includes an audit of the formal institutions of the locality in 
terms of political organisations and representation, development agencies and business 
organisations. Beyond, formal organisations importance is also given to the informal 
behaviours and continuities with the past that underpin these emerging structures and 
the networks that characterise them. 
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In line with an emphasis on both agency and the existence of differentiated interests 
elaborated in Chapter Two, the second part of the chapter focuses on path shapers, that 
is those agents of change who are forging the new institutional landscape. Radical 
institutionalists, rather than seeing a harmony of interests see economic processes as 
inherently conflictual, as the partial disappearance of centralised planning has allowed 
divergent interests to emerge. Continuation is represented by those groups who 
occupied positions of power under the old regime, while newly formed groups 
previously deprived of participation in the different institutional games, are 
endeavouring to gain recognition for their aspirations (Bafoil, 1999). In particular, the 
nomenklatura, trade unions and institutions from the US and western Europe are 
identified and discussed as the main path shapers in the Wroclaw regional economy. 
4.2 RECONSTRUCTING L O C A L GOVERNANCE 
This section begins by examining the way that after 1948 a process of Stalinisation 
took place in Poland as a whole, the result of which was that the local economy and 
society was controlled through a combination of local agents of the centre (the 
voivodship) and SOEs. The section then goes on to look at how legacies persisting from 
the pre -1990 period are shaping the emergent formal and informal institutions in the 
Wroclaw locality. It explores the extent to which and in what ways these embryonic 
structures of governance are able to build local institutions and create social capital that 
is able to attract, embed and retain foreign investment. 
4.2.1 Rebuilding social capital 
The period after the Second World War saw a dramatic shift in the social structure in 
Poland, with the decomposition of coherent local conmiunities and historical regions as 
thousands of people were uprooted (Krzysztofek, 1992). In 1948 Wroclaw was 
repopulated with people from Lvov (ceded to Ukraine) and peasants driven by poverty 
from villages in cenfral Poland. These two groups were joined by human flotsam and 
jetsom and the dispossessed, who were drawn by stories of work and food, to what 
Kennedy (1997) describes as the 'El Dorado' of the West. 
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From 1948 onwards two elements imposed order on this chaotic situation. First, the 
stalinisation of society imposed the voivodship as the local agent of national 
government, as regions were grouted into artificial administrative structures. The 
voivodship was housed in a purpose built, imposing and austere building, and was the 
transmission belt for the orders of Ministers or party officials. Thus high ranking party 
officials regarded the personnel of the voivodship as the official guardians of national 
interests in the region (Jensen and Plum, 1993). Between 1945 and 1990 town planning 
was basically an exercise in accounting and management, serving largely as a 
diagnostic tool for drawing up an inventory of the region. Although SOEs were largely 
under the authority of the relevant Ministry in Warsaw, interviews with former 
managers of these monoliths in Wroclaw suggested that there had been regular 
meetings of an elite coalition in the region comprising leading officials of the 
voivodship and managers of these companies. However, this had more to do with 
maintaining social networks and preserving the privileges of social capital than it had 
to do with resolving either practical issues or discussion regarding any vision for the 
local economy outside of fiilfiUing the plan. 
Second, SOEs were a central way in which the communist authorities attempted to 
impose social control in the region. However, this was far from unproblematic and 
uncontested as these factories were sites of overt or covert conflict about wresting 
control from workers in an attempt to stamp Stalinist work practices and ideology onto 
the workplace (Kennedy, op.cit). Importantly, at a local level welfare was linked to 
employment in the large SOEs that dominated the landscape of the Wroclaw region. 
They were significant contributors to welfare capital, and typically provision would 
include housing, health, vacation homes, nurseries, leisure, sports facilities and so on, 
although the access to these facilities varied between and within firms. 
Within firms the nomenklatura acted as 'gatekeepers' (Domanski, 1997) in that they 
made decisions regarding access to and the allocation and distribution of these benefits. 
Apart from the direct benefits they awarded themselves, access to services such as 
loans, cars, trips abroad was used as patronage for loyal employees. Leisure and social 
provision was an important source of social cohesion, for example up until the mid 
1960s Pafawag (producers of train carriages) had a huge range of activities including 
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choirs, dramatic groups and a wide range of sports teams. Aspects of welfare and social 
activities that persisted into the 1990s included vacation homes, sports facilities, 
mushroom picking expeditions and fishing trips, which meant that there was a sense of 
community and interaction between workers. 
The hegemonic role of SOEs was undermined by the post martial law reforms of 1981 
which decentralised control and devolved functions giving these firms more autonomy. 
Although there was a great deal of variation between SOEs with regard to what and 
how much was divested social provision, particularly of housing, began to contract. 
However, by the late 1970s collective activity of a different sort manifested itself in the 
industrial action and political activity spearheaded by Solidarity. Wroclaw, along with 
other major Polish cities, was heavily involved in the fight for political change (Garton 
Ash, 1999), with factory occupations in Pafawag and Dolmel in the centre of the city 
and Polar, Wrozamet and Hydral in the industrial area to the Northeast. Tanks were 
used against workers and activists were arrested and often imprisoned, with fellow 
workers and neighbours taking collections to support their families. The collective 
memory of the industrial action of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the subsequent 
imposition of martial law is still very strong in the minds of older workers, but little 
more than ancient history for many people under forty. 
Renewed crisis in the 1980s brought about a complete breakdown in social cohesion, 
and the rapid deterioration in the system and its increasing inability to deliver social, 
economic or political benefits meant that there was a marked deterioration in the 
quality of life. Although diminished by the end of the 1980s, the welfare capital of 
SOEs had to a certain extent been preserved. Social capital, however, was in a state of 
disarray and collapse, old networks were no longer delivering material or symbolic 
privileges for the nomenklatura. They were now in the process of searching for new 
rent seeking opportunities in the purported panacea of the free market and 
reconstituting old linkages to this end. Those with more foresight had already started to 
forge new relationships, particularly through foreign trade opportunities in anticipation 
of the collapse of the command economy. This was the institutional vacuum in which 
social capital had to be rebuilt or rather reconstituted in Wroclaw from 1990 onwards. 
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4.2.2 The emerging base of formal institutions 
As we saw in the previous section local economies and regions in an administrative and 
political sense were weak and completely undeveloped in comparison with the West. 
Competencies and the scope of responsibiUty at a regional level had been constrained 
by legal acts, the manipulation of elections and limitation of fimds. Zaucha (1999) 
describes the voivodship's budget as the spatially clustered budgets of individual 
government ministries. Further a whole range of intermediate agencies and NGOs such 
as chambers of commerce, agencies of regional development, consulting agencies and 
business support centres were completely non-existent. 
In Poland a self governmental system on a local level was restored after the first fiilly 
democratic elections in 1990. According to a typology of countries (Gorzelak 1998) 
fiom the point of view of share of local budgets in all public spending and in GDP, 
Poland is a country of 'shallow decentralisation'. Gminas (communes), the lowest tier 
of local government, had responsibility for a range of tasks and receive money fi-om the 
state and local taxes to finance their activities. However, Rrzysztofek (1992) describes 
these organisations as lacking the hard instruments for affecting economic 
development. From 1990 onwards the second territorial unit, the voivodship became 
increasingly dependent on the central government or rather several departments of the 
governments, in that it has a set of sub budgets each of them under the control of a 
given Ministry. The voivod (governor of the voivodship) was nominated by the prime 
minister, and there was no elected political representation at the level of voivodship. 
The process of transferring responsibilities from central government was underway 
from 1990, but demanded the creation of bigger units, which is reflected in the reform 
of the territorial structure, which took place from January 1999. 
On the following pages Figure 4.1 shows the major city and towns in the voivodship. 
Table 4.1 shows the relationship between the different tiers of government in the 
voidvodship and Table 4.2 shows the main non governmental agencies in the region. 
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Figure 4.1 Map of the Wroclaw voivodship 
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Table 4.1 Local government arrangements in Wroclaw 1975 to December 1998 
Tier Local 
Government 
Features Development Functions 
Voivodship 
(Region) 
Municipality 
(City) 
Population 1.2 million 
1 of49 in Poland 
Performs functions of national 
government 
Governor appointed at national level 
Population 641,000 
1 out 3 urban communes 
Responsible for city 
Department of Economic 
Initiatives 
o Privatisation 
• Foreign investment 
Department of Economic 
Initiatives 
• Year 2000 Plan 
• Foreign investment 
e Technology Park 
Gmina 
(Commune) 
37 in voivodship 
11 urban-rural, 23 rural 
Limited fimctions 
Initiative at level of local 
mayor 
Source: Author 
With regard to regional development the municipality had published an economic 
development plan that was accepted in March 1998 entitled Wroclaw 2000, which 
proposed a blueprint for the city's economic development. Outside of the institutions of 
local government the Wroclaw Development Agency was formed in December 1999 to 
promote economic development in the voivodship as a whole. In addition, since 1990 
there has been a proliferation of other institutions such as the Lower Silesian and 
British Chambers of Commerce. Table 4.2 provides a summary and overview of the 
main institutions. 
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Table 4.2 Non-governmental agencies in Wroclaw in 1999 
Agency Functions 
Wroclaw Development Agency Set up 1999 as private company 
Owns assets (properties and land) 
Economic development of voivodship 
Supporting establishment of new companies 
Place marketing 
Attracting foreign investment 
Build public and private networks 
Lower Silesian Chamber of Commerce 
British Chamber of Commerce 
Set up 1989, currently 400 members 
Funded by subscriptions(non profit making) 
Members mainly from municipality 
Most active members small business 
Exchange of information 
Networking for companies 
Information for potential investors 
List of contacts 
Monthly meeting 
Talks 
Social events 
Source: Author 
4.2.3 Rebuilding local institutions 
The problem of rebuilding 'localism' had its roots in the legacy of the past. Apart from 
the institutional vacuum in Wroclaw in 1990, the ability to rebuild a civil society with 
participation was undermined by the way in which social energy in the previous system 
had vented itself, not into running the system, but into rent seeking in the parallel 
informal economy. Hausner and Marody (2000) point to the importance of social 
capital based on mutual trust to achieve certain goals, and suggest that the social 
cement of trust has been imdermined by the institutionalisation of non-accountability in 
Poland. In their view there has been an erosion of state authority as power shifts 
beyond the bounds of constitutional government, which in the economy relates to 
chaotic decision making with regard to satisfying the demands of powerfiil and 
discontented groups. Hausner and Miroch (ibid) quote a survey by Haman and 
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Wesolowski (1999) which found among ten features of democracy that 'participation in 
democracy' was given a relatively low eighth place, while 'choosing the best people to 
govern' to 'ensure the prosperity of citizenship was rated top'. It was suggested that 
this reflected a culture of exculpation and passivity regarding participation in 
democratic and community processes. 
These issues are now explored in relation to FDI in the Wroclaw economy through 
three themes: the continued importance of SOEs in influencing transformation at a 
local level; conflict between those converting and reconstituting the social capital of the 
previous period into new power bases and the emergence of new interests; and how far 
networks have repressed or stimulated organisational innovation and initiatives. 
The continued preeminence of State Owned Enterprises 
The legacy of the past in terms of vertical lines of authority between the centre and the 
regions, overlaid with new piecemeal legislation from 1990 onwards, presented 
significant problems for formulating any coherent local sfrategy, particularly at the 
level of the municipality. Land use was chaotic (Figure 4.2 overleaf) with residential 
and industrial areas and dzialka (allotments) mixed together. The first problem was that 
control of the land was and continues to be a barrier to economic planning in the 
mimicipality. A large amount of land was allocated for industrial use, and SOEs 
continue to be significant landlords owning considerable areas of land in industrial 
areas to the West and the South East of the City over which the municipality lacks 
control. This had two implications for foreign investors first that there was little 
possibility for greenfield production within the municipality and second they had to 
negotiate directly with the local or national representatives of SOEs. 
By 1998 three foreign supermarkets had been sold land by SOEs without consulting the 
municipality and the Director of Economic Initiatives of the municipality suggested 
had created tensions. 
109 
V 
on 
3 
•o 
C 
o 
CO 
c3 
.S 
'o 
'S 
3l 
D 
(N 
Frustration on the part of the plaimers emanated from the fact that the Wroclaw 2000 
municipal development plan had included provision for a network of supermarkets, but 
it was argued that the current retail projects exceeded the number anticipated and had 
not been located in the areas deemed to be best for the city. Thus the number and 
pattern of supermarkets was viewed as incompatible with the city's development plan, 
and there were no laws with which to regulate the situation because of the confiising 
situation with land ownership. One supermarket, had written a Letter of Intent, but had 
already reneged on parts of the agreement. There was particular concern for the impact 
that the presence of large supermarkets would have on smaller local shops and the fact 
that this may leave some parts of the city dead. The possibility of planning and the 
formulation of a regional strategy was undermined by a lack of confrol over key firms 
in the region or municipality. 
Large SOEs dominated the economic landscape at the beginning of the transformation 
period, several of which continued to be significant employers. The legacy of the past 
was one where the cenfral relationship was between large SOEs and central 
government with personnel in local economies often unaware of and not consulted 
about decisions taken. Municipal governments made plans without the cooperation of 
large SOEs in their localities and in turn these SOEs usually ignored those local plans. 
The current privatisation process reflects these past relationships, and strong tendencies 
still exist towards vertical rather than horizontal linkages with different agendas being 
pursued by national and local institutions. For example, the regional Ministries of 
Privatisation based in the voivodship are an extension of national government and 
decisions are likely to reflect national priorities and concerns rather than specific local 
circumstances. Therefore important decisions about large local SOEs were taken at 
national level without reference to local actors. 
Brownfield foreign investments as part of the privatisation programme were all 
negotiated at national level, with local actors playing a role only at workplace level. 
Firms such as Rokita and Wrozamet are both part of National Investment Funds (Mass 
Privatisation Programme), holding companies with both a national and international 
element based in Warsaw but with significant ownership lying outside of Poland In 
the restructuring and sale of Polgas (state monopoly industrial gas company) or Dolmel 
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there was no regional logic or coherence to the bundles of firms assembled for the 
purchase of foreign investors and no mechanism to ensure that local interests would 
have any sway or influence. Thus decisions regarding the expansion, closure or 
rationalization of a large number of firms such as Polar (5,000 employees) or Jelcz 
(3,000 employees) lay in Warsaw rather than the locality or region. A palpable 
bitterness and fiaistration was evident from the outcome of a national decision to sell a 
local computer firm to Siemens. Siemens had been forced to buy the Wroclaw 
company as part of a national package to gain entry into the telecommunications 
market. Part of the agreement was that all 1,500 employees would be maintained, 
however, the redundancy package was so attractive that jobs were voluntarily 
'relinquished'. 
Competing interests: emerging elites versus the old guard 
An important element of institutional thickness (Amin and Thrift 1995a) is consensus, 
trust and a congruity of objectives (Hausner and Marody, op.cit.). This could emerge in 
one of two ways. The logic of the systemic vacuum argument (Jessop, 1995a) is that an 
institutional configuration needs to be constructed with regional development agencies 
as a principal agent (Hausner et al, 1997). In the evolutionary analysis with path 
dependency at its core, institutions wi l l emerge slowly recombining elements of the 
past and present in a new constellation which wi l l be both fit for purpose and therefore 
efficient (Grabber and Stark, 1997). In the case of Wroclaw, the lack of coordination 
and cooperation between various levels of adminisfration and government is the 
outcome of legacies from the past reflected in current processes of the privatisation of 
land and firms, but also reflected deeper conflicts. 
Different organisations had evolved to represent different factions of capital. The 
Lower Silesian Chamber of Commerce was set up in 1989 as a non-profit making 
volimtary organisation. It employed four people and had 400 members in 1999, 85 per 
cent of whom are based in the municipality. Despite the nominal membership of large 
firms such as Enginco, the organisation mainly represents the interests and concerns of 
SMEs. For example, twenty five per cent of member firms were tourist or holiday firms 
who cooperated on issues such as standards of service and marketing. Another 
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significant group were the small firms who own bars, restaurants and cultural 
institutions such as galleries in the old town, who had collectively made representations 
to the muncipality on issues such as leases. Thus the activities of the Chamber of 
Commerce reflected the membership and concerns of SMEs. 
In the early 1990s there has been an initiative by the governor of the voivodship to form 
the Psie Pole Industrial Group to represent and develop the interests of white goods 
manufacturers, comprising Polar, Wrozamet, Hydral and Dohnel. It was envisaged that 
they would cooperate together for mutual support and development, with shared 
technology and research, suppliers and marketing. Financial backing would be 
forthcoming from the powerfiil local Bank Zachnodnia. However, the individual 
interests of managers and workers in the firms outweighed the potential benefits of the 
collective. Even on the most basic level Hydral failed to have a contract renewed for 
supplying components to Polar, because they could not meet delivery times and quality 
standards. 
Foreign capital in the area tended to coalesce around the British Chamber of 
Commerce. In addition to British firms, US and Swedish firms were also included in 
the list of members. The chamber facilitated important informal contacts between 
foreign investors, who used it as a forum for the exchange of information on wage 
levels, work practices and infrastructural problems. It was also the starting point for 
incoming FDI in terms of establishing contacts with existing firms. The municipality 
was unable to get any large foreign investors interested in contributing to the Wroclaw 
2000 plan, because as the Vice President suggested, " They are too busy playing their 
own games". The abortive Psie Pole Industrial Group, the Lower Silesian Chamber of 
Commerce and the British Chamber represent the interests of different sections of 
capital in terms of both size and nationality. These are manifest in these three 
organisations exhibiting different and possibly divergent interests and largely operating 
within different ambits. 
Overt conflict and i l l concealed hostility, however, were evident between the municipal 
council and the voivodship, and particularly its ex-governor. While the voivodship had 
responsibility for the wider region, the concern of the municipality lay in the 
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development of the city. The ex-Governor suggested that the city was over dominant 
and too strong in local decision making processes, while city representatives argued 
that the voivodship favoured the smaller towns and gmina to the detriment of the 
municipality. There was little communication between these two institutions regarding 
foreign investment - they produced different promotional literature, attended different 
international fairs and conferences, and courted individual firms separately in line with 
their divergent agendas. The outcome was that that these two levels of regional 
government have pursued parallel, i f not competitive, strategies to attract foreign direct 
investment. 
The hostility towards the ex-govemor went beyond a simple clash of personalities. As 
governor of the voivodship for eight years, and the appointee of the national 
government, he occupied an extremely powerful position in the region. He had been in 
post from 1990 to 1998 during which time he had survived five changes of national 
government. A view voiced not only by the municipality and the Lower Silesian 
Chamber of Commerce but also other local agents, suggested that the ex-govemor 
dominated and was at the apex of a powerftil network which had survived from the pre-
transformation period which comprised people from the voivodship and some of the 
large local SOEs. The view was widespread that the activities of this network were 
focused on rent seeking rather economic development. From an institutionalist agenda 
these deeply rooted relationships and networks are critically important, but by the 
nature of their informality are exclusive, have low visibility and are not easy to verify. 
As we shall see the ex-govemor moved his power base from the voivodship to the 
newly created Wroclaw Development Agency. 
There was also conflict between the municipality and the smaller towns and gminas, 
particularly in trying to win foreign investment. Although Wroclaw city had relatively 
low rates of unemployment, there were marked disparities within the region, 
particularly between the city municipality, small town municipalities and rural gminas. 
There was also a wide variation in terms of the initiative and dynamism exhibited by 
actors at the sub regional level. There were examples of proactive local mayors doing 
direct deals with firms. Bielany, a gmina just outside of the city, succeeded in securing 
a two large greenfield investment in 1993, Cadbury and Cargill. On the same site there 
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is now a huge out of town retail complex with IKEA, Makro and Tesco. To a lesser 
degree Sroda Slaska had been successfiil in capturing foreign investment, with the 
Coca Cola bottling plant at one end of the town and Armsfrong (foam manufacture)r at 
the other. 
The creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) at national level in 1995 gave 
preferential tax treatment to foreign investors and added to the complexity of regional 
governance and intensified inter regional competition. Without any SEZs within its 
territory there were fears that Wroclaw would become relatively unattractive in 
comparison to those regions that could offer substantial financial inducements such as 
tax holidays. Two firms which had intially showed a sfrong interest in the Wroclaw 
region, decided to locate in SEZs. Consequently Motorola located near Krakow and 
General Motors in the Katowice area. More problematic is the fact that two adjacent 
voivodships of Walbrzych and Legnica had been designated SEZs and this may have 
deflected potential investments from Wroclaw. Volkswagen, for example, have built a 
greenfield site to build engines for its global operations in Legnica. The consultant 
Arthur Andersen identified the potential financial benefits of these adjacent SEZs to 
client firms looking to locate or relocate, and reported that at least one firm had 
consolidated seven smaller investments from Wroclaw on one larger site in the 
Walbrzych voivodship. 
Bypassing old networks: from inertia versus innovation 
Amin (1999) has emphasized the need for recursive learning by local agents, where 
they actively seek new solutions to problems rather than following the reactive, 
hierarchical rule following behaviour that characterised the previous regime. The 
municipality showed the greatest degree of forward and proactive planning, although 
they experienced passivity with regard to participation from individuals and groups in 
the community. A number of conferences and meetings were held out of which large 
numbers of books and documents were produced, but this did not attract 'new blood' 
rather the same group of academics and local bureaucrats who were obliged to 
participate. The plan itself resembled advanced spatial planning and was mainly 
concerned with land use and was reminiscent of old five year plans. Further, as the plan 
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was being formulated local actors were overtaken by events with the arrival of 
supermarkets into what were regarded as undesignated areas. A positive initiative by 
the municipality was the establishment of a technology park which had the legal status 
of a joint stock company belonging to the State Treasury. In 1999 the park was still at 
the initial stages of development, because there was difficulty in purchasing the 4,000 
square metres of land for which plans had been drawn up, fi-om the Ministry of 
Agriculture. 
In comparison with the municipality the voivodship showed a much greater degree of 
inertia. The Department of Economic Initiatives set up in 1 July 1990 was nominally 
responsible for economic development in the voivodship. This department was also the 
regional representative of the Ministry of Privatisation, and therefore economic 
development was mainly viewed as being synonymous with promoting privatisation. 
Thus there was no strategy or vision for economic development because the main 
activity was divesting property and selling off large numbers of small and medium 
sized companies. In this case the enabling myth of the plan had been exchanged for the 
enabling myth of the market with a complete absence of understanding or discussion as 
to how newly created SMEs might be supported by the voivodship or how 
entrepreneurial expertise harnessed in wider networks. There was no notion of creating 
a supportive environment in which these firms might develop - private property was 
seen as the only necessary condition for successful entrepreneurship. 
The task of attracting and liaising with foreign investors lay within the ambit of the 
Department of Economic Initiatives and was the responsibility of one low level 
bureaucrat, who between 1990 and 1998 was directly involved in the arrival of only 
one foreign firm - Cargill. His other tasks included identifying potential sites for 
foreign investors that were available for purchase, writing promotional literature for the 
voivodship and producing a catalogue of land and assets for sale. In the event of any 
interest being shown by flagship firms, the Governor of the voivodship would intervene 
and directly carry out negotiations, with the bureaucrat nominally in charge relegated to 
the sidelines. In fact it appeared that the purpose of the nominal appointment of a low 
level bureaucrat was to leave the governor's role in intervening and negotiating with 
foreign firms unchallenged. 
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The Governor of the voivodship (1992 to 1998) suggested that the voivodship was 
simply incapable of promoting economic development. At voivodship level he argued it 
was not clear who needed to be approached to get things done and a potential foreign 
investor faced a muddled and complicated system where different departments needed 
to be contacted, regarding land purchase, use of utilities and labour issues and saw the 
current rules, regulations and structures as inflexible and a barrier to promoting change 
and development. Following his analysis regarding the shortcomings of the voivodship 
the Governor set up the Wroclaw Development Agency in December, 1997. WARR 
(Wroclawia Agencja Rozowoju Regionalego) was a non-governmental institution, 
which has the legal status of a commercial company and therefore had to cover its costs 
and work on a zero plus basis. Its financial situation is stable as it has a stream of 
income from managing the land and property which it owns. The shareholders are the 
municipalities, the Chamber of Commerce and regional enterprises. WARR is managed 
by a one person board, who was the previous Governor of the Wroclaw voivodship 
(1992 to 1998). 
The aim of the organisation was to build networks at different levels. In the region it 
was intended to cooperate with other development agencies, chambers and business 
associations, banks and consulting companies through a series of partnerships which 
have been formalised by signed declarations. In addition, local networks were not only 
mobilised as customers and clients for its activities, but also as a source of additional 
expertise for consultancy. As the Director of the WARR and before in his role as 
governor there had been attempts to build international level partnerships which had 
been established with regions in France and Germany (although it was felt that Eire, 
Portugal or Spain are closer to the Polish experience) and trade visits have taken place 
to a variety of countries. 
In 2000 it was too early to judge the success of WARR as it has only been in existence 
for two years. The ex-govemor/current Director had set it up with the ambition of it 
becoming the leading force for local economic development in the region. Its 
aspirations and status are reflected in the new offices in a palatial building in the rynek 
(town square) which was completely refurbished early 1999. The Director used his 
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previous post as governor to create assets for WARR, through the ownership of 
buildings and property, necessary to sustain the agency financially. It was suggested 
that past networks would be used to gain work and contracts and also to subcontract the 
work. The Director was politically astute and well connected in both Warsaw and the 
locality as a result of eight years as governor. The emphasis placed on breaking with 
old habits and an openness to new ways of doing things, coupled with extensive 
networks at a local, national and international level offer the possibility of a proactive 
local development organisation. 
The potential contribution of WARR to local development and 'intelligent' institution 
building has to be offset against other factors. First, the extent to which the agency wil l 
be able to deliver the quality of services across the ambitious range of activities listed, 
all of which face competition from other local private and public institutions. Second, 
how far the current strategy extends beyond witming FDI and place marketing, with no 
strategy for SMEs which are regarded in some quarters as the backbone of development 
from below. Third, because the agency does not have a public budget it must make a 
profit, and this may constrain its ability to incorporate wider social objectives. Finally, 
the most significant factor that inhibits WARR's ability to play a developmental role in 
the region, is the way in which the current organisation is perceived by other local 
actors as a continuation of rent seeking activity by a small network of unelected people. 
As a consequence relationships with other institutions in the locality, particularly the 
municipality, were poor and a barrier to a coherent strategy. 
4.3 PATH SHAPERS IN T H E L O C A L I T Y 
This section identifies and elaborates a discussion reagarding those groups who have 
been significant agents of change. First, an examination the role of the nomenklatura 
accords with the view that powerfiil social groups have led to chaotic decision making. 
The second group of agents of change focuses on the importance of organised workers, 
and in particular Solidarity. This trade union cum political party was central in 
dismantling of the old communist system and shifting the trajectory towards a more 
market based economy. At a local level Solidarity has played an important role in either 
cooperating with or contesting change, particularly at the level of the workplace. The 
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final section examines the role of agents from western market economies and the part 
they have played in influencing formal institutions and shifting informal institutions. 
4.3.1 Social capital into economic capital: the nomenklatura 
The main impact of the chaos of the 1980s was that the ruling class and party leaders 
started to turn their social capital into economic capital. By the end of the 1980s, many 
managers followed the call of the leadership and engaged in private enterprise, and 
party and state officials used their position to become wealthy owners of what used to 
be state enterprises (Kolankiewicz and Lewis, 1988). Typically, what happened in so-
called nomenklatura privatisation was that an SOE would sell its non-core operations, 
such as a computer centre, repair facilities, or the sales centre to a group of insiders that 
included managers and party activists. Purchasers were offered favourable terms in the 
price, leases or licenses, thus stripping state owned enterprises (SOEs) of their most 
profitable operations (Kierzkowski et al, 1993). As enterprises were restricted from 
raising prices, the private purchaser could buy cheaply and make a profit by selling on 
the unrestricted black market. These nomenklatura privatisations fiirther weakened the 
management of the SOEs. Decentralisation allowed them the option of shifting their 
power base, either by acting as owners of small businesses or as a result of 
nomenklatura privatisations, or more commonly as increasingly powerfiil managers in 
quasi governmental, decenfralised enterprises. 
As we saw earlier since 1990 that group of people who constitute the nomenklatura at a 
local level, have actively fransformed and reconstituted their social capital to transform 
themselves from the agents and beneficiaries of the command economy to the new 
entrepreneurs. The remnants of the nomenklatura do not form a homogenous group and 
are much more fluid than before 1990, and as we shall see have deeply differentiated 
interests regarding foreign capital and firms. In these recombinant emerging 
institutional forms it is envisaged, and indeed viewed as desirable by some, that the 
new elite of entrepreneurs wi l l substantially overlap with the old nomenklatura 
(Grabber and Stark, 1997). Strong connections are seen between managerial and 
technocratic positions in the state socialist sector and success in entering 
entrepreneurship in post communism. The legacy of the previous period is that the 
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former elite were well endowed to convert their cultural capital of education and 
training acquired in the old order to prominent positions in the new. This has been 
reflected in the way that managers of previous SOEs have bypassed local government 
in their disposal of assets, in particular selling land to foreign food retailers. Further 
there is strong continuity in those that managed the old firms and the new management 
in FDI owned firms, particularly in brownfield developments. Powerfiil actors in the 
voivodship have been able to use their position and networks to convert the physical 
and cultural capital of the old system to assets under the new market economy, from 
which they are direct beneficiaries. Interviews with a selection of worker-management 
buyouts in Wroclaw confirmed the findings of Tittenbrun, (1995) that this process has 
enabled previous managers or people in important positions to transform themselves 
into the entrepreneurs, managers and new owners of small and medium sized 
companies. 
4.3.2 Blockade capital into social capital: workers 
Following the radical institutionalist approach rather than seeing firms as consensual 
and coherent, workplaces are regarded as sites of (potential) conflict (Clarke et al, 
1993; Thirkell et al, 1994 and 1995; Herod, 1998). It follows that this analysis brings 
the role of labour both organised and unorganised into focus as a significant agent of 
change, as cooperators with, initiators, or contestors of transformation, with regard to 
the privatisation process and the restructuring of firms in particular. At a national level, 
government strategy was either tempered by the threat of potential industrial unrest, or 
supported by trade unions playing a critical role in mobilising consent for economic 
reform. 
At enterprise level, attempts to reform structures of property ownership and the 
relations of production were constrained and conditioned by the traditional approaches 
of managers and workers developed over the long period of the command economy. 
The sfrength and persistence of these enterprise patterns and habits varies from country 
to country, according to recent past policies of economic reform and the specific 
features of the regime. The need to restructure the labour process and to introduce 
capitalist patterns of labour control have been a necessary corollary to the attempt to 
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transform the economy into a large privately owned market system. The difficulty in 
doing this is what makes labour relations a key issue for regime change. (Thirkell, et al, 
1994:1) 
The notion of workers self management is strongly rooted in the Polish radical trade 
imion tradition (Biezenski, 1994). The spontaneous seizure of the factories by militants 
in 1945 resulted in the formation of factory councils (Kennedy, 1997), and in 1956 
(Harman, 1988) and in 1970 workers turned to self-management in the form of 
Workers Councils or commissions. Pankow (1993) argues that Polish SOEs in the post 
war period were scenes of permanent social conflict, sometimes hidden sometimes 
overt. Workers tried, with varying degrees of consistency and success to build workers' 
representation in factories which communist employers tried to counter. 
After the political and economic crisis of 1981 workers self-management was conceded 
as part of the measures giving SOEs more autonomy. This remained on the statute book 
and was strengthened by the Employee Self Government Law of 1989. Under the terms 
of the self-management legislation, the general meeting of employees elected members 
of the Workers Council, and the director and all high- and medium level managerial 
staff were excluded from running from the council. The council had broad powers 
which included, among other things, drawing up the annual plan, auditing the annual 
balance sheet, making resolutions concerning investment, approving cooperation or 
partnership arrangements with other economic entities and approving the acquisition of 
fixed assets. 
Workers self government had implications for the role of the director, the connecting 
thread between the centre and the enterprise. Since 1946 this position had been highly 
ambiguous in terms of responsibilities, prerogatives, lines of subordination and 
accountability. From 1958 until 1990 the director fimctioned in harness with the 
Conference of Workers Self Mzmagement (KSR), the party secretary and the union 
chairman. During this whole period appointments were subject to nomenklatura 
procedures and the usual personal ties typical of cadre policy in communist countries. 
Furthermore, the Workers Council, together with the minister responsible for the 
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enterprise, has the power to appoint and dismiss the director, and the decisions of the 
council were binding on the director (Dzwonczyk and Sobczyk, 1993). 
In 1990 Solidarity was a powerful political force which mobilised large numbers of 
workers to bring about the demise of the Commimist government, and which then as a 
political party ushered in the period of market led transformation (Rainnie and Hardy, 
1995). It was a Janus like organisation described by Lewis (1994) in 1990 as being a 
political giant but a trade union pygmy. Solidarity, instead of constituting, 'blockade 
capital' were turned into 'social capital' to facilitate reforms involving massive 
restrictions on consumption and far reaching structural change'(Deppe and Tatur, 1997: 
246). At the level of the Wroclaw regional economy Solidarity's enthusiasm for the 
market, in theory at least, manifested itself in courses organised by Solidarity on 
market economics and attended by one himdred of its members, which was financed by 
the University of New Britain, United States. In practice the role of Solidarity has been 
more complicated and at times contradictory, both competing with or contesting the 
pace, scale and form of restructuring. However, as we shall see although Solidarity 
embraced the notion of the market with a degree of enthusiasm, there was a gap 
between the enabling myth and the realities they experienced in their workplaces. This 
gave rise to instances of conflict as the role foreign direct investment in the ownership 
structure or its impact on the firm were strongly contested. 
Apart fi-om the key role they played in a number of flagship SOEs, in the locahty 
Solidarity has played a defensive role with little involvement in any vision of economic 
development. It has mostly been concerned with trying to mitigate the effects of the 
impact of rapid transformation on the most vulnerable sections of the community. In 
the voivodship there was one main office in Wroclaw municipality and ten smaller 
offices in other towns. Within the voivodship Solidarity dealt with diverse problems 
and the differential effects of transformation as some sub-regions faced very high levels 
of unemployment. Health and education reforms instigated in January 1999 produced 
huge problems for Solidarity. Eight hospital closures by March 2000 and more 
planned, had resulted in large scale redundancies. Solidarity played an important social 
work fimction and individual case work formed a large proportion of its work, 
involving legal advice regarding work, family and personal problems, and writing 
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letters to courts and governments. The shedding of jobs in its traditional base of SOEs 
and a failure to recruit and establish a presence in the new foreign investments, 
particularly, the retail sector, has left Solidarity operating on the margins. 
4.3.3 Imported intellectual capital: western market economies 
Governments, firms and NGOs from Western market economies have been important 
agents of change in attempting to institute a new set of informal institutions at both a 
national and a local level. In the communist period the locality had accumulated 
knowledge comprising embedded habits, routines and legacies, which western 
economists and business practitioners have generally considered to be unsuitable 
legacies and a barrier to economic development. According to Pejovich (1994) this 
philosophical heritage was based on communalism, political hierarchy, shared values 
and shared traditions. These collective norms and values were not viewed as conducive 
to methodological individualism and rewards based on performance. Notions of 
collectivism were reflected in a deeply enfrenched belief in the communal provision of 
a variety of benefits such as low cost vacations, allowances for children, medical 
benefits, subsidised housing and leisure. 
The market economies of the West have been proactive in transferring what was 
thought to be 'appropriate knowledge' relating to the fimctioning of market economies. 
Managerial know how has been transferred through FDI, which arises through the 
extensive training given to senior and middle managers, coupled with the transfer of 
management systems from the home country. Chapters Five and Six discuss how 
managers of foreign investments consciously attempted to displace 'old attitudes' to 
work and replace them with those which were in line with US and West European work 
practices. 
After the establishment of a critical mass of foreign capital there was a growth in the 
number and activities of organisations, both formal and informal, to fialfiU a networking 
function and to lobby in the interests of foreign capital. The corporate strategy of Volvo 
of having expatriates in post for a longer period than other firms, led the Managing 
Director to lobby for an international school in order to recruit and maintain younger 
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executives with families in post. The international school opened in Wroclaw in 
September 1998 and the Managing Director of Volvo was appointed to the supervisory 
board. In addition, by 1999 there were British, German and Swedish consuls. Further 
the Swedish consul appointed in 1998 is the Polish HRM Director at Volvo. 
Representatives of foreign capital have lobbied for infrastructural improvements and 
facilities such as international banks and direct flights from a larger number of 
European destinations. A l l of these developments have served to lock the region fiarther 
into international circuits of capital and increase their attractiveness from the point of 
view of potential investors. 
Creating the appropriate institutional conditions has been at the heart of assistance and 
aid from western market economies. Knowledge has also been transferred through aid 
to transforming economies predicated on the idea that change wi l l be facilitated and 
accelerated through an understanding of the 'right' ideas or the existence of best 
practice (often unadapted), strictly codified, bundled and transferred. The New Britain 
University, from America gave a special grant to the Technical University of Wroclaw, 
one element of which was to organise courses for frade unionists on economics. The 
syllabus, based on a neoliberal text, was designed to help workers understand the 'new 
situation' and the meaning of a market economy and the current problems faced by 
enterprises. Over one hundred trade unionists, mainly from Solidarity, attended these 
courses. Further Trade Union leaders from Jelcz and Polar were provided with all 
expenses paid trips to the US, which lasted several weeks on the invitation of American 
trade unions. These were nothing less than very overt attempts to transfer, unmodified, 
a set of enabling myths about the free market whose economic benefits were beyond 
question. There were more subtle attempts at infroducing new ways of thinking from 
West European economies that fell short of the all embracing ideological packages 
exported from the US. For example, Ostwestcentrum was a non-governmental 
organisation financed by local government from Bayem, Germany with the aim of 
transferring knowledge and imparting business practices. The organisation worked with 
the Lower Silesian of Commerce to provide support for local SMEs through organising 
short courses on making business plans and business games. 
Otrek was a Polish consultancy which was supported as part of the UK Know How 
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initiative ,^ and this aid took the form of buying in assistance from UK's leading 
supplier of training. Initially these UK consultants advised the company on how to 
transform itself from a cooperative with many stakeholders to a two-person limited 
liability company. Simultaneously they transferred packages for training in a wide 
variety of management skills in HRM, finance and marketing, which were transferred 
with varying degrees of customisation for the local market. Between 1996 and 1998 a 
number of consultants from the UK had delivered courses, on the basis of 
disseminating what was understood to be 'best management practises' to Polish trainers 
and managers. 
Advice from the West also extended to the reorganisation of social provision along the 
lines of the market. At the beginning of 1999 reforms, based on the advice of the World 
Bank, were infroduced in both health and education. In the case of health the budget 
was reduced and devolved to the regional bodies. The method of restructuring the 
chaotic health service has been for money to follow patients, and let decisions about the 
fiiture of hospitals and clinics be taken by the market through some sort of '(un)creative 
destruction' mechanism. The Otrek consultancy won several confracts for advising 
hospital managements and training health managers in the art of accountancy and 
budgeting. The result has been the closure of eight hospitals in the voivodship by the 
end of 1999 with over a thousand health workers having been made redundant. 
Therefore new ideas and discourses have been active not only in restructuring firms but 
also welfare capital. 
Thus there was extensive investment in the necessary ideological apparatus at a local 
level to displace old attitudes, mindsets and routines and replace them with those more 
adapted to the needs of market economies and underpinned by unquestionable 
assumptions regarding the desirability and efficacy of market led transformation. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
By the end of 1999 the formal institutions of governance in Wroclaw were embryonic 
and fractured. While there was a shared enthusiasm for the arrival of foreign 
investment, no coherent strategy was evident. Rather institutions at different spatial 
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levels such as the voivodship, the municipality and sub-regions were pursuing their 
own agendas regarding both attracting inward investment and wider issues of 
development. Alongside the newly emerging interests of indigenous SMEs and foreign 
TNCs, powerfiil local networks carried over from the previous regime continued to 
exert influence in the regions through SOEs and the voivodship. 
From 1990 onwards the reduced importance of SOEs had a profound effect on local 
governance that extended beyond the economic effects of job reduction or reduced 
social provision. These institutions were important and powerfiil actors under the 
previous regime, and their decline has had a marked effect both in terms of power 
relations and represents a shift in collective understanding. Regions such as Katowice 
with a concentration of steel and coal have powerfiil vested interests, and both workers 
and managers having greatly affected the pace and form of change to the extent that 
Gorzelak (1998) suggests that they have blocked restructuring processes. The industrial 
legacies of the Wroclaw region have produced a different configuration of interests. 
The relatively diverse economic base has meant fewer obstacles to restructuring, 
particularly as foreign investment has absorbed some of the local managerial elite into 
the transnational capitalist class. Previous managers of SOEs were often appointed to 
well paid, but often nominal roles in the new enterprises which fractured old networks. 
At the level of the workplace Solidarity accepted the rhetoric of the market but not its 
material consequences in terms of employment reduction, changing habits of work and 
different systems of organisational governance. 
In the context of weak and underdeveloped structures of local governance. Western 
institutions in the form of governments (national, local, and supranational) and TNCs 
have been able to have a significant impact on institution building. Foreign investors 
have created their own institutions including Chambers of Commerce, international 
schools and consuls. Aid programmes from the US or Western Europe have been 
deliberately focused on shifting collective imderstandings in the locality, ranging from 
advice on reconstructing governance to crude attempts to instill an understanding of the 
market. However, in order to understand the economic and institutional impacts of 
foreign investment it is necessary to now focus on incoming firms as agents of change 
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by opening the 'black box' to examine influences on the embedded of organisations as 
they cross national boundaries and operate in different institutional set ups. The next 
chapter uses the taxonomy developed in Chapter Three to analyse the qualitative and 
quantitative linkages of incoming firms in the Wroclaw regional economy. 
ENDNOTES 
1 National Investment Funds (NIFs) were holding companies which owned a bimdle of 
about twenty eight firms to restructure as a resuU of the Mass Privatisation Programme. 
The NIFs were leased to consortia of Polish and foreign banks, financial institutions and 
consultants. The balance between domestic and foreign partners was to inject know-how 
and finance ioto the restructuring process at the same time as allaying fears about high 
levels of ownership by non Polish companies. 
2 The UK Know-How Fund was aid given specifically to Poland aimed at transferring 
business skills, retraining redundant workers or supporting regional labour market 
planning. In many cases UK consultants were the financial beneficiaries of such initiatives. 
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CHAPTER F I V E 
STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES ON T H E 
EMBEDDEDNESS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN WROCLAW 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Three reviewed claims that recent trends in corporate dynamics and 
restructuring have led to qualitatively superior forms of manufacturing investment by 
TNCs that may benefit local economic development in Less Developed Regions 
(LDRs). Further, it has been argued in some quarters that firms are increasingly gaining 
competitive advantage firom participating in localised networks from which they derive 
tacit knowledge. The main question is not whether incoming foreign investment is 
embedded, because all behaviour is rooted in a range of social, institutional and 
economic relationships. The issue is how and in what ways incoming firms are 
entangled in webs of social and economic relationships, and the quantitative and 
qualitative dimensions of these linkages. 
The taxonomy presented in Chapter Three suggests that in order to give a more 
nuanced account of the complex impacts of foreign investment in a locaUty, influences 
on embeddedness need to be grouped into four broad categories; structural, cultural, 
cognitive and institutional. The particular focus of this chapter is to examine the 
structural and institutional embeddedness of foreign investment in the Wroclaw 
regional economy, by drawing on interviews in thirteen flagship foreign investments. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: The first section begins by presenting some 
stylised facts regarding foreign investment in the region and then looks at the economic 
context of incoming firms in terms of past industrial legacies and current restructuring 
processes in the Wroclaw economy. The second section examines structural factors 
influencing local linkages such as the nature of competition in sectors in which the case 
study firms are based, and the extent to which this influences the quality of linkages in 
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the locality. The third section on institutional influences of embeddedness examines the 
relationship between incoming firms, formal institutions and agents of change at 
different spatial levels. Further, the importance of shifting informal understanding in 
the workplace is discussed. The last part of the chapter focuses on the case study of 
Polar, Poland's largest white goods producer. This allows a detailed and in-depth 
examination of the transformation of an State Owned Enterprise (SOE), where 
changing structural influences on the embeddedness of the firm, particularly related to 
changes in competition, has made foreign investment a necessity. However, deeply 
rooted collective understandings in the workplace articulated through the Solidarity 
trade union have made restructuring a complex and contested process. 
5.2 BACKGROUND TO F O R E I G N INVESTMENT IN W R O C L A W 
5.2.1 Foreign direct investment in the context of national and international 
trends 
In the context of the transforming economies of CEE Table 5.1 shows that Poland is 
now the lead country in terms of both absolute flows and inflows and as a percentage of 
the total in the region: 
Table 5.1 Foreign direct investment in selected countries in Cenfral and Eastern 
Europe. 2000 
Country FDI inward stock Breakdown by country 
(USD billions) (percentage of regional total) 
Poland 36.475 39 
Hungary 19.863 8 
Czech Republic 21.095 18 
Russia 19.245 11 
Adapted from World Investinent Report 2001, UNCTAD 
The following two tables need to be treated with some caution as the measurement of 
foreign investment inflows and their distribution have some shortcomings'. Table 5.2 
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gives the absolute and percentage share of foreign investment in Poland of the top nine 
voidvodships. A highly uneven picture of the distribution of foreign investment 
emerges. Warsaw has the lion's share of foreign investment with 44.5 per cent of the 
total, although this figure wi l l have been inflated by substantial flows of capital into the 
financial sector. According to these figures Wroclaw is in sixth position with a 3.5 per. 
cent share of total investment. Voivodships in the West of Poland, Warsaw and Krakow 
then account for 72.6 per cent of total investment with the remaining 27.4 per cent 
shared between the remaining 33 voivodships. Regions in the East of Poland have been 
the recipients of very small amounts of foreign investment. 
Table 5.2 Foreign investment: top nine Polish voivodships. \991 
Voivodship Foreign investment 
(millions of Polish 
zloty) 
Percentage share of foreign 
investment in Poland 
Warsaw 9, 653.0 44.5 
Krakow 1419.0 6.8 
Poznan 1281.7 5.9 
Katowice 1128.2 5.2 
Bielska 773.1 3.6 
Wroclaw 750.2 3.5 
Lodz 732.8 3.4 
Opole 376.6 1.7 
Radom 366.0 1.7 
Source: Adapted from Urzad Statystyczny we Wroclawiu (Wroclaw Statistical Office), 
1998. 
Table 5.3 shows a broadly similar pattern. The figures relate to the distribution of the 
number of foreign investments by region, according to the new administrative structure 
from January 1999, which reduced the number of voivodships from 42 to 16. Within 
Poland, Dolnoslaskie with Wroclaw as its capital, is in fourth place when measured by 
the number of foreign investments. Mazowiecki contains Warsaw and not surprisingly 
has the highest number of foreign investments. The following three regions Slaskie 
(Upper Silesia), Wielkopolskie (capital city Poznan) and Dolnoslaskie all lie in the 
West of Poland and account for the majority of incoming capital. 
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Table 5.3 Foreign direct investment in Poland: breakdown bv region. 2000 
Voivodship Number of Foreign 
Investments 
Mazowiecki (Warsaw region) 582 
Slaskie 266 
Wielkopolskie 237 
Dolnoslaskie (Wroclaw region) 175 
Pomorskie 144 
Malopolskie 125 
Lodzkie 119 
Kujawskie-Pomorsjie 86 
Zachodniopomorskie 83 
Lubelskie 59 
Podkarpackie 57 
Lubuskie 51 
Sietokrzyskie 47 
Warminsko-mazurskie 47 
Opolskie 39 
Podlaskie 32 
Source: Panstowa Agencja Inwestcyii Zagranicnych, 2002 
5.2.2 The structure of incoming foreign investment in Wroclaw 
An analysis of the sectoral composition of joint ventures in Wroclaw shows that the 
overwhelming majority of foreign investment in 1997 has been in manufacturing (80 
per cent), with only the retailing (6.6 per cent) and real estate (7.7 per cent) sectors 
receiving investment of any note (Agencja Reklamova, 1998). 
The value of capital contributed (see Table 5.4) mirrors the national picture of a small 
number of flagship investments surrounded by a large number of small FDIs 
contributing little or no capital. For example, of the top 50 investments in the 
voivodship, 80 per cent contributed less than one million dollars. This underlines the 
importance of foreign TNCs rather than SMEs in the transformation process. 
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Table 5.4 Top foreign investments in Wroclaw classified by value in 1997 
Millions of Dollars Number of 
Firms 
10 to 35 million USD 3 
2 to 5 million USD 5 
1 to 2 million USD 5 
0.5 to 1 million USD 10 
Below 0.5 million USD 28 
Source: Author 
Table 5.5 shows foreign investment by gmina (sub-region). The vast majority of 
foreign investment is concentrated in the city, but two gminas, Sroda Slaska and 
Kobierzyce have also received significant amounts of incoming capital. In the case of 
Sroda Slaski this is largely accounted for by one investment in a Coco Cola bottling 
plant, and in the case of Kobierzyce by investment fi-om several large retailers as part 
of an out-of-town shopping complex. 
Table 5.5 Foreign investment bv gmina in the Wroclaw voivodship in 1997 
Citv/ Gmina Value in % share of City/ Gmina Value in % share of 
thousands total foreign thousands of total foreign 
of zloty investment in 
Wroclaw 
zloty investment in 
Wroclaw 
Wroclaw 551 421.3 61.6 Wolow 6159.9 0.7 
Sroda Slaski 137 698.2 15.4 Dlugoleka 5869.3 0.6 
Kobierzyce 86 228.4 9.6 Strzelin 5361.1 0.5 
Twardogora 22 152.6 2.5 Olesnica 5011.0 0.5 
Brzeg Dolny 21 213.3 2.3 Sobotka 4707.5 0.5 
Katy Wroclawskie 18 622.9 2.0 Trzebnica 3434.8 0.4 
Olawa 16 382.6 1.8 Milicz 2369.5 0.3 
Prusiice 7020.5 0.8 Jelcz Laskowice 1339.3 0.1 
Source: Adapted fi-om Urzad Statystyczny we Wroclawiu (Wroclaw Statistical Office), 
1998:37. 
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Table 5.6 shows flagship investments in the manufacturing sector, the mode and year 
of their arrival and their product. This includes examples of firms fi-om sectors which 
have been attractive to foreign investors such as confectionary and domestic chemicals 
in the early 1990s, and vehicle assembly or production fi-om the mid 1990s. Two firms, 
BOC and Cargill are TNC supplier firms to other large companies rather than final 
producers. 
Table 5.6 Flagship foreign investments in manufacturing in Wroclaw in 1998 
Firm Activity Year of 
Arrival 
Mode Location 
Cadburys Confectionery 1994 Greenfield Kobierzyce 
Dolmel (drives) Engines 1990 Brownfield City 
Dolmel (Electrical) Electrical installation 1992 Greenfield City 
Dolmel (Turbo Power generators 1990 Brownfield City 
Vitapolymer Foam for furniture 1991 Greenfield Brzeg Dolny 
Cargill Glucose 1996 Greenfield Kobierzyce 
BOC Industrial gases (admin) 1993 Brownfield City 
BOC (production) 1993 Greenfield Brzeg Dolny 
GKN Automobile components 1996 Brownfield Twardogora 
1998 Greenfield Olesnica 
Armstrong Foam insulation 1994 Greenfield Sroda Slaska 
Cussons Household detergents 1993 Brownfield City 
Adtranz Locomotive engineering 1993 Brownfield City 
Volvo Truck assembly 1994 Brownfield Jelcz 
Truck & bus production 1997 Greenfield City 
Source: Author 
From the mid 1990s there has been significant investment by large western European 
retailers, and in particular food retailers using both supermarket and hypermarket 
formats. Although some food retailers have located in the city most are greenfield 
developments on large out-of-town sites. 
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Table 5.7 Inward foreign investment in retailing in 1999 
Name of Retailer Country of Type of Retailing Year of 
Origin arrival 
Tescos UK Hypermarket 1998 
Hit Germany Hypermarket 1996 
Leclerc France Hypermarket 1999 
Praktiker Germany DIY/Building materials 1998 
Carrefour France Hypermarket 1999 
Makro Holland Hypermarket (wholesale) 1996 
OBI Germany DIY 1998 
IKEA Sweden Furniture 1996 
Castorama (2 stores) France Furniture 1999 
Biedronka Portugal Supermarkets 1998 
Billa France Supermarkets 1997 
Sconto Germany Furniture 1999 
Source: Author 
5.2.3 Past legacies and current restructuring 
In most accounts of restructuring previously planned economies, privatisation has been 
viewed as a prerequisite of the transformation to a market economy and has therefore 
been the centrepiece of policy. This process is relatively well progressed in Wroclaw 
and Table 5.8 shows the legal status and employment of the twelve largest State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) in the Wroclaw region. Figure 4.2 indicates the location of these 
SOEs based in the city of Wroclaw (as opposed to smaller towns) and shows the extent 
to which they dominate the industrial landscape in terms of land use. Table 5.8b 
indicates, that although these firms taken together, were large employers in 1990, by 
1998/99 their significance as providers of jobs had rapidly diminished. The importance 
of these firms went far beyond providing employment, but extended, to varying 
degrees, to the provision of a wide range of social benefits, including nurseries, health 
care, housing and holiday homes. Several of these firms were national icons, for 
example Pafawag was the Polish train producing firm, while Polar produced around 90 
per cent of the washing machines sold on the Polish market. Further, in 1999 large 
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SOEs also continued to dominate employment in some of the small towns. For 
example, in Jelcz Laskowie, Jelcz (producer of trucks and buses) employed 3,000 
people, while in Brzeg Dolny, Rokita (heavy chemicals) employed 2,500 people. 
The experience of privatisation in the region reflects the experience at the national level 
in Poland, with the emergence of a range of hybrid firms. At one end of the spectrum 
are nominally privatised firms where the state continues to hold all the shares by 
default, and at the other end are fully owned private firms, usually by foreign investors. 
In between these two points lie hybrid firms where the goverrmient maintains a degree 
of ownership in the company, and firms owned by National Investment Funds as part 
of the Mass Privatisation Programme, which have more complex governance 
structures^. 
Table 5.8 Status of and emplovment in State Owned Enterprises in Wroclaw in 1999 
Name of Activity Legal Status Employment Employment 
Firm 1998/99 1990/91 
Polar Washing machines & Polish American Fund (35%), State Treasury, 3,700 5,500 
refrigerators (45%), Employees (20%) 
Hydral Defence goods State Treasury Company 1,650 3,000 
Wrozamet White goods (cookers) National Investment Fund 1,720 2,000 
Polifarb Paints State Treasury Company Not known Not known 
Elwro Computers Purchased by Siemens 1990 0 1,480 
Pafawag Train carriages Purchased by Adtranz (1996) Daimler Benz 300 4,000 
(1998) 
Rokita Heavy chemicals National Investment Fund 3,000 4, 200 
Jelcz Trucks & buses Joint venture Volvo 1992 Purchased by Zasada 3,500 5,000 
Group 1997 (Daimler Benz) 
Dolmel Engines Purchased by ABB 1990, bankrupt 1999 0 1,500 
Dolmel Power generators Purchased by ABB 1990, 50% sold to Alstom 632 400 
1999, 100% sold to Alstom 2000 
Alfa Lavel Dairy products Purchased by Alfa Lavel 1992 Not known Not known 
Dolmel Electrical switch gear Purchased by ABB in 1992 200 200 
Source: Author 
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The various forms of privatisation demonstrate a high level of path contingency and are 
the outcome of a compromise between different interests: foreign and domestic capital, 
the strategic interests of national government and workers with a strong tradition of 
worker participation (Hardy and Rainnie, 1996). By 1999 in Wroclaw out of the twelve 
SOEs listed, two remained as State Treasury companies, where the government 
continued to be the major shareholder and caretaker. In eight companies foreign 
investors have bought the majority of shares, ranging fi-om 52 per cent in the case of 
Polar to nearly 100 per cent in the case of Pafawag and Dohnel. Two firms are owned 
by National Investment Funds. Therefore foreign investors have been central to the 
privatisation process by investing in the most economically and politically significant 
SOEs in the region. 
5.3 S T R U C T U R A L INFLUENCES 
Following the taxonomy presented in Table 3.1 the first aspect of structural 
embeddedness relates to the way in which the nature of competition in the sectors from 
which the firms are drawn, influences the way in which they are linked into the local 
economy. 
5.3.1 The nature of competition 
An uncritical acceptance of the location or relocation of production on the basis of low 
wage costs lies at the heart of the New International Division of Labour ^ (Froebel et al, 
1981) and has also been central to neoclassical predictions of FDI and transformation 
in CEE (Lipton and Sachs, 1990). Pavlinek and Smith (1998) see FDI entry into the 
Czech and Slovakian republics as primarily motivated by accessing low costs, and 
point to maquiladora regions on the border with Germany. While they conclude that 
the outcomes in terms of supply linkages are complex. Grabber (1992 and 1994) 
suggests that investment on the basis of low cost produces 'cathedrals in the desert', 
firms which are isolated with little impact on or engagement with the locality. This 
section examines how far low wage costs can explain the location of FDI in Poland 
generally and Wroclaw specifically. 
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In contrast to the case studies of Pavlinek and Smith (op.cit) all of the incoming FDI 
firms in this study gave establishing a foothold in the markets of CEE with an eye to 
emerging markets in the Ukraine and Russia, as the primary reason for entry. Although 
Poland was viewed as a much more risky base than for example Hungary this was 
offset by the fact that it had a significantly larger market of 38 million people compared 
with 12 million in Hungary. The possibility of accessing markets fi-om outside of 
Poland was limited by several factors. In the case of consumables such as soap powder 
and confectionery, the existence of substantial tariffs coupled with a need to access 
specific local knowledge meant that a physical presence in the market was required. In 
the case of vehicles, tariffs on imported trucks and buses were prohibitive at between 
35 and 40 per cent. High transport costs and relatively low value added in the case of 
industrial gases, foam pipes and foam meant that it was necessary to produce in the 
Polish market. 
The reasons given for firms locating in Poland, however, extended beyond market 
access. In the case of six companies, market domination as part of international 
oligopolistic competition ^ was imperative. Essentially competition was on the basis of 
product differentiation, and it followed that market information, marketing and 
advertising were critical. Thus six of the case study firms (BOC, Cadburys, Cargill, 
Volvo, GKN and Tesco) were part of an international picture of oligopolistic 
competition replicated within Poland albeit in a slightly different form from other 
economies depending on individual corporate strategies and sectoral trajectories. In 
producing solely for the Polish market, none of these firms produced for the wider 
industrial network of the parent company, neither did they have world or regional 
mandates (Roth and Morrison, 1992). The pace of restructuring and intensity of 
competition was such that firms in these sectors were seriously disadvantaged i f they 
had failed to enter the market at an early stage .^ In the case of ABB and Adtranz, the 
scale of competition and nature of production in heavy engineering, where there are 
significant economies of scale, made them one of a handful of companies who 
competed for large projects across the globe. Their presence in Poland was a reflection 
of global competition where market domination was an explicit aim. 
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In the case of Tesco, the home market had become saturated as restrictions on further 
out of town development constrained fiirther expansion. Investment abroad was also 
driven by the fact that European competitors and suppliers had adopted 
intemationalisation strategies. While forays in the early 1980s by Tesco into France 
and Ireland had been aborted due to strong indigenous competition and stringent 
planning laws, CEE in general was considered an attractive site for investment because 
of the combination of a large market and ambiguous rules regarding planning. 
Only one firm, Armstrong, gave low costs in addition to market access as a reason for 
locating in Poland. Low wage costs were not reported as being of primary importance 
for any of the other twelve firms, and were considered to be a bonus rather than a 
prerequisite for entry. However, although low wage costs were not given as an initial 
reason for location, in the case of two of the firms the situation was more complex. 
Adtranz invested in Pafawag, the train producing firm, as part of the privatisation 
programme. This gave them ownership of manufacturing capacity, which potentially 
provided units for the third largest railway network in Europe. Part of the FDI 
agreement was that the government would place an order for new rolling stock worth 
$90 million with the company. Once the acquisition had been negotiated, initially on 
the basis of market access, the possibility of new strategies within the firm's global 
industrial system opened up. With the cost structure in Poland one twentieth of that of 
Switzerland, in 1998 Adtranz was planning to supply train shells to other parts of its 
global structure. In the case of Volvo, the initial investment was in assembly 
production to access an expanding market for trucks and buses in Poland. In 1999, on 
the basis of a skilled labour force, low wages costs and high quality production within 
the Wroclaw factory, top management closed Volvo's four bus producing plants in 
Europe (Scotland, Belgium, Finland and Germany) to relocate all production on an 
expanded Wroclaw site (this is discussed in detail in the next chapter). 
Therefore there is little evidence to suggest that the firms had arrived on the basis of 
low costs to insert local networks into global chains on the basis of low value added 
processes. The entry of all firms is a reflection of the exigencies of global competition 
(oligopolistic or otherwise) which demanded intemationalisation strategies. On this 
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basis at least the pessimistic prognosis of Wroclaw as a low cost enclave is unjustified. 
However, this dichotomy based on low cost and market access may be simplistic and 
static. The arrival of fums had initially been driven by market access and domination, 
increasing competition and contracting profit margins. However, in the case of two of 
the firms, headquarters reconsidered the role of the Wroclaw subsidiary in the context 
of their global networks. The ability to produce high quality goods with relatively low 
wages led to the restructuring of production and sourcing to take advantage of the 
preferential cost structure in Poland. 
5.3.2 Knowledge and technology transfer 
This section examines the claim that bridgehead investments which have taken place, 
on the basis of market access are related to positive trends in internal restructuring, 
namely, the transfer of skills and competences which wil l upgrade human capital, 
increase local autonomy and create better quality linkages in the locality (Grabber, 
op.cit). 
A l l brownfield FDIs reported upgrading products, processes and logistics. Initial and 
planned investments were aimed at ensuring that the level of technology in the branch 
plants, both brownfield and greenfield, was comparable with processes in the home 
country. It should be noted, however, that there were variations in technological 
disparities between SOEs and comparable western plants, which meant that in some 
cases only minor upgrading of processes was necessary. An illustration of this variation 
is provided by BOC. The previous national SOE, Polgas, purchased two new plants as 
part of the import led growth progranmie in the 1970s .^ However, financial strictures 
meant that it could only purchase one plant, which was 'state of the art' fi-om the 
United Kingdom, and a second, that was technologically inferior, was bought from East 
Germany. Therefore, rather than assuming uniform backwardness we should 
understand the legacy of the old regime in terms of uneven technological advancement. 
Generalisations about the benefits of technological upgrading brought about FDI have 
deflected attention away from the fact that the most marked changes have occurred in 
the restructuring of management and management fiinctions. The example of Cussons 
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illustrates the mixed legacy of SOEs. When the company was taken over it was 
described by the Managing Director as; 
A small, well-managed business which was profitable. There was excellent control of 
working stock. They knew what just- in-time was and practised it. The workforce was 
well educated and productive although the plant was old and overmanned.' (Manager 
Director of Cussons) 
He challenged the received view that Polish managers were not entrepreneurial. He 
reported; 
We also found resourcefuhiess, an attitude bred from the past 50 years. For example, 
the 'spare parts department' was a heap of scrap metal, from which the management 
had found lots of machinery to keep the plant running ' (ibid) 
However, the Managing Director suggested that under the previous system accounting, 
logistics, quality and sales and marketing were fimctions that were practically non-
existent. 
We foxmd very little quality consciousness. As long as the boxes were ful l everything 
was OK. What's more they occasionally substituted ingredients! Marketing was non-
existent. There was no market research. We didn't know who our customers were; we 
didn't even know where they were. Sales organisation was limited to man who sat by 
the telephone which occasionally rang. There were no growth plans. Sales plans were 
measured against what happened last year. Furthermore there were no exports. Export 
to the east, to former soviet countries had been a very important 
market Teamwork was completely lacking. A l l decisions were sent to the 
president. I remember large queues of people from the ground floor to the first floor 
(where my office was) all awaiting decisions. Organisation was extremely centralised. 
Nor were there any pay differentials. Some supervisors got even less than the 
operatives. We found lots of data but little useful information. For instance there were 
no cash flow forecasts or daily sales analysis. There was not much money nor was 
there much English. One engineer in the factory spoke a little English When 
we arrived there were six Russian computers still in their boxes and a workforce that 
was computer illiterate (ibid). 
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ABB Dolmel (power generators) and Cussons provide examples of upgrading that were 
typical of the internal restructuring that took place in all of the brownfield sites (with 
one exception). In the case of ABB Dolmel (power generators) between 1991 and 1994 
they had already transferred existing technology from other firms in air cooled 
generators, improved and stabilised quality and reduced production cycles, and had 
also begun the process of integration with other Dolmel technology centres. In terms of 
organisation, stress was placed on quality consistent with ISO 9001 and making the 
necessary adjustments to internal structures. In addition, they were preparing to 
implement integrated computer systems to support the management of production, 
finance and trade activity. The use of technology was crucial for integrating the branch 
plants with the parent company. 
In Cussons quality management was introduced with improvements in packaging and 
soap powder formula. The Research and Development department in the home country 
used value engineering to achieve significant cost reductions. The firm introduced 
marketing management and in particular market research into product preference. An 
increased emphasis on sales management has meant that the number of sales personnel 
was increased from zero to 125 people. This emphasis on sales and marketing was also 
found in Cadburys and BOC. In the firms studied which produced directly for the 
consumer market, skills associated with market research, marketing, product 
differentiation and sales were critical areas of competition. In brownfield investments 
the notion of logistics was non-existent, and part of the restructuring process was to 
focus attention on the management of supply chains, distribution and optimising stocks 
and storage. 
What emerged from these case studies, and other research (Amsden et al, 1994; Hardy 
and Rainnie, 1996) was that Polish enterprises were not uniformly poor and backward 
in relation to western counterparts in terms of the hard technology employed. There 
were significant variations both between and within sectors. In all cases, however, what 
was missing was tight managerial control over the full range of the production process, 
and in particular Western managerial practices in the areas of financing, accounting, 
marketing and human resource management. While improvements in hard technology 
could be described as incremental, changes in managerial practices had taken a 
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quantum leap, with the most significant skills transferred being in areas associated with 
oligopolistic competition. As we shall see later, there were profound implications for 
the remaining SOEs (or newly privatised SOEs) which continued to be large employers 
but lacked, to varying degrees, both the resources and managerial skills to compete in 
international markets. 
These FDI bridgehead investments have transferred managerial skills, but with regard 
to individual workers the effects were differentiated. The picture of Polish managers 
employed in senior managerial positions was mixed and dependent on corporate 
strategy. Volvo had four senior Swedish managers in place for four years whereas 
'locals' quickly replaced expatriate managing directors in all the other companies. At 
the level of middle management in areas such as HRM, marketing and finance, 
employees tended to be Polish and recruited locally. The direct beneficiaries were 
mainly, but not exclusively, young people with university level education and fluent 
English. For the region hmnan capital was upgraded, at least in terms of managerial 
skills, and opportunities were opened up for the yoimg and educated which had not 
existed previously. 
5.3.3 Supplier linkages 
It has also been argued that bridgehead investments, based on market access would 
bring about indirect employment creation through the establishment of more extensive 
and qualitatively better local supply networks that would embed firms in the locality. 
One of the major claims of the benefits of FDI at a local level is that a multiplier effect 
would be created through incoming firms establishing links with local suppliers. This, 
it is held, stimulates local suppliers to upgrade products and processes thereby 
encouraging the location of fiirther FDI. These effects would not simply be confined to 
suppliers of components but would encourage a range of financial and business support 
services to emerge. Thus the interaction of foreign capital with local firms would lock 
the region into a virtuous circle, not only upgrading individual firms, but the business 
environment and the infrastructure. 
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In the case of the thirteen case study firms there appeared to be few spillovers through 
using local suppliers for raw materials or components. In the cases of Cadbury, 
Cussons, and Cargill local purchasing meant buying bulk materials from elsewhere in 
Poland and other coimtries. In the case of Adfranz, part of the negotiations to purchase 
the company was an agreement that the company would source 50 per cent of its 
components in Poland within three years. In ABB Dolmel (power generators), copper 
and steel were important inputs of production. However, copper produced only fifty 
miles away in Poland was not of sufficient quality to be used, and was therefore 
exported to Germany where it was upgraded and resold to ABB Dolmel (power 
generators). Overall, the thirteen investments had few primary economic linkages with 
or reliance on the region. The significant exception to this are the implications of 
Volvo's decision to relocate all of its European bus production in Wroclaw, which has 
had a significant multiplier effect and brought about new local networks. In 1999 two 
major components suppliers were in the process of transferring production to adjacent 
sites. 
TNC food retailers were starting to restructure their supply chains, which would have 
both national and local impacts. In 2000 Tesco were still dealing with a large number 
of suppliers in Poland, but as in the UK they were looking to develop longer term 
special or preferred relationships. Part of this process was to identify potentially good 
suppliers and work with them on organisation, logistics and technology. While Tesco 
would not finance suppliers directly it enabled these firms to borrow money from the 
bank to make improvements on the basis of their contracts with a large retailer. 
Examples of organisational change that were supported by Tesco included the use of 
transport, pre-packaging during transport, stock files, increasing quality and getting 
ISO 9001. Restructuring supply chains was at an early stage in 2000, but it is likely that 
a process that developed over a decade in Western Europe wil l be accelerated and 
completed in a relatively short space of time in CEE. This wi l l have a profound effect 
on producers whose fortunes wil l be tied to whether they are locked into or excluded 
from supply chains. In particularl, local suppliers of fhiit and vegetables in a 
fragmented agricultural economy would be in competition to supply hypermarkets 
which would be looking to only a small number of preferred suppliers in a 50 kilometre 
radius. 
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One of the most interesting insights in terms of the impact on linkages is that two of the 
firms themselves (Cargill and BOC) are suppliers rather than final producers. Rather 
than incoming investment providing opportunities for indigenous suppliers, it was the 
case that the suppliers themselves were significant TNCs. For example, BOC's primary 
customers were Polish steel producers and large foreign investors in soft drinks, food 
processing and glass production. Cargill were major suppliers for the food processing 
industry which was dominated by TNCs and the second biggest category of foreign 
investment in Poland in 1998. Managers of these supplier TNCs suggested that it was 
part of their strategy to establish long term customer/primary supplier relationships 
which raises questions of the displacement of indigenous firms as a result of 
competition from foreign competitors. This finding is in line with other research which 
points to recent trends in sourcing across a wider geographical boundary and with 
primary preferred suppliers and suggests that this may not be conducive to linkages at a 
local level (Amin and Dietrich, 1991; Rainnie, 1993). 
In some cases suppliers were only able to enter into medium and long term contracts 
with TNCs on the basis of up front investment. For example, in 1996 BOC needed to 
purchase several nitrogen trailers at a cost of £45,000 each in order to service French 
and German glass producers. There was no evidence to support the claim that foreign 
investment would provide opportunities for local suppliers either through increasing the 
demand for particular suppUes or components or through the competitive impetus. 
Rather it is the case that Polish firms may be left in the interstices and niches of 
production without the necessary technology or the financial means to acquire it to lock 
them into global chains. 
However, while the case study firms used local suppliers for physical inputs to a 
limited extent, they had a much more positive effect on the demand for a range of 
business services such as training, consultancy and accountancy which had a significant 
impact on the local infrastructure of business services. Consultants Ernst and Young 
arrived in 1993 and by 1998 employed 60 people with 80 per cent of their work coming 
from foreign firms. Arthur Anderson arrived in Autumn 1997 and employed 30 people. 
Arthur Anderson had gained extensive experience of the Polish market by undertaking 
o 
contracts in Warsaw for the PHARE programme, and restructuring banks as part of a 
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World Bank funded initiative. A senior manager at Arthur Anderson suggested that the 
growing importance of the Wroclaw region meant that it could no longer be serviced 
from Warsaw. Personal contacts and knowledge of the local context meant that a base 
was necessary in the area, particularly because they were interested in the SME market. 
Arthur Anderson offered advice on strategic investments, warehousing, logistics and 
the purchase of real estate. A recent and significant area of growth in their services was 
in response to firms outsourcing finance and accounting functions, pay roll processes 
and personnel functions as they concentrated on their core activities. Arthur Anderson 
also provided a range of human capital services, incentive sfrategies, employment 
policies and, particularly, assistance in administering the new social security system 
reforms which include mandatory state and private insurance contributions. 
Not only did the stimulus of FDI in manufacturing contribute to the arrival of 
significant international consultancies but also stimulated the development of 
indigenous consultancy firms. Otrek ranked as Poland's seventh largest (second outside 
of Warsaw) training firm. The growth of this firm was not only attributable to the 
existence of a market and growing demand for services, but also from receiving 
fimding from the British Know-How initiative. Finally, the demand for services from 
businesses has acted as a stimulus for the growth, of certain departments at least, in 
local institutions of higher education such as the Academy of Economics, the 
University of Wroclaw and the Technical University of Wroclaw, concerned with 
management training or business consultancy. 
The arrival of expertise in the form of consultancy companies, the development of 
appropriate provision in institutions of higher education and a range of support services 
contributed to a pool of locally based expertise and the upgrading of human capital in 
the region through the creation of a layer of educated, trained individuals to develop, 
promote and cascade learning. 
5.3.4 Labour market impacts 
Table 5.9 provides a summary of total employment and new job creation in the thirteen 
case study firms. In the short term, the overall number of jobs has been generally 
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protected in the brownfield sites, attributable at least in part, to the fact that the 
privatisation agreement obliged firms to maintain current employment for eighteen 
months. 
Table 5.9 Job creation and realised investment in Wroclaw's leading foreign 
investments in 1999 
Firm Products Mode Realised 
investment 
£ millions 
Current 
Employment 
Net job 
creation 
Cadburys Confectionery Greenfield 18.7 300 + 300 
Dolmel (Drives) Engines Brownfield 0 0 - 1000 
Dolmel (Electrical) Electrical installation Brownfield Not known 200 + 150 
ABB Dolmel Power generators Brownfield 3.4 630 + 190 
(power generators) 
Vitapolymer Foam for fumitme Greenfield Not 50 + 50 
known 
Cargill Glucose Greenfield 35.1 70 + 70 
BOC Industrial gases Brownfield Not know 50 0 
GKN Brake shoes Greenfield Not 205 0 
known 
Armstrong Foam insulation pipes Greenfield Not 48 48 
known 
Tesco Hypermarket Greenfield Not 600 + 600 
known (part time) 
Cussons Household detergents Brownfield 15.2 700 0 
Adtranz Locomotive engineering Brownfield 8.1 1,200 0 
Volvo Truck and bus assembly Greenfield 10.5 300 +300 
Source: Author 
In the case of two of the greenfield sites, the number of jobs created could be regarded 
as disproportionately small in relation to the size of the investment. In the case of 
Cadburys, the largest investment in the region in 1999, the number of people employed 
was 300 and in the case of its immediate neighbour, Cargill, a £35 million investment 
led to the creation of only seventy jobs. In four of the brownfield investments (BOC, 
GKN, Cussons, Adtranz) there was no new job creation, although internal 
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reorganisation had shifted the structure of employment from production into marketing, 
human resource management and logistics. 
In terms of salaries in 1999, managers and workers in brownfield and greenfield 
investments, consistently reported wages being fifty per cent higher than the local 
average wage in similar firms for non-managerial jobs. 
There were also less well publicised examples of disinvestment and job loss as a result 
of foreign investment. It was reported that in 1991 the computer firm Elwro was taken 
over by Siemens in order to establish a foothold in the computer and 
telecommunications market. Although part of the privatisation package was an 
agreement to maintain employment, the level of payment offered to people to persuade 
them to leave their jobs was so attractive that 3,500 jobs were voluntarily relinquished. 
It is not simply the number of jobs that have been created or lost, but also the quality of 
employment. Six hundred, mainly part time jobs, were created at Tesco with women 
making up 90 per cent of the employees. When multiplied by the other foreign owned 
food retailing TNCs this represents a significant new area of employment growth. 
However, whether this represents quality employment is both ambiguous and 
subjective. Women have borne the brunt of the transformation process in Poland and 
CEE generally (Einhom, 1993; Hubner et al, 1993; Czertny, 1998; Ruminska-Zimny, 
1999) and comprise the largest proportion of the unemployed. Women who lived in 
small towns and villages of the Wroclaw region had few, i f any, employment 
opportunities. Describing her job at Tesco one woman said 'This was a chance for 
women to survive'^. This attitude was reflected in the fact that several women fravelled 
forty kilometers to work a four hour shift at a rate of £1 per hour. In contrast, women 
interviewed in the Polar SOE, where wage levels were relatively good, the jobs were 
ful l time and where there was still a range of social facilities, did not regard work in the 
retail sector as an adequate replacement for their jobs that were under threat. 
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5.3.5 Competition Effects 
The competitive impact of incoming TNCs wil l have important consequences for 
existing firms. In the neoliberal view this wi l l be the impetus for the restructuring of 
domestic firms to become more efficient. Pessimistic views, however, see firms within 
CEE as without the resources or access to funds to compete with international 
oligopolies. There was only one indigenous firm that faced competition within the 
voivodship. The abortive joint venture between the Polish SOE Jelcz and the foreign 
investor Volvo, and Volvo's subsequent investment in a greenfield site ten miles away, 
meant that they became competitors rather than collaborators. The impact of FDI in 
other sectors is ambiguous. In Poland as a whole the presence of foreign investors in 
confectionery and industrial gases, for example, has left only two indigenous firms in 
each sector and household chemicals are almost completely foreign owned. FDI in the 
Wroclaw region wi l l have an effect on indigenous firms in other localities, with the 
corollary being that TNCs in other areas of Poland wi l l have an impact on indigenous 
firms in the Wroclaw region. 
It is too early to gauge the impact of FDI in other parts of Poland on recently privatised 
SOEs in the Wroclaw region. For example, Rokita employed 2,000 people in a small 
town gmina twenty miles outside Wroclaw. It is part of the Mass Privatisation 
Programme whereby the majority shareholder is a National Investment Fund (NIF). 
Competition in the chemical sector has intensified with an influx of foreign firms, and 
it is not clear how far Rokita's 'hybrid' privatisation can secure the financial resources 
for the considerable upgrading which is necessary to reach the standard of Western 
companies. Thus the profitability and long term ability to maintain jobs in these firms 
wil l depend crucially on their ability to compete in a market with foreign investors 
located in other parts of Poland. These competition effects are examined in detail in the 
case study of the Polar SOE in section 5.5 of this chapter. 
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5.4 INSTITUTIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS 
Chapter Three emphasised firms as reflexive and pohtical in crossing national 
boundaries and locating in new institutional set ups. This section looks at the nature of 
the relationships that firms developed with formal institutions at various spatial levels 
to gain either entry or ownership. Outwith the formal structures of local and regional 
government, informal relationships between large firms were important for gathering 
and disseminating important knowledge about the locality. The last section examines 
the impact of foreign investment on the institutions of the workplace. 
5.4.1 Brownfield foreign investment: institutional engagement at tlie 
national and workplace level 
In Wroclaw, flagship foreign investments arrived by two routes, either as brownfield 
investments as part of the privatisation programme or greenfield investments. 
Brownfield investments included Cussons, ABB Dolmel (power generators), ABB 
Instal, ABB Dolmel (Drives) Adtranz, BOC and GKN. In all of these cases geography 
and locality had no specific influence on the decision to invest, except insofar as target 
firms happened to be located in the region. For example, in the case of BOC, five 
packages were drawn up as part of the national privatisation programme of Polgas, the 
state monopoly industrial gases firm, by the government. The company bid for the 
package which included the Wroclaw plant. 
It was actually strongly influenced by the local element, which was nothing to do 
with geography. It happened to be the package that had the combination of the best 
equipment and given that type of equipment they had the strongest market position.... 
So it wasn't about geography, it wasn't about crossroads, communications or 
anything. It was a package Wroclaw was part of. (Senior Manager BOC UK) 
Similarly, location was unimportant in all of the brownfield foreign investments. In the 
case of Cussons the brownfield acquisition was motivated by a desire to buy into 
existing established Polish brands to gain market share and position. GKN took over 
the production of components fi-om Fiat which was concentrating on core operations. 
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while Adtranz purchased the Pafawag national train wagon making factory which was 
located in Wroclaw. 
Entry by the privatisation route required a significant degree of institutional 
engagement, which took place at national and workplace level. However, in the case of 
all six case study brownfield FDIs completed through the privatisation programme, the 
negotiations by-passed the voivodship and took place between high level managers 
fi-om TNCs and ministers and bureaucrats in various Warsaw Ministries, and between 
prospective investors and Workers Councils. These negotiations were protracted and 
the outcomes reflected the competing and negotiated claims of foreign and domestic 
capital, the government and organised labour (Solidarity in particular). Regional 
institutions were not consulted and the implications for the locality were given little or 
no consideration in the process and outcome of the deliberations. 
Engagement was also necessary at the level of gaining the legally necessary agreement 
of the factory Workers Council. As we have seen the relative strength of Workers 
Councils and Solidarity have been a critical factor in the process and outcomes of 
privatisation at a national level in Poland, a phenomenon underplayed in the political 
economy of transformation (Rainnie and Hardy, 1995; Thirkell et al, 1995). The 
necessity for the agreement of the Workers Council for a firm to be privatised was 
embodied in the original privatisation legislation in 1990. As we shall see Solidarity 
played a crucial role in the transformation of two large workplaces in the region. In 
1995 Volvo had initially set up assembly facilities as a joint venture with the Polish 
firm, Jelcz, a truck and bus building plant, but negotiations to purchase the plant were 
blocked by Solidarity who would not agree to a 50 per cent reduction in employment. 
In the case of the Polar SOE the form and pace of privatisation was strongly contested 
by Solidarity, as we shall see in the next section. 
In most of the brownfield sites (for example, Cussons, Dolmel, BOC) the relationship 
with unions had been one of accommodation and cooperation. In BOC and Cussons 
unions had agreed to privatisation by the current foreign investors afl;er presentations 
by prospective buyers. In the case of the privatisation of Dolmel, Solidarity were 
dissatisfied about the way the firm was broken up and cherry picked, by splitting the 
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firm into four parts and leaving the least profitable in the hands of the state. They 
reported reluctantly cooperating with the deal and as one Solidarity Official reported, 
"We agreed at the time because our imagination was limited." In other words this was 
the only offer on the table. In Adtranz Solidarity representatives played the role of 
intermediaries. They could see no alternative outside of a strategic investor and saw 
their role as paving the way by shifting attitudes away from collectivism and towards 
an understanding and an acceptance of notions of competitiveness, individual 
responsibility and the necessity of job reduction. In their role as mediators full time 
Solidarity officials were called to Volvo where there was a communication problem 
between young Polish managers in personnel who adopted an autocratic approach to 
management and shop floor blue collar workers who had carried over expectations 
about consultation from the previous regime. Relative job security and wages that were 
slightly higher than the local average in most FDIs, meant that few problems of 
industrial relations were evident. The exception was ABB Dolmel (Drives) where 
Solidarity had unsuccessfully protested over a period of seven years against asset 
stripping and job reduction from 1,500 in 1990 to 200 in 1997. 
5.4.2 Greenfield foreign investment: engagement at the sub-regional level 
Cadburys, Cargill, Volvo, Armstrong, Vitapolymer and Tesco were all greenfield 
investments. The area of Lower Silesia, of which Wroclaw is part, borders Germany 
and was identified in all cases as the general area that was considered for location. The 
West of Poland has the majority of the population, a better infrastructure than the East 
of the country and proximity to Germany. One manager suggested that attitudes to 
work and change improved as one travelled from East to West Poland. Although the 
majority of the FDI is located in Warsaw, the not-Warsaw factor was sfrong as the 
capital city was viewed as expensive, bureaucratic and having strong imions. As a 
senior Manager from Cadbury explained: 
Warsaw seemed a bit of a nightmare, wage rates were higher, it was heavily unionised and 
transportation was congested. It had everything against it. (Regional Development 
Director/Project Manager Poland of Cadbury) 
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Individual local actors at a sub-regional level were also important in the decision to 
locate in Wroclaw voivodship rather than other possible locations in the Silesia area. In 
particular, local mayors in two small gminas were successful in courting FDI and 
persuading firms to locate in their fiefdoms. These local mayors were successful in 
establishing the necessary infi-astructure and dealing with red tape in a way that was 
described by one foreign investor as, 'on the borders of legality'. There were many 
bureaucratic hurdles such as permission to buy the land, right to use the water, visa and 
work permits for senior staff which were deah with by different departments at 
voivodship or national level. Old contacts and networks meant that local actors at the 
gmina level were able to accelerate processes and procedures. 
The mayor of the gmina was quite a character - he drove the whole process. The 
voivodship contributed nothing. It was meeting the mayor and finding as Margaret 
Thatcher would say 'someone we could do business with' - that was crucial. He had 
to persuade the voivodship to give him a piece of land for industrial development. He 
was hellbent on getting quality investment. (Regional Development Director/Project 
Manager Poland of Cadburys) 
Dealings with central government were regarded as bureaucratic and cumbersome, and 
permission to buy land held up the process by six weeks in the case of Cadburys and 
the only other dealings, which were to apply for a tax holiday, were described as a 
'fiasco'. 
Our experience is that it is 99 per cent the local mayor, other people in the voivodship 
were irrelevant. The only things that worked properly for us in Poland were things we 
did in the local village with the local mayor. That in a nutshell was our experience. 
(Regional Development Director/Project Manager Poland of Cadburys) 
This should be put in the context of Cadbury being one of the first major investors in 
the area. Subsequent firms faced fewer problems and had a more positive experience 
finding the municipality more helpful in dealing with the necessary bureaucracy. 
In the case of greenfield investments questions of locality and institutional avoidance 
came in to play with varying degrees of importance. It should be noted that we cannot 
read off fi-om the sector whether a TNC would choose greenfield or brownfield route of 
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entry. The strategy of TNCs within sectors was not homogeneous, in the case of 
vehicles and confectionery firms, for example, both brownfield and greenfield 
strategies had been adopted. However, in all cases managers of greenfield FDIs 
reported a desire to circumvent existing structures and institutional legacies. The view 
was that negotiating with existing institutions, such as current management and the 
govenmient was too costly and that the inherited legacies of past behaviours would be 
an obstacle to restructuring. The negotiation of agreements with the government 
regarding employment protection and agreement about levels of investment were 
regarded as protracted. In particular, one motive for greenfield investment was a desire 
to circumvent Workers Councils which were seen as potentially obstructive, and once 
established managers were keen to keep unions out. Solidarity suggested that workers 
employed were expected to trade in union rights for a wage level higher than the local 
average, and that it was made clear that a job offer was conditional on not being a 
member of a trade union. In 1996 one foreign investor in the food retail sector sacked a 
worker for joining a union, although they were then reinstated after legal action 
instigated by regional Solidarity. 
Brownfield privatisations reported having to offset potential problems with institutional 
and behavioural legacies against the advantages of buying firms with an existing 
market or brand name that offered them instant access to markets. The Managing 
Director of GKN elaborated on the advantages of greenfield, citing fi-eedom for the 
employer to select the number, age range and educational level of employees as an 
important benefit. Further he explained that new appropriate structures could be set up 
fi-om the beginning and decisions taken about in-house or external sourcing. In 
particular they 'can ensure that Trade Unions are kept out'. In contrast, the inheritance 
of brownfield acquisitions meant acquiring too many employees with an inappropriate 
age structure, and with the wrong proportions employed in production and 
administration. It was argued that there were problems in introducing change, which 
could result in the demotivation of the workforce, and push people towards trade union 
membership and activity. 
As we have seen voivodship levels of government and governance were largely by-
passed by incoming foreign firms. In Chapter Four we saw that regional structures. 
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particularly those relating to foreign investment, were embryonic and inexperienced. 
This situation was compounded by the way in which brownfield acquisitions were 
negotiated at the national level with the relevant Ministry with little concern for or 
sensitivity to the region. A case in point is that in adopting a sectoral approach to 
privatisation the Government insisted that Siemens bought a bundle of firms to avoid 
the problem of the best ones being 'cherry picked'. This strategy backfired in the 
locality because the Wroclaw part of the bundle was surplus to requirement and the 
factory was quickly closed in the early 1990s. 
5.4.3 Firms as reflexive and political 
Reliance on formal local institutions was reduced by two factors. First, that large TNCs 
were experienced at establishing production or sales across national boundaries and 
second, that firms were active networkers in exchanging information and codifying 
tacit knowledge. Most firms reported conscious decisions to internationalise and/or 
restructure fi-om the mid 1980s onwards. It followed that firms had created dedicated 
departments responsible for identifying new markets and searching out new locations. 
Therefore senior managers were proactive prospectors and intemationalisers, with a 
wealth of experience from operating in Europe, South America, Asia, Afiica and more 
recently China. A common approach was to send a team comprising technical and 
managerial personnel to undertake the search for new sites and to undertake feasibility 
studies. In the case of Poland they generally started in Warsaw and worked their way 
West. These 'prospectors' from TNCs anticipated problems and had experience in 
identifying people who could get things done, and where, i f possible, accelerate 
processes and circumvent formal structures. This does not imply that there was one best 
way or blueprint, or that mistakes were not made in starting production in what, in the 
early 1990s, was uncharted territory. However, the importance of completing the 
investment and getting established in a particular market was far greater than local 
difficulties that were encountered, which were cited as frustrating but only a temporary 
inconvenience in the longer run of maintaining or gaining competitive position. 
In the case of Tesco the first part of their entry strategy was to take over a small chain 
of Polish supermarkets to gain insight into and knowledge of Polish supply chains in 
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1994. The next step was to open twelve hypermarkets in Poland, the first of which was 
opened in Wroclaw in 1999. Tesco had extensive information from which to make 
broad choices about location. The European Development Director explained: 
We have priority targets for where we want to be. We probably have 70 to 100 
possible locations identified in Poland. For that process we have a small team of 
researchers who look at die classic data. Where is the money? Where are the people? 
What is the rolling structure - the human flow? Then for example, you identify you 
want to build a site m Poznan and you go out to Poznan and meet the mayor and say 
OK how do you feel about hypermarkets and he'll say these are the areas where I 
want to put hypermarkets. Well do you own the land? And the whole thing starts to 
move. (European Development Director Tesco) 
Tesco was good at combining their accrued experience with local knowledge: 
I have a property team of 60 to 70 people who buy the sites and build the stores. 
They would employ consultants to help them with specialist advice and they are 
overwhelmingly based in the region or countries. (European Development Director 
Tesco) 
Once the land was purchased and the necessary permission established, they had a team 
whose exclusive brief was to open up the new stores and oversee the first few months 
of trading before starting the next project. The team was comprised of experts in 
recruitment, training and sourcing drawn from senior managers in the UK and newly 
recruited Polish managers. The accumulation of experience and learning meant that the 
establishment of each new hypermarket was incrementally easier. Successful formulas 
were fed back to central office where a newly established department continually 
updated and adapted the blueprint for opening new stores. 
The CEO Tesco Poland reported that they had developed a highly successful recipe for 
the opening ceremony of new stores, which included the attendance of the British 
Ambassador, the president of the voivodship (local authority) and the local Bishop. The 
involvement of agents of local institutions bestowed approval and legitimacy on the 
activities of the firm, and suggested a sophisticated level of relational marketing. As 
supermarkets and hypermarkets have increasingly been in the public e y e a n d as the 
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UKs largest investor in Poland, Tesco had attempted to develop and maintain good 
relationships at a national level and the CEO had met with government ministers at 
least ten times between 1998 and 2000. 
5.4.4 Relationships between large firms 
The second factor that reduced reliance on local institutions for information, was that 
vital sources of information and local knowledge came fi-om networking between 
foreign investors. A l l senior managers responsible for locating sites and starting 
greenfield projects reported using other firms to gather information regarding key 
personnel in the locality, identify who could get things done, establish what problems 
might be encountered and how they might be overcome. Flagship companies provided 
an important demonstration effect, but also supplied practical information regarding 
relationships with building contractors, architects, and consultants that could be used 
by other companies. Networking not only took place outside the locality, but outside of 
the country. The European Development Director of Tesco explained: 
The story of the Wroclaw store was our property guy, who is British, who hves in the 
UK but spends about two thirds of his working week in Central Europe, went to a 
property exhibition in the South of France, which was a pan European jamboree. He 
biunped into the property director of IKEA who said I've got a site in Gdansk, would 
you like to come in along side us. I said I don't think we are really interested in 
Gdansk - what else have you got? And the conversation developed and we ended up 
building a store in Wroclaw (next to IKEA). (European Development Director of 
Tesco) 
BOC reported feeding information back to firms, with whom they had long term supply 
relationships in the UK about conditions in the Polish market as a whole and the 
locaUty in particular. Senior managers gave other examples of where they had jointly 
assessed the prospects in particular markets with companies which were either their 
suppliers or major customers such as British Steel. 
A distinction was drawn between getting information about what actually happened as 
opposed to how things were supposed to work. Once established all firms reported 
acting as sources of information for other firms considering locating and producing in 
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the area. Once firms arrived in the area this relationship continued and networking took 
place to exchange information on employment issues, salary surveys and unsuitable 
employees through a number of expatriate organisations such as the British Club, 
British Chamber of Commerce and the International Club. Frequent contact took place 
particularly between firms fi"om the same country of origin and in particular Sweden 
and the UK. Thus early entry FDIs were able to quickly transform tacit to codified 
knowledge. 
5.4.5 Changing the institutions of work 
Chapter Three argued that large foreign investors played a critical role in institution 
bending, that is bringing about a shift in collective understandings about economic 
behaviour necessary to underpin their production activities. The corollary of trying to 
instill new management practices, was that old legacies considered to be a block on 
new ideas and necessary change had to be replaced. The first issue was related to 
retraining incumbent management. A senior manager from BOC suggested that there 
was a whole raft of experience that was simply not there when they took over the firm 
in 1994. It was suggested that the hierarchical nature of SOEs meant that yoimger and 
brighter people had no status, and there was hostility to the introduction of a marketing 
team, who in the view of the incumbent workforce had the twin disadvantages of 
including women and non-engineers. There was resistance to other changes relating to 
the spatial reorganisation of the firm. BOC's original site for both administration and 
production was in the city centre. It was proposed to move production to a brand new 
site at Brzeg Dolny (a small town twenty kilometres from the city) and drastically 
refiirbish the old production site for adminisfration by converting it into open plan 
offices. Open plan offices were met with a great deal of suspicion because of the lack 
of privacy, the challenge to hierarchy and the possibility of surveillance. Further senior 
managers from the UK reported cultural differences in problem solving. 
We have our facts and figures they have got their emotions. Run, shout, lots of energy. 
Although they can generate numbers they are not used to using them to manage or to 
understand what action needs to be taken. (Senior Manager of BOC) 
Old routines also influenced the way the time frame within which managers operated. 
158 
They can't believe in the future until it becomes the past. Even when it's the present 
they can't quite believe that it's happening. Before the lorry is parked outside they can't 
believe it exists. This presented problems for planning because they couldn't understand 
that you could plan a deal in four months time and simultaneously get the equipment. 
They were locked into a linear way of thinkmg, which meant that fu-st they had to have 
the equipment and get it going and then they could start thinking about planning and 
how to sell it. (Senior Manager BOC) 
Extensive training for all management level employees and in most cases for 
supervisory workers and technical workers, was an important way of shifting 'old mind 
sets'. There were frequent trips by senior management from the home country to 
Poland and Polish managers to the UK and other European centres. Meetings and 
conferences took place between managers with similar functions in different European 
branches to instill and diffiase best practice. This was aimed not only at rapidly 
establishing and consolidating new management techniques and integration with the 
parent organisation but also served the purpose of incorporating the individual into the 
organisation and encouraging the view that they were part of an international company. 
Anecdotal evidence suggested that new ways of working and thinking were sometimes 
embraced with too much enthusiasm by some employees. In four of the case study 
firms tensions had emerged between young Polish managers (or trainee management) 
and generally older manual workers. Young Polish managers were recruited and 
promoted on the basis of their ability to grasp and accept reform and change and were 
critical of manual workers for having the 'wrong mentality' and their resistance to 
change. 
Apart from replacing existing managerial legacies with those that were in line with 
western business practices, another task was to instill new attitudes to work in 
production workers. The Manager of Cadbury complained that workers were 
undisciplined. 
Employees were drawn from surrounding villages. They required a lot of training. 
Working life in the village was very different. People were not used to coming in at a 
certain time every day and working for fixed hours. For example, when the plum 
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harvest was on people simply did not tum up. In the beginning they were very sloppy 
about the way they did things and coming in. There was an understanding that you were 
paid a wage and supplemented that with anything you could put in your pockets at the 
end of the working day. (The U K Cadburys chief) 
GKN had bought a components firm from Fiat as it restructured to concentrate on its 
core activity and experienced a different set of problems with past habits and legacies. 
In 1996 GKN started production on an old military site in the small town of 
Twardogora some thirty kilometers from Wroclaw. By 1998 production had been 
transferred to a new factory in Olesnica, the second largest town in the voivodship. The 
first reason for relocating to a purpose built factory was associated with the physical 
demands of new production methods such as just-in-time. However, it was suggested 
that the move was equally important to break the 'incestuous' legacy of the past as a 
result of producing in a small town where relationships were viewed as being too 
strong. This was characterised by families working in the same firm, close and closed 
community relationships, which were not conducive to change. Although the new 
relocated factory employed 80 per cent of previous employees who were bused 20 
miles in three shifts, the manager reported that the physical move had succeeded in 
breaking some of the legacies of past relationships and networks and opened up 
workers to new forms of organisation and work. 
5.4.6 Disembedding old legacies 
An important aspect of disembedding old legacies was restructuring to increase 
competitiveness by concentrating on core activities, thus accelerating the process of 
restructuring social assets. In the past welfare functions from the cradle to the grave had 
often been undertaken by SOEs rather than the local or national state. In this sense 
SOEs were highly vertically and horizontally integrated units heavily embedded in the 
locality. The six brownfield privatisation companies report having sold social assets 
which included leisure and catering facilities and holiday homes which had been 
traditionally provided by SOEs. Therefore, TNCs had accelerated a process of selling 
or spinning off peripheral activities which had begun in the 1980s. This would appear 
to constitute disengagement from, rather than a continuation of past legacies. As 
collective welfare provision is increasingly marketised the most adversely affected 
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group were lower paid manual workers, which explained why the maintenance of these 
benefits was given the highest priority by unions in negotiations with management 
regarding the restructuring process in recently privatised SOEs. 
Greenfield developments were more easily able to introduce labour or managerial 
practices fi-om the home country. Tesco for example, was representative of other 
incoming food retailers, in that they were in the forefront of driving new atypical 
patterns of work. Within months of the store opening in 1998 most ful l time contracts 
were withdrawn. Of the 600 hundred employees only a small number of middle and 
senior managers worked full time. The remainder of the workforce had permanent, 
fractional confracts, that is they were contacted to work between 50 and 75 per cent of 
a full time job. Workers reported working regular but varied hours over and above their 
confracts, but were not paid at the overtime rate, because according to the law such 
payments were only triggered when more than forty hours were worked. This enabled 
the store to cope with uneven demand while keeping costs down by not having to pay 
overtime. 
The discussion so far has focused on examples of FDI, which have been negotiated 
with varying degrees of cooperation between incmnbent management and Workers 
Councils. The next section focuses on the case study of Polar, where discussions 
regarding the pace and nature of privatisation and subsequent restructuring have been 
profracted and contested, particularly by the Solidarity trade union. First, the discussion 
illusfrates how the changing structural embeddedness of this firm explains why foreign 
investment was the 'only game in town'. Secondly, the study facilitates an exploration 
of the deep seated and entrenched collective understandings about economic behaviour 
and workplace institutions that prevailed in SOEs and which were viewed by western 
firms as a barrier to efficient production. 
5.5 T H E CHANGING EMBEDDEDNESS OF SOEs: T H E CASE O F POLAR 
In 1990 Polar " was Poland's largest producer of washing machines and refiigerators. 
The factory occupies a large site to the North West of Wroclaw (see Figure 4.2) and in 
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1997 employed 5,000 workers. Polar was an archetypal SOE that owned buildings, 
transportation, warehousing facilities and railway sidings. In addition, in 1997 it 
continued to provide extensive social fimctions such as holiday homes, childcare, cheap 
summer camps for children, and a health centre with a physiotherapist and 
gynaecologist. 
The transformation of the factory was not only economically important for the region, 
being a flagship enterprise and large employer, but it was also politically significant. 
Polar was one of the main centres for Solidarity in the region and one of the first 
factories on strike in 1980. Solidarity continued to have a significant presence in the 
factory and has been the most important influence in determining the path of 
transformation either by their cooperation or opposition. Further, in contrast to other 
large SOEs in the region based on engineering or heavy chemicals with predominantly 
male employees, women not only comprised nearly half of the work force (42 per 
cent), but they have also been a significant political force in the factory by virtue of 
their active and leading role in the Solidarity trade union. 
5.5.1 Structural embeddedness 
The new competition 
In 1990 Polar went from having a captive and protected market to facing international 
competition from market economies as a result of trade liberalisation. There are a 
number of related factors that contributed to the changing nature of Polar's structural 
embeddedness. 
First, there were a number of issues relating to European integration and conforming to 
European standards. Under the European Association Agreements import taxes were 
completely removed by 1997 and customs tariffs by 1999 and this intensified 
competition in the Polish market. Although to date the company has complied with 
European standards and changed their production technologies, there are increased 
costs associated with current and fiiture regulations. 
Second, the demand for white goods in the domestic economy was linked to increases 
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in GDP in real terms between 1991 and 1996 that produced sfrong growth in domestic 
demand. However, growth effects while increasing demand also affected the product 
life cycle forcing manufacturers, including Polar to be more innovative and replace 
their product line more frequently. 
Third, liberalisation and market growth has led to CEE becoming a central focus for 
foreign investors in the manufacturing of electrical appliances. Polar's major 
competitors (Bosch-Siemens, Electrolux, Merloni and Whirlpool) have been active in 
the market either by acquiring local manufacturers or suppliers. Also more recently, 
Asian transnationals such as Samsung and Daewoo have appeared in the market. Apart 
from the high quality of goods produced by foreign manufacturers they also possessed 
financial economies of scale which enabled them to gain competitive advantage by 
offering good payment terms and conditions on consumer durables 
Four, the range of Polar's production of two goods, washing machines and 
refrigerators, was too narrow. The importance of establishing and maintaining brand 
names means that the household appliance market was increasingly dominated by 
manufacturers who offered a wide range of products. Advertising is generic in that 
manufacturers promote the firm rather than individual products and attempt to gain a 
reputation for producing across the full range. For Polar producing only two goods was 
insufficient to establish a competitive brand name. 
This intensification of competition was reflected in Polar's decreasing share of the 
Polish market in all its major products. Between 1992 and 1996 Polar's share of the 
domestic market for washing machines fell from 70 per cent to 30 per cent, and for 
refrigerators fell from 95 per cent to 57 per cent of the market. This is particularly 
serious given that the domestic market accounted for 90 per cent of sales of Polar's 
sales. 
Upgrading 
Between 1993 and 1995 Polar had borrowed PLN 8 million to under take a 
modernisation programme in order to maintain market share and to comply with 
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regulations. Polar got rid of CFCs in refrigerators and made changes to the washing 
machine production line. First, this included investment in a new generation of washing 
machines with better technology and design. A new paint shop was installed to replace 
non-environmental solvents with powder paints. This expanded production capacity 
from 900 to 1,500 units per day. The second element of investment has financed 
launching a new product range of refrigerators with glass doors, and increased the 
capacity of the line from 300,000 to 400,000 per year (33 per cent increase). Third, 
there has been investment in an environmental project that involved the reconstruction 
of the boiler to eliminate environmentally dangerous emissions of sulphur and nitrogen. 
Despite the changes that took place between 1993 and 1995 fiirther investment was 
necessary to modernise products and production processes. For example, traditional 
materials in the manufacture of household goods were being replaced by cheaper 
thermoplastic elements and laminates or ceramics. This not only required changes in 
production technology, but also the use of plastics in production that involved 
economic and legal restrictions. Between 1993 and 1996 the cost of raw materials 
increased by 122 per cent whereas net revenue from sales increased by only 106.9 per 
cent. Therefore between 1994 and 1996 net operating profitability fell from 11.4 per 
cent to 4 per cent (Prospectus, 1996). 
The investment made between 1993 and 1995 went part of the way to modernise 
products and processes, but only represented incremental changes in technology. 
Pressure from competitors and the company's development plan required more 
investment and expenditure in fixed assets and working capital. The company had high 
debt and this coupled with liquidity problems limited the amount Polar was able to 
borrow and the extent to which its investment plans could be carried out. 
Supply chains 
Supply networks changed as Polar increasingly sourced components outside the region 
and the country thus reducing local linkages and by 1996 total purchases from within 
Poland had fallen to 53.2 per cent. The reason given by both Solidarity and 
management for the increase in imported purchases was that domestic firms were 
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unable to deliver in terms of quality, design, and export requirements. 
Attempts to forge and maintain linkages with suppliers in the locality have not been 
successful. In 1994 Polar concluded an agreement with 'EDA' Poniatow Wroclaw to 
supply sub-assembly parts such as: compressors, electric engines and electric piunps 
and to carry out joint development in design and production. However, Table 5.10 
shows that this firm only supplied 33 per cent of the engines while a foreign supplier 
providing 67 per cent, while in the case of compressors the supply was equally shared 
with the foreign supplier, hi 1996 an agreement was reached between Polar and Hydral 
to deliver compressors for one year (January to December 1997). Hydral was a large 
SOE which undertook work for the defence industry and occupied a large site opposite 
Polar (see Figure 4.2). The collapse of demand in the defence industry left the firm on 
the point of closure. Although the supply agreement with Polar offered an opportunity 
for Hydral to diversify its production and become a major supplier, the contract was not 
extended. Hydral failed to meet the quality standards demanded by Polar and was 
viewed as unreliable. Ironically Polar could have sourced compressors from a firm 500 
metres away but by 1996 imported over half the components from a foreign supplier. 
Table 5.10 Polar's Polish and foreign suppliers of selected components in 1996 
Item PoUsh Supplier % share Foreign SuppUer % share 
Compressors Eda Poniatow, PZL Wroclaw 48 Danfoss 47 
Engines Eda Poniatow, PZL, Wroclaw 33 Michalovce Mez 67 
Programming components TERMET 73 
Sheets for runners Walcownia Oswiecim 48 Pechiney 32 
Polyol Inter Rokita, Wroclaw 35 Elastogram BASF 65 
Refridgerating thermostats Each Cieszyn 22 Danfoss 71 
Steel sheets Huta Sendzimira, Krakow 33 Stalexport 67 
Source: Prospectus, 1996: 93 
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Building local linkages 
Although the hierarchy of decision making in all SOEs bypassed the level of the 
voivodship in the locality, Chapter Four discussed an initiative to try and form an 
industrial group in Wroclaw. In the early 1990s the president of the voivodship 
attempted to set up a group comprising the four large SOEs involved in light 
production or engineering to form the Psie Pole industrial group, all based in the North 
West of the city. This group was to be comprised of Polar (white goods), Wrozamet 
(cookers), Hydral (military production) and Aspa (engineering) with the support of the 
Bank Zachodnie. The idea was to look at areas of complementarity or co-operation to 
ensure the survival and development of these large workplaces. This initiative produced 
no concrete results and now Aspa has closed and Hydral produces few goods with a 
greatly reduced work force. In contrast both Polar and Wrozamet have shown a greater 
capacity for development and upgrading. As we have seen although the potential 
existed to develop strong links with local suppliers the trend has been to source outside 
of the country. The inability of Hydral to take advantage of diversifying production and 
developing closer links with Polar can be regarded as a missed opportunity. Formal 
institutions or informal networks were not been strong enough to build local linkages 
and opportunities have been missed. 
Therefore the changing structural embeddedness as a result of heightened competition 
in products, processes and quality meant that Polar lacked sufficient funds to upgrade 
and had to consider either a foreign investor or changing its legal status in order to be 
quoted on the Stock Exchange and raise finance through a share issue. 
5.5.2 Institutional embeddedness 
Contesting the privatisation process 
Within the factory the privatisation process has been slow and contested at every stage. 
Between 1989 and 1996 Solidarity and the Workers Council were a major force in 
negotiating and shaping the restructuring process. For example, between 1989 and 
1996 there were seven managing directors who were dismissed in turn by the Workers 
Council. It was suggested by the President of Solidarity that the sacking of managers 
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was less to do with their incompetence and more to do with unreaHstic expectations 
held by workers regarding what could be delivered in terms of change. While Solidarity 
viewed their own contribution as positive and motivated by a desire to secure the long 
term development of the company, the Prospectus (1996) saw the situation in terms 
of continual management-union conflict where the Workers Council was blocking 
change and preventing the emergence of a clear governance structure with managerial 
prerogative. This view is clear in the Prospectus: 
It should be pointed out that key members of the company's management were removed from 
their offices several times in the 1990s resulting from recmrent conflict with the trade unions. 
The lack of personal continuity and the above mentioned conflict made efficient management of 
the company difficult and diverted attention of individual teams from issues related to the 
company's development. (Prospectus 1996: 38) 
Privatisation per se was not opposed by Solidarity, but the particular route to be 
followed was disputed. The main area of contention related to the allocation of shares, 
because the government wanted to sell 67 per cent of shares to a foreign investor. 
Solidarity, however, strongly opposed any situation where there would be one (foreign) 
strategic investor such as Electrolux or Daewoo, both of whom had already shown an 
interest in the company. Solidarity's argument was that this would not be in the best 
long term interests of the firm and its workers, because the new investor would not be 
interested in developing the firm, only gaining a foothold in the market. 
After much discussion and argument between management and the Workers Cotmcil, it 
was eventually agreed in December 1995 that Polar would be put on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange and transformed by the capital privatisation route, whereby the firm would 
be converted to a joint stock company and shares sold. Further discussion and 
disagreement ensued regarding the details of the privatisation and there were two points 
of conflict with the national government. 
First, the large number of shares that were to be retained by the State Treasury was 
viewed by Solidarity as leaving the back door open for a takeover by a foreign firm. As 
the Prospectus notes. 
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In the opinion of the trade union active in the company, the number of Series A Shares 
retained by the Minister of the State Treasury for the purposes of future transactions gave 
grounds for certain fears of "hostile takeover" by an investor who could reduce the 
production output and the number of employees. (Prospectus 1996:38) 
The different outcomes, anticipated by Solidarity, emanating from different forms of 
ownership suggests a textbook view of capitalism where ownership by a large number 
of small shareholders is both possible and preferable. This reflected a very literal 
understanding of the theoretical properties of the market expounded in standard 
economics textbooks. This is not surprising given that leading members of Solidarity 
had been on courses in the US where these 'enabling myths' about the attributes of 
market economies had been widely disseminated as self evident facts about 'how 
capitalism works'. 
A second, contentious issue was that Solidarity and the Workers Council bargained 
hard for PLN 9.6 million to be set aside from earnings retained by the enterprise for the 
purchase of shares by workers through the establishment of a company called EKO 
Polar. The auditor's review of the financial statement in the Prospectus expressed grave 
reservations about this arrangement. 
There is a need to strengthen the equity base through the capitalizing of much higher 
profits generated in the previous periods and during the current period. However, the 
envisaged outflow of a part of the Company's eqiiity (reserve privatisation capital) in the 
amount PLN 9,600,000 allocated for borrowings to the company's employees has to raise 
doubts of the auditors. (Prospectus 1996: 13) 
Polar was floated on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in November 1997. The Polish 
American Fund took ownership of 35 per cent of shares, the workers had 15 per cent of 
the shares through a company, EKO Polar, and the State Treasury continued to hold 45 
per cent of the shares. The relative share ownership is reflected in the composition of 
the Supervisory Board that comprises two representatives of the PAF, two workers' 
representatives, and four representatives from the State Treasury. The Polish-American 
Fund is the sixth largest investor in the Polish economy and the largest source of 
venture capital. This fimd was set up in 1990 with USD 240 million from the US 
government for 'private sector support and market economy consolidation' (Business 
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News from Poland No. 24 [308] 1999). It is a much more covert form of foreign 
investment and invests in a varied range of enterprises, the aim being to precipitate 
restructuring and increase share prices. In doing this the US is able to both accelerate 
the transformation process and push it towards the market model at the same time as 
receiving a commercial rate of return on money invested. 
It was only after the flotation on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 1997 that management 
was able to exercise a stronger hand as the Workers Council was dissolved or at least 
stripped of its formal powers. The expectation of worker participation by Solidarity in 
terms of communication and consultation has remained strong, and in 1999 the social 
assets were still retained despite the expressed intention of senior management that 
these should be sold o f f Here the role of individual human agency is important, 
because in other workplaces Solidarity has played a much more passive and 
acquiescent role. 
Institutions of 'no redundancy' and social provision contested 
Between 1996 and 1998 the workforce in Polar had been reduced fi-om 5,500 to 4,800 
and this was achieved through natural wastage and voluntary redimdancy and was not 
opposed by the union. In May 1998, following the November 1997 privatisation, 
McKinsey consultants were engaged to report on the state of the company and review 
its operations. Acting on the recommendations of the McKinsey report Polar's 
management announced a further 910 redundancies in October 1998. Five hundred 
further workers took voluntary redundancy, which left a decrease of 410 to be effected 
by compulsory redundancy. Jobs for life were a significant part of the collective 
understanding about work that persisted from the previous regime, and redundancy was 
unthinkable. Solidarity refused to accept these recommendations and hired a firm of 
Polish consultants from Poznan (no firms in Wroclaw were willing to take on the job) 
to scrutinise the case put by management. In light of the counter report produced for 
Solidarity, which suggested that the McKinsey figures were superficial and the 
financial argument unconvincing, management withdrew the 410 redundancies. 
Table 5.11 gives the age and gender composition of employment and suggests why 
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redundancy was so strongly contested. 
Table 5.11 Employment structure by age and gender of workers at Polar in 1996 
Age group Women Men Total 
Under 20 7 71 78 
21 to 30 326 986 1312 
31 to 40 671 844 1515 
41 to 50 993 1059 2052 
50 to 60 189 295 484 
61 to 65 1 18 19 
Total 2187 3273 5460 
Source: Prospectus, 1996: 96 
The age structure of the workforce is skewed towards the older end with the largest 
number of workers in the 41 to 50 age group. With a basic education and experience in 
production rather than clerical work, this group face much greater difficulty in finding 
new employment than younger people or white collar workers. 
Attempts to reduce social provision were another source of conflict between the 
management and union. In 1998 management's proposal to divest the health clinic was 
strongly opposed by Solidarity. They argued that the physical nature of the job meant 
that these services were constantly in demand fi-om the workforce, and particularly 
women workers. Further, they argued that eliminating this facility on site would cost 
the company more than it would save them, either in days off sick or hours lost due to 
visiting health clinics off the premises. The low wages of workers in the factory and an 
underfimded and deteriorating state health service, meant that the retention of on-site 
medical facilities was considered a huge benefit for workers. 
Despite the declared intention of selling off holiday homes by the Personnel Manager, 
in 1998 they still remained part of the social assets. According to Solidarity the holiday 
homes were well used with an average of 1300 children per year using the facilities. 
Workers paid 25 per cent of the cost and i f they did not use the facilities and took a 
"holiday under the pear tree", that is stayed at home on the dzkiala (allotment) workers 
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were entitled to a bonus of 600 zloty (approximately £140). 
In 2000 Polar was a hybrid company with ownership in the hands of private investors, 
the state and workers. Unlike most Polish SOEs it also still retained a significant level 
of social provision. However, this may be a transitional stage and it is likely that the 
pressures of competition wil l push the form of ownership and organisation to converge 
with the organisational structures dominant in companies in Western Europe. By 2001 
negotiations were underway whereby the State Treasury and the Polish American Fimd 
were considering selling shares to a French TNC producer of consumer durables. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
Structural embeddedness and in particular exogenous pressures and the nature of 
competition in the sector faced by firms were important in influencing the degree of 
permanence of employment in the locality. In 1998 Cadburys, Cargill and Cussons all 
had a significant market share in Poland and produced in sectors where competition 
was on the basis of marketing and product differentiation rather than the technological 
content of the process or the product. These firms would seem to have a fairly stable 
future in the locality, particularly as they have consolidated their positions either in the 
country or the region. Cadbury used their market experience to buy Wedel, the most 
prestigious Polish chocolate company, from Pepsico in 1998. Knowledge of the market 
meant that taking over an existing production facility was less risky than when they 
entered the market in 1994. Cussons undertook a further round of investment in 1998 
and built a brand new state of the art factory in Wroclaw to consolidate its strong 
position in the Polish market. 
In contrast Volvo was operating in a highly competitive market characterised by 
increasing concentration in the vehicle sector as firms attempted to gain economies of 
scale through mergers and acquisitions. The Wroclaw assembly facility could have 
gained or lost fi-om this period of restructuring, but Wroclaw emerged as the winner 
when all European bus production was moved to the site and in this zero sirai game 
four factories closed elsewhere in Europe. 
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ABB Dohnel (power generators), ABB Dolmel (Drives) and Pafawag/Adtranz (50 per 
cent owned by ABB) exhibited the most volatility. A l l these firms faced saturated 
markets in mature home market economies and transformation opened up a whole new 
range of assets and markets in the transforming economies of CEE and Russia. 
Between 1990 and 1999 ABB adopted a pohcy of 'buy now rationaUse later'. As we 
shall discuss in more detail in the next chapter ABB Dolmel (Drives) was closed by 
1999, and the 50 per cent stake in Pafawag/Adtranz was sold in 1998. In April 1999 
ABB Dohnel (power generators) sold 50 per cent of shares to Alstom as part of a joint 
venture agreement and the remaining 50 per cent in April 2000, as it shed its 'old 
economy businesses' (power generators, railway equipment) in favour of newer 
technology related businesses. The FT 1 April 2000 suggested: 
It is hardly the greatest advert for mergers. Little more than a year after announcing a 
deal to combine their operations on power generation equipment, Alstom and ABB, two 
of the world's giants in electrical engineering agreed to go their own separate ways. 
The new structural conditions which Polar faced after 1990, in terms of intensified 
competition, meant that its fiitiu-e was more precarious. Given the necessity of raising 
finance to update products and processes and the failure of local initiatives to 
cooperate, foreign investment was the only option. However, on the basis of the pattern 
of restructuring apparent in other case study foreign investments the following 
outcomes are highly probable: job reduction would be contested but not resisted 
indefinitely, social provision would be reduced as the firm concentrated on its core 
activities and supply chains would be increasingly internationalised. In this case foreign 
investment elsewhere in Poland would reduce the economic and political linkages of 
Polar in the regional economy. 
In terms of the economic linkages of FDI firms in general, the research is in line with 
surveys reviewed by Young, Hood and Peters (1996). These report a reasonable degree 
of similarity in the impact of FDI on locality, namely that the direct effects on the firm 
itself have been positive, with improved availability of fiinds, improved financial 
techniques, technical help and marketing skills which tended on balance to be 
favourable to the acquired companies. On the other hand the spillover effects, 
especially with respect to local sourcing were disappointing. However, while local 
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sourcing for primary inputs (except in the case of Volvo) has been very small, the 
presence of firms has stimulated the development of indigenous provision and foreign 
investment in a whole range of related services and fundamentally altered the 
infrastructure of business services in the municipality. 
Firms have displayed different levels of engagement with local formal institutions. 
Brownfield investments as part of the privatisation process were negotiated at national 
or workplace level, and bypassed the voivodship with decisions taken with little or no 
consideration for locality. Greenfield investments were motivated by a desire to avoid 
formal institutions in the locality and the workplace, with entry strategies focusing in 
some cases, on agents of change at a sub-regional level. Firms were able to glean and 
gather information through the informal networks of transnational managers and lobby 
through their own institutions such as the chambers of commerce. Thus TNCs pooled 
tacit knowledge and learning about local informal institutions to aid the entry and 
operation of foreign investors, and this became part of the intellectual capital of the 
individual firm or collective knowledge of the foreign business community. 
Therefore by extricating themselves from or locating themselves outside old 
institutional and economic networks, both greenfield and brownfield, foreign investors 
were in the process of forging new links. A relationship between the subsidiary and the 
parent company was carefully and deliberately cultivated and nurtured. Although firms 
exhibited different patterns of intemationalisation and pursued such strategies over 
different time scales, there were tried and tested methods for locking subsidiaries into 
their global networks. An emphasis on reviewing supply chains and distribution, and 
changing work processes were aimed at getting firms up to speed in terms of time 
reduction and cost efficiency. Restructuring the labour force has involved a 
reorientatation of personnel on market research, sales and marketing in order to develop 
the necessary tools for engaging in oligopolistic competition. Further, the development 
of networks and linkages between incoming firms and local suppliers was undermined, 
to some extent at least, by the collaboration between large foreign firms both as final 
producers and suppliers. The demands of quality and scale of investment required may 
leave indigenous firms on the margins and in the interstices. 
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Overall the findings of the case studies were that the economic linkages have been 
modest, and the most marked effect was the behaviour of firms as reflexive and 
political actors in acquiring assets and 'bending' the behaviour of economic agents both 
inside and outside the workplace. Rather than informal institutions and conventions 
being an important asset and source of competition for incoming firms, as some 
accounts suggest, the field work suggested that firms' strategies focused heavily on 
marginalising or changing informal institutions. In particular, incoming firms tried to 
alter management and work practices and instill new behaviours and expectations 
consistent with Western business practice. The process of 'bending' or eviscerating 
institutions and the introduction of new collective understandings is explored in greater 
depth in the next chapter by drawing on the notions of cultural and cognitive 
embeddedness. 
ENDNOTES 
1 There was no consistent measure of the value of foreign investment by voivodship. The only 
rough estimations for FDI come from PAIZ (Panstowa Agencja Inwestycji Zagranicznych 
[Polish Agency for Foreign Investment]) bi-annual reports. It provides an aggregate picture only 
and its breakdown into voivodships is not possible since it shows total value of particular 
investors based on the location of the enterprise headquarters and ignores many large investors. 
The conclusion according to Dr Bolek Domanski (Jagiellonian Univeristy, Krakow) the leading 
Polish expert on FDI, is that accurate figures can only be derived from detailed research. 
2 Each enterprise had designated a lead NIF. Each of the 15 NIFs was a consortium owned by 
foreign and Polish banks and consultants with a contract for restructuring their bundle of about 
28 frnns. The shares of firms in the Mass Privatisation Programme was as follows: lead NIF (33 
per cent), state (25 per cent), workers (15 per cent), other 13 NIFc collectively (27 per cent). 
3 For a critique of the NIDL see Schoenberger (1988) and Henderson (1989). Low wage costs 
are not synonymous with low costs. Low productivity due to poor technology or inefficient 
work organisation or high inflation, may negate or offset low wages. Exchange rates are also an 
important influence of relative costs in international trade. 
4 In 1994 Poland was rated 41st (bottom of the table ) by the The International Competitiveness 
Report prepared for the International Institute for Management Development in Lausanne 
(Privatisation News, November 1994, p.4). 
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5 Oligopolistic competition is defined as industries and sectors dominated by a few firms where 
there is a significant degree of interdependence and where strategy is a mixture of collusion and 
competition. 
6 There was a high degree of rivalry in acquiring Pohsh confectionery frnns. For example, Nestle 
won control of Poland's second largest chocolate factory, by 'snatching' Goplana away from an 
Israeli food processing firm who were about to sign a contract. Nestle used local radio and 
representatives with leaflets and megaphones at the factory gate to advertise their package to the 
workers. 
7 Import led growth was a strategy used in the 1970s to attempt to break out of economic 
stagnation by borrowing money from Western banks to buy licenses and technology from the 
West to update production. 
8 PHARE (Pologne/Hongrie: Assistance a la Restructation Economique) was the support effort of 
24 Western countries (G24) coordinated by the E C . Assistance fell into five categories: food 
supplies; investment and joint ventures; envhonmental cooperation; and access to western 
markets (Mihalyi and Smolik, 1991). 
9 Interviews were carried out with women workers in Tesco and Polar. This formed part of the 
research into the changing work of women in Poland carried out with Dr. Alison Stenning from 
the University of Birmingham and funded by a NuffieldGrant of £5000. 
10 The presence of large foreign food retailers was controversial on two counts. First, their impact 
on small shopkeepers had led to sporadic strikes in the Katowice region in 2000. Second, in 
2001 several newspapers had carried articles which were highly critical of the wages and 
working conditions in supermarkets who were seen as evading labour laws. 
11 In 1952 the Zakrow Metal Works was established on the basis of the Ordnance of the Machine 
Industry Minister and started production in January 1953. At fust production included a variety 
of disparate products such as cardboard boxes, quilts, metal objects, spare parts for farm 
machines, mail trolleys, gas water heaters and motorised bicycles. In 1957, the Works started 
the production of absorption refiidgerators and in 1963 the production of compression 
refridgerators began. In 1966 the Zakrow Metal Works changed their name to Polar Metal 
Works. Polar started the production of automatic washing machines in co-operation with a 
Yugoslavian frnn TOO Gorenje in 1971. In 1976 it expanded production under licence from a 
German company Blomberg, and as a result the next few years saw the modernisation of the 
enterprise and the introduction of new products. 
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12 The Association Agreements (1992) were given a high profile m terms of claims to liberalise 
trade between PIT (partners in transition) countries and the E U . In reality it opened up C E E 
markets for E U frnns while restricting the export of goods in which Poland had comparative 
advantage (Messerlin, 1992). 
13 The prospectus issued in December 1996 by a consortium of financial organisations in 
preparation for the company being floated on the Warsaw Stock Exchange November1997, 
provides a succinct account of the problems facing the company and the new competition in 
which it must operate. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
COGNITIVE AND C U L T U R A L INFLUENCES ON T H E 
EMBEDDEDNESS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN WROCLAW: 
A T A L E OF TWO FIRMS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter argued that the most important impact of incoming foreign 
investors was their capacity for instilling new collective understandings about 
economic behaviour, both in the locality as a whole, and in individual workplaces. In 
order to give a richer understanding of this process of 'institution bending' the focus 
of this chapter is on the cultural and cognitive influences on the embeddedness of 
firms. Cultural embeddedness is defined as the behavioural norms and rules of the 
game that comprise the corporate culture of a firm and which influences the way in 
which organisations enter new settings. As firms cross national boundaries and in the 
context of an intensification of competition, they need to introduce and establish new 
material and discursive practices in the workplace. Cognitive processes in the firm 
focus specifically on how firms encourage appropriate learning through restructuring 
management practices and the labour process in order to change the behavio.ur and 
imderstandings of workers. Radical institutionalism, however, problematises the 
establishment of hegemony when organisations are complex and contested and the 
environment uncertain as firms operate in new circumstances. In particular, the 
problem is how firms negotiate with or aroimd existing established collective 
understandings. 
Cultural and cognitive influences on embeddedness are explored through an in-depth 
examination of two case study firms, Volvo and ABB, which are both significant 
investors in the Wroclaw region. Volvo has developed from an assembly operation to 
becoming a European industrial centre for bus production, while ABB has invested in 
five firms in the region. The firms have been selected because they provide 
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conti^asting examples of corporate culture and cognitive practices which are manifest 
in their entry strategies, methods of restructuring and dealing with entrenched 
inherited behavioiu-s. The second part of the chapter explores the implications of 
these different cultures for their embeddedness in the locality in terms of their impact 
on technology, the labour market, suppliers and the effect on indigenous firms. The 
chapter begins by examining structural embeddedness of the two firms to set the 
context of the case studies. 
6.2 S T R U C T U R A L EMBEDDEDNESS: BACKGROUND TO C A S E STUDY 
FIRMS 
6.2.1 Reasons for entry and the nature of competition 
The first firm, ABB, is a multinational corporation headquartered in Zurich formed in 
August 1987 by a merger between the Swedish ASEA, flagship of Swedish industry 
since 1890, and Swiss Brown Boverei (1891) which held a comparable industrial 
status in Switzerland. Both were already middle level players in the international 
electrotechnical or electronic engineering industry. The new corporation subsequently 
grew rapidly through a series of acquisitions and by 1996 the ABB group had an 
annual revenue of over 35 billion USD and nearly 215,000 employees worldwide 
(Financial Times, 12 June 1997). This firm has been a central player in the 
restructuring of the power production and servicing sector in CEE, where it has had 
some presence in the two decades prior to transformation through licensing 
agreements. In Poland ABB ranked as the twentieth largest investor in 1999 and has 
made significant investments in the Wroclaw region. 
The second firm, Volvo, shares the same country of origin as ABB and is a world 
leader in the production of heavy goods vehicles and buses and employs 75,000 
people worldwide. It is currently the largest industrial enterprise in Scandinavia with 
sales exceeding 26 billion USD in 1998. Although its development is directed 
towards developed markets, it has intensified activities on the markets of Asia, CEE 
and Latin America. Volvo invested in the Wroclaw region in 1993 and we trace its 
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rapid development from a joint venture to greenfield production and then from 
assembly to being the European industrial centre for bus production. 
Volvo started research into CEE in 1990 with a view to starting production either in 
Hungary, the Czech Republic or Poland. The initial motive for entry was market 
access in that Poland was a large market but had excise duties on trucks which ranged 
between 35 and 40 per cent, which made sales from outside the country 
uncompetitive. The strategy was to gain market access to Poland with the assembly 
production of trucks and buses, while keeping the high skill and value added 
production of cabs and engines in Sweden. After testing the water for production 
conditions in Poland in general through assembly production, and Wroclaw in 
particular, full production was considered, along with the possibility of component 
production for Volvo's global industrial system. Although initial production was for 
the Polish market, the intention was to use Poland as a platform for exporting to other 
parts of CEE and Russia, before setting up production in those economies as part of a 
longer term strategy. 
After discussions with the national government a joint venture between Volvo and 
Jelcz, the leading Polish bus and truck producer, was agreed and assembly production 
began in 1993. However, the joint venture with Jelcz, situated in Jelcz Laskowie (see 
Figure 4.1), twenty kilometres from Wroclaw city, only lasted for one year, because 
of a failure to agree on employment levels. Subsequently Volvo started production on 
a greenfield site on the edge of Wroclaw city. There were several reasons given by 
senior management for remaining in the Wroclaw region rather than relocating 
elsewhere in Poland: first, components came from Gothenburg and Ghent which 
meant that an area in the west of Poland was well positioned in terms of fransport; 
second, because of the industrial atmosphere that included a strong engineering 
tradition and good standard of education; third, Volvo had aheady trained 160 people 
at Jelcz whom they had leased and wanted to bring to the new greenfield site; fourth, 
and less important was that Wroclaw was less expensive than Warsaw where salaries 
were high and construction work expensive. 
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Between 1995 and 1998 Volvo invested 20 million USD in developing bus and truck 
assembly on the new greenfield site. In June 1998 Volvo's head office in Sweden 
took a major policy decision and designated Wroclaw the centre of Volvo bus 
production in Europe to produce for the Polish market, as well as markets in Central, 
Eastern and Southern Europe. By mid-1999 a new factory to build complete buses 
had been constructed on 40 000 square metres of land. The additional investment 
amounted to 50 million USD and produced 1500 new jobs by 2001. Additional 
employment was created not only in production, but also logistics and data 
processing. Table 6.1 shows the planned and actual increases in production between 
1995 and 2001 
Table 6.1 Technical capacity and production volumes of trucks and buses at Volvo. 
Wroclaw 
Truck production Bus production 
Technical Production Technical Production 
capacity volumes capacity volumes 
1995 950 498 
1996 1380 935 
1997 1600 1285 110 21 
1998 2000 1735 220 115 
1999 2400 380 159 
2001 2400 1100* 
* Also 1400 chassis 
Source: Volvo, 1999 
The decision to relocate bus production to Poland was related to changes in the 
market that had undergone a wave of concentration. By 1992 the number of bus 
producers was one third of the number there had been in 1962 and between 1992 and 
1998 that number had fallen by a further 40 per cent. In 1998 bus production by 
Volvo was spread across five factories (Scotland, Austria, Germany, Belgium and 
Poland) and this was regarded as too fragmented and costly. Therefore senior 
management in Sweden decided that a rationalisation of production was necessary to 
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achieve economies of scale in terms of logistics, supply distribution, the use high tech 
equipment and financial and support services. 
In the case of ABB pressures in the power generation market and the need to 
internationalise came from both push factors in the domestic market and pull factors 
in international markets. The market for power transformers had matured, limiting 
demand in established markets while the need to modernise obsolete equipment 
through privatisation had created a high level of demand in emerging economies. 
Thus the transformation of former SOEs and the deregulation of monopoly product 
markets had opened up new markets and intensified competition between big players. 
The high level of investment by ABB in Poland was driven by both market access 
and the need to lower costs. Due to a presence in the 1970s through licensing 
agreements, ABB was able to gain first mover advantage in CEE and Percy Bamevik 
(President of ABB) starting negotiating with the Polish government about fiirther 
investment in 1988, completing the first acquisition in 1990. 
ABB's presence in Poland and other emerging markets was also motivated by 
the necessity of securing lower cost sources for components such as turbines and 
switchgear which were 40 per cent cheaper to produce in Poland than in western 
Europe. Between 1990 and 1996 over 54,000 jobs were eliminated in ABB in 
the US and Western Europe as 46,000 new jobs were added in the Far East and 
CEE through the acquisition process (Financial Times, 9 June 1997). ABB is the 
single largest investor in the former CEE and Russia. Percy Bamevik, the then 
President, made his motive explicit: 
We must stop looking at eastern Europe as a potential burden, as a risk area which 
dirnips products on us. They have a gigantic market where whole industries need to be 
rebuih. I truly believe we are in a 'win-win' situation. (Obloj and Thomas, 1998: 391) 
Within Poland ABB has made a large number of investments in the Wroclaw region 
which are shown in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 ABB investments in the Wroclaw voivodship from 1990 to 1997 
Subsidiary Activity Employment Employment in 
in 1998 2000 
(projected) 
ABB Dolmel* Power generators 600 600 
ABBDolmel Drives* Engines for industry 450 0 
ABB Instal Switchgears and electrical installation 200 200 
ABB Centrum Engineering components for power plants 70 70 
Donako* Metal stamping 300 300 
Adtranz (ABB & Locomotive shell manufacture 1200 400 
Daimler Benz) 
* Previously one former State Owned Enterprise, Dolmel 
Source: Author 
6.3 C U L T U R A L EMBEDDEDNESS 
This section examines the way in which the corporate culture of the firm has 
influenced the entry strategy and restructuring of the two case study firms. 
6.3.1 Internationalisation and mode of entry 
ABB Dolmel (power transformers), ABB Dolmel Drives, ABB Donako and Adtranz 
occupied adjacent sites on an industrial area on the edge of Wroclaw (see Figure 4.2). 
The previous SOE, Dohnel (power generators) was one of the two largest acquisitions 
by ABB in Wroclaw. The Dohnel SOE had started production under hcence from 
Russia in 1947 and in the 1970s, as part of a strategy of import led growth, imported 
western technology under licence from the UK, Germany and Switzerland. 
When ABB purchased Dolmel it was one of the largest firms making power 
generators in the Soviet bloc. Negotiations took place between ABB Power Ventures 
and the Polish government with ABB purchasing 100 per cent of the shares. The 
purchase of the company was controversial because, according to Sohdarity, ABB 
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used cherrypicking tactics. The former SOE was split into three parts; Dolmel (core 
area of generator production), Dolmel Drives (engine production) and Dozemal 
which owned the land, buildings and social assets. 
ABB bought Dolmel (power generators) and Dolmel Drives while Dozemal remained 
as a State Owned Enterprise which leased the land and buildings to ABB. This was 
entirely consistent with entry tactics used by ABB in other parts of Poland and CEE, 
which was to negotiate in advance precisely how much of the business it wanted to 
take on and cede control of the rest to the state. In some acquisitions in Poland 
workers were picked by individual interview. As one ABB Executive put it, 
" we don't want the lazy ones, or the ones who are set in their ways. We leave 
them to the State" (Financial Times, 16 April 1993:17). Financial risks were 
controlled by buying into existing capacity which kept costs low and it was rare to 
spend more than 20 million USD on an acquisition (Financial Times, 10 March 1996) 
and sometimes this took the form of in-kind payments such as technology transfer. 
The Financial Manager at Dolmel suggested that entry by the brownfield privatisation 
route meant that capital was not tied up with land and buildings. 
The entry strategies and subsequent development of these two firms had implications 
for their embeddedness in the regional economy. In the case of Volvo, the decision to 
reject a joint venture and opt for greenfield production was to avoid old institutional 
legacies and start with a clean sheet on which it could imprint the corporate culture of 
the firm. However, as we saw earlier, the pressure of international competition 
driving rationalisation rapidly led to changes in the Volvo industrial system with the 
subsequent designation of Wroclaw as an industrial centre, that would substantially 
increase the potential for local embeddedness. Factors related to geography and 
favourable production conditions meant that between 1995 and 1999 the Wroclaw 
site changed from a truncated assembly site to an industrial centre with substantial 
additional investment to produce for the European market. As we wi l l see in the 
following sections this was associated with decisions related to sourcing and 
relationships with local institutions which would embed Volvo in the local economy 
at a nimiber of different levels. In contrast ABB's mode of entry through the 
privatisation process enabled the firm to get access to skilled labour and embedded 
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technological expertise while avoiding the costs associated with search, greenfield 
development and ownership of land and buildings. Leasing rather owning assets 
meant that it was much more footloose and could operate on shorter time horizons i f 
it wanted to sell or switch production which meant that it had shallow roots in the 
locality. 
6.3.2 Restructuring and agents of change 
The two firms had different ways of dealing with the deep rooted nature of rigidities 
in former SOEs which were characterised by centrally allocated vendors and buyers, 
enduring fiinctional structures, domination by technocratic and engineering elites and 
strong inertia with little impetus for or tolerance of change and uncertainty. 
Part of Volvo's decision to discontinue the joint venture and start greenfield 
production was motivated by a wish to circumvent existing institutions. The 
Managing Director of Volvo explained, 
In Jime 1994 negotiations [with Jelcz] were falling to pieces and we decided to go 
for our own site, my task was to find a greenfield location The problem 
was that they had a lot of people, 3,500 at that time and one of the remarks fi-om the 
authorities was that we should take on all of them. We said we can only take 2,000 
and that is all. Then Mercedes came on the picture and promised to take care of all 
of them. It was one of the best decisions we ever made. (Managing Director of 
Volvo) 
This view was echoed by other members of senior management, 
Greenfield gives much more control of the business we can run the business 
the way we want. I can't think of any successful joint ventures, especially big ones, 
may-be smaller ones. You just inherit a bag of problems with a joint venture. 
(Finance Director Volvo) 
Volvo's corporate culture conformed much more closely to Hedlund's (1991) view of 
'heterarchical' Swedish firms which relied much less on hierarchical authority, 
formal measurement and explicit internal markets. Rather Volvo relied on 
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socialisation, rotation of managers and the emergence of shared views of the 
company's strategy and identity. Whereas ABB's managers were generally older and 
inherited firom the previous company Volvo tended to recruit young Polish managers. 
There was a significant number of Swedish managers in Volvo sfill in post 1999 
which included: the Managing Director, Finance Manager and Global Sourcing 
Manager. While the ultimate goal was to imbue middle and senior managers with the 
'Volvo way of thinking', the route taken was very different fi-om that of ABB. There 
was much less evidence of the right way of doing things codified in manuals or 
procedures, particularly regarding HRM and supply management. The style was 
much less hierarchical and appeared, on the surface at least, to be much more flexible. 
Proximity, personal contact, coaching and a very hands on approach on the part of the 
Swedish management were seen as preferable to formal training. The decisions of 
Headquarters were mediated by the Managing Director and the presence of Swedish 
managers in key positions such as sourcing and finance served to drip feed and 
reinforce company culture. 
I f Volvo took a gradualist and pragmatic route to restructuring the ABB approach to 
the transformation of management culture was much more akin to 'shock therapy'. 
ABB had given priority to creating a core group of global managers who were 
cultivated by rotating people round the world to give them line experience in three or 
four different countries to create a global perspective and to make sure that their 
loyalty was to the company rather individual coimtries or subsidiaries. According to 
the then CEO Percy Bamevik these global managers were required not only to 
understand the local culture but also, "to sort through the cultural debris of excuses 
and find opportunities to iimovate" (Taylor, 1991: 481). Therefore shock troops 
comprising ABB global managers and consultants were sent in to administer a short 
sharp shock and effect rapid change in the stmcture and culture of the organisation. 
ABB corporate-approved solutions were transferred and forcibly implemented into 
Polish firms, immediately replacing the former well-established routines, recipes, 
procedures and structures of the centrally planned economy They did not 
initially perform any sophisticated diagnosis or analysis of local conditions or 
develop a strategic vision for the transformation process. Rather they forcefully 
implemented market enterprise discipline in the acquired former state-owned forms 
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by a series of high speed actions. (Obloj & Thomas, 1998: 392) 
One of the main tasks was to create a small group of Polish managers who could be 
left to run the firm once the 'agents of change' had moved on elsewhere. Previous 
management in SOEs were representatives of the Communist Party and powerfiil 
adminisfrators. However, an unusual balance of power prevailed with top managers 
earning only as much or even less than the best performing workers. The process of 
creating new managers or remoulding existing managers took place by increasing 
material rewards and promoting the enabling myths of the company. First, as with 
other ABB acquisitions in CEE this included extensive training sessions to identify 
and select managers from the previous SOE who were most likely to adapt and 
change. These individuals were then put through intensive education and training to 
expose them to the principles and practice of the market economy in general and 
ABB management systems in particular. Rather than using local providers, the 
fraining and development of this layer of managers generally took place at the ABB 
Management Centre in Warsaw. This group of selected Polish managers were sent on 
benchmarking tours to other firms in the ABB Business Area to understand best 
practice and become imbued with company culture. This was an ongoing process 
reinforced by biarmual meetings of middle management functional teams within the 
Business Area. Second, the material incentives and prestige of managers were 
substantially increased with large wage increases, company cars, remodelled offices 
and the possibility of foreign fravel. 
This intense restructuring took place in the four year period from 1990 to 1994 after 
which ABB Dohnel (power generators) had all Polish management, the consultants 
having moved on and the expatriate managers transferred elsewhere. Constant 
financial reporting and manuals supplied to the HRM and supply managers regarding 
ABB policy, meant that there was strict arms length control with little room for 
manoeuvre for incumbent managers. The ABB Business Area decided which market 
the firm could sell in, the level of investment and R&D continued to take place in 
Switzerland. The main area for which the factory workers and managers had 
responsibility was cost reduction and productivity, although targets for these 
parameters were handed down from the Business Area. 
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As we shall see in the following sections the different approaches to organisational 
structure and differences in corporate culture were played out in and permeated all 
other aspects of their operations in HRM, production philosophy and supply 
management. 
6.3.3 Country of origin and national systems of business 
Both of the firms originated from the same country of origin, but as we have seen 
manifested contrasting corporate cultures. Volvo exhibited sfrong but not unmodified 
cultural traits from the home country such as the inclusion of employees, more 
heterarchical structm-es and the stated aim of being a good corporate neighbour. They 
were positive about building links with the locality beyond those that served their 
immediate needs. ABB was half Swedish in that it had merged with a Swiss company 
in 1987. There were no discernible traces of the Swedish model, and the corporate 
culture reflected the personal stamp of senior executives. 
6.4 C O G N I T I V E EMBEDDEDNESS 
As we saw in earlier sections Volvo and ABB adopted different policies to deal with 
the norms, habits and past behaviours of workers and incumbent management. While 
ABB used a 'shock therapy' approach to restructuring and corporate strategy, Volvo's 
more gradualist approach was based on drawing on local tacit knowledge. 
6.4.1 Regions as a source of tacit knowledge 
Both of the case study firms accessed local tacit knowledge in different ways through 
their human resources managers, networks of other firms and their participation in 
local chambers of commerce and the business community. 
The role of the respective HRM Managers reflected a different emphasis on the 
importance of local tacit knowledge. In Volvo the HRM manager, a woman in her 
late twenties previously the personal assistant of the Managing Director, was a 
member of two local HR groups which met frequently. One was the regional branch 
of the Polish HR Association that met monthly and the second meeting comprised 
Pohsh and international managers (mainly HRM) and was organised by a local 
consultancy firm. These groups drew their membership mainly from large companies 
and provided a forum for exchanging local knowledge about recruitment and trade 
unions. The HR Manager at Volvo explained why practices had been locally adapted. 
HRM is a very local thing. Knowing the culture, the traditions, the education system, 
the history of the region, the mentality of the people, religious background. These are 
things that cannot be learned abroad. (HR Manager Volvo) 
The gradual development of the Volvo site meant that many of the policies were 
pragmatic and had developed in response to new situations. In contrast the HRM 
Manager at ABB Dolmel was in her fifties and had worked for the company for 
twenty five years. Her main contact with other HR managers was within the ABB 
organisation itself, cultivated through frequent fraining courses and meetings in 
Warsaw and elsewhere in Europe. The HRM manager at ABB Dolmel was much 
more a conveyor belt for implementing ABB policy, which was extensively codified 
in a series of very detailed manuals and mechanically implemented rather than locally 
adapted. 
The previous chapter emphasised the importance of networks of large firms as a 
source of local knowledge. Volvo had strong and frequent contacts with other foreign 
investors. When they were considering greenfield production in the area they talked 
to Cadbury, the first large FDI in the area, to facilitate and accelerate the process of 
relocation. They were given practical details about how Cadbury had built their 
factory, which consultants they had used, the main bureaucratic hurdles encountered 
and who could get things moving in the city and at voivodship level. In turn when the 
site was completed Volvo became a source of information for other investors 
considering locating in the area and enquiries were put in their direction by the British 
Chamber of Commerce. There was frequent contact between Volvo and other 
Swedish investors such as ABB and Alfa Lavel with whom they have sponsored a 
children's home and financed and promoted annual Swedish culture days. The 
Managing Director attended regular private dinners at the International Club reserved 
189 
for the highest echelons of management fi-om the leading foreign investments. 
ABB's roots in the locality, in contrast, were shallow and token. Membership of the 
Lower Silesian Chamber of Commerce and the British Chamber of Commerce did not 
translate into active participation in the business life of the locality. The mode of 
entry through buying into an existing factory that was negotiated at the national level 
circumvented local stmctures. The Polish management of the company, largely 
recruited from the previous SOE, was not locked into the formal or informal 
stmctures or networks of intemational management in the locality. The only long 
standing and substantial contact was with one department in the Technical University 
of Wroclaw. There was no suggestion that a high profile in the area, or a positive 
image or reputation as a good corporate neighbour was an important aspect of their 
corporate culture. 
One salient aspect of the debate on local embeddedness is the extent to which 
regional linkages with formal institutions have become increasingly important for 
firms, or whether the critical spatial level of engagement continues to be at the 
national level. Although the role of the head office played a different fimction in each 
of the firms, the existence of a headquarters in Warsaw reflected the fact that both 
firms needed to have a base near the decision making centre and the potential for 
political links with relevant Ministers and govemment departments. 
In the case of Volvo the Warsaw office housed the Managing Director of Volvo 
Poland, the sales and after sales organisations, and the statutory finance fiinction that 
consolidated information from regional operations for the head office in Sweden. A 
presence in Warsaw was important for lobbying the govemment regarding the mles 
pertaining to foreign investment. In the mid 1990s, for example, there was ongoing 
concem about the classification of industrial assembly, with mles under discussion on 
exemption from customs duties. These mles related to the number of people 
employed the value of investment and production levels. Pressure to tighten mles on 
foreign assembly investment came from domestic producers such as Jelcz who 
demanded a degree of protection from competition and from other large foreign 
investors such as Daewoo who had committed large sums of money. Further, there 
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was antipathy to foreign investors from individual politicians. While there was no 
fundamental difference in the policies of the two major parties (AWS and SDP) the 
main division was within the parties, for example, the Peasant Party which was part 
of the AWS coalition was hostile to and suspicious of foreign investors and raised 
objections to them buying land. 
A second reason for Volvo needing a high and positive profile in the country and 
being regarded as good corporate neighbour lay in the demands of the new 
competition. In the sale of buses purchased by municipalities and city councils Volvo 
had extended the package that they offered beyond the provision of finance. From 
1998 onwards they offered a wider service relating to transportation and plarming, 
where they provided an overview of the fransport needs of a locality and worked with 
local officials and platmers to make adjustments and improvements. In 1999 this 
strategy had not yet been adopted by other bus makers because it required a high level 
of resources and finance which were beyond the resources of weaker competitors in 
the market. 
In the case of ABB a presence in the national economy was formalised in their matrix 
structure. This matrix system meant that senior management in each subsidiary were 
answerable to a country manager usually based in the capital city, and Business Area 
managers based outside the country. The purpose of a country headquarters was 
intended to ensure not only access to decision makers but to disseminate information 
regarding national issues, particularly when in the case of CEE, there are a large 
number of firms and profit cenfres operating within each economy. Therefore, when 
there was a new ABB acquisition managers could benefit from local knowledge 
embedded in other companies in the group operating in the same country. Important 
information would include where to recruit, links with universities, building an 
efficient distribution and service network across product lines, circulating managers 
among local companies and maintaining good relations with top government officials. 
Therefore, ABB needed a base inside the country in order to gain local knowledge 
and a national focal point for collecting tacit knowledge and codifying it for existing 
and new operations. An understanding of labour relations, banking systems and the 
establishment of high level contacts with customers were crucial to the operation of 
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the business. Further, acquiring firms which were industry leaders and country 
monuments required a degree of local sensitivity in both their acquisition and 
restructuring. 
6.4.2 Hierarchy to heterarchy 
Chapter Four suggested that the move to flatter organisations was an important way 
of accessing tacit knowledge from employees and encouraging innovation. Since its 
formation, ABB has espoused a corporate strategy of being local world wide - 'a 
company with many homes'. In the previous section we saw how ABB's 
organisational structure was designed to exploit the two-fold advantage of local 
specialisation, on the one hand and, global resources and coordination on the other. 
Its' global manfra has been think global act local (Taylor, 1991: 477). 
ABB's operation in the Wroclaw region reflected the way in which most of the 
company's employees were organised in autonomous small units. Operations in the 
organisation as a whole were divided into nearly 1,200 companies with an average of 
222 employees, and these companies were fiirther divided into 4,500 profit cenfres 
with an average of 50 employees. Bamevik claimed that 'Separate companies allow 
you to create balance sheets with real responsibility for cash flow and dividends. 
Better for rewarding, motivating and recruiting managers' (Taylor, 1991: 486). 
Cenfralised reporting took place through a Management Information System called 
Abacus, which collected performance data on 4,500 profit centres and compares 
performance and budget forecasts every month. This information was collected in 
local cvurencies and then translated into US dollars for comparability. The 
performance indicators were cash flows, invoicing, new orders, profit margins, and 
their purpose was to discern patterns and to track how far individual subsidiaries were 
out of line with general trends in efficiency. 
ABB Dolmel was described by the Managing Director as both super local and super 
global. Super local in that it specifically served the local market in Poland for new 
generators and the equipment for and servicing of existing ones. The second business 
area was in power plant production which was part of a world wide network of 
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generator factories which both competed and cooperated with other ABB subsidiaries 
for contracts and was therefore super global. 
The matrix system meant that the senior management of ABB Dohnel (power 
generators) was answerable to one country manager in Warsaw and two Business 
Area Managers. The Business Area Manager for Power Utilities was based in 
Germany, while the Business Area Manager for Power Production was based in 
Switzerland. The Business Area Manager's role was to monitor the frajectory of the 
business. S/he decides which factories wi l l make which products, what export 
markets each factory wil l serve, how factories should pool their expertise and 
research for the benefit of the company worldwide. In addition, s/he tracks the talent 
of 60 or 70 outstanding managers and recommends them for new companies. 
The organisational stmcture of Volvo was more flexible and multidimensional in 
comparison with the formal and rigid matrix organisation of ABB and HQ functions 
were comparatively more diffiise. Volvo Management on the Wroclaw site, as we 
shall see in the next section, had a greater degree of autonomy regarding the 
organisation of production, HRM policies and sourcing decisions. The plant was only 
responsible for production, with sales and marketing taking place elsewhere. 
Decisions regarding new investment, and the expansion or closure of the plant were 
taken in Sweden. Unobtmsive control was in evidence with the constant monitoring 
and measurement of quality according to criteria that were established to every last 
detail in Goteborg. As we shall see when we look at the labour process, the 
philosophy of the company was that the best way of fulfilling these externally 
determined criteria was to mobilise the tacit knowledge of workers rather than the 
prescriptive and restrictive approach of ABB. 
6.4.3 Learning by coercion 
Although stmctures appeared to be flat and autonomous in ABB this masked the way 
in which the stmcture coerced the individual divisions to leam in particular ways. 
Every month the Business Area headquarters distributed detailed information on 
performance measured by cmcial parameters, such as failure rates, throughput times, 
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and inventories as a percentage of revenues. These reports generated competition for 
outstanding performance and produce 'constructive internal competition'. The 
Business Area management board met four to six times a year to shape the global 
strategy and monitor performance. This allowed Business Area managers to 
benchmark subsidiaries against each other and to encourage the adoption of similar 
management practices without detailed hands-on interference in the day to day 
operations of firms. The Business Area had two additional tools to correct poor plant 
performance, and thereby encourage conformity with its programmes: export 
allocation and management promotion. A l l ABB plants were restricted geographically 
in the areas to which they could market their products and expansion beyond this 
required the permission from the Business Area. Another mechanism to create 
competition was the ABB trade company at Mannheim which tendered for confracts 
and then awarded the order to the firms (or firms) within the ABB network that 
demonsfrated the highest quality and lowest costs. The trade company was in a better 
position to tender for and win large confracts than individual firms because it was 
able to offer financial packages for projects. 
6.4.4 Workers and the labour process 
ABB's process of restructuring and changing the work process stood in sharp confrast 
to that of Volvo. In the early 1990s ABB laid down the four principles according to 
which it was going to demonsfrate the applicability of business and managerial 
reform in CEE : first, the immediate reorganisation into profit cenfres with well 
defined budgets, strict performance targets and clear lines of authority and 
accountability; second, to identify a core group of change agents from local 
management, and give small teams responsibility for championing high priority 
programmes; third, the fransfer of ABB expertise from around the world to support 
the change process without interfering; four, to keep standards high and demand 
quick results. 
The Production Manager at ABB Dohnel who had worked for the former Polish SOE 
for nineteen years outlined the main changes that had taken place since 1990. These 
included new technology, new processes, extensive training in business skills, cost 
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measurement and people management. The major change in the organisation of work 
was that in 1994 the production process was broken products into five different profit 
centres to which the previously centralised functions of manufacturing, quaUty 
confrol, purchasing and process engineering were devolved. According to the 
Production Manager visits to plants in other countries had inspired the new 
restructuring ideas which had been internally generated and evolved through 
discussions with colleagues in other countries and workers in the Wroclaw factory. 
He explained: 
This is Poland, and this is Wroclaw and these are not exactly the same people and 
we have to find some compromise between our organisation and our knowledge. It 
is not exactly the same It is difficult to move the same organisation, the same 
structure from other countries to Poland and to try to convince people that this is the 
best solution for everybody. (Production Manager ABB Dohnel) 
However, while this was the official line as soon as the tape was turned off the 
Production Manager suggested that the Polish management were not consulted and 
were treated as second class citizens by the parent company in that they were 
conveyor belts for orders from senior managers. Further, the foreman who gave me a 
tour roimd the factory emphatically denied any employee involvement in the 
restructuring of work within the factory. Whereas Volvo employees had intemaUsed 
the company culture there was a significant gap between the enabling myths 
generated by ABB and the perceptions of workers in ABB Dolmel (power 
generators). 
The Production Manager at Volvo explained that in the case of workers from 
previous SOEs such as Jelcz (the truck and bus company with which Volvo had a 
joint venture) old habits and attitudes had to be unlearned. In particular, workers 
being motivated by responsibility rather than control was a new departure, in that 
Polish management under the previous regime had been based on a culture of 
hierarchy, discipline and order. Ideas and edicts came down from senior managers 
and workers were expected to comply passively and there was therefore little or no 
incentive to iimovate. 
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Another distinctive feature of Volvo's work organisation was its attitude to 
recruitment. In an international study of bus and truck producers, Thompson et al 
(1995) found that there was no consistency between the qualifications and skills 
required by different producers of commercial vehicles. They found that strikingly 
different inputs of labour were used which ranged fi-om craft employees to 'raw semi 
skilled workers'. Volvo used a mixture of both skilled and experienced workers and 
young semi-skilled workers in production, and behavioural characteristics and 
attitudes were cited as more important for recruitment than technical or skill 
qualifications. The Managing Director explained that; 
Even if people have experience that doesn't mean they have Volvo experience so 
they are starting from the same point. An open mind is the really key factor for 
people. (Managing Director Volvo) 
The Production Manager identified a number of areas where past behaviour was a 
barrier to adapting to the Volvo culture and way of doing things. First, Polish firms 
were (and are) much more hierarchical and based on age and therefore some of the 
older workers found it hard to accept orders or instructions fi-om someone who was 
much younger, as in the case of the Polish Production Manager. Second, another 
continuity with past behaviours that was found to be obstructive was individuals 
trying to improve their personal standing by proposing organisational changes which 
were motivated by self interest rather than the efficiency and development of the firm. 
Thus some individuals sought to mould the emerging organisational structure to give 
themselves a good position or a power base, and continuity with the past was 
exhibited through rent or position seeking which was prevalent imder the old regime. 
Third, the Production Manager reported problems in trying to get workers to take 
responsibility for their work, and gave instances where quality was not up to standard 
and workers gave lots of excuses or blamed poor components rather than finding 
solutions. He suggested that it was difficult to get workers to see that it was not 
important to apportion blame or to attach guilt but to look for processes or procedures 
to ensure that mistakes did not reoccur. The Production Manager explained that; 
This was the most intensive period - having a meeting every day to teach them how 
to solve problems and how to fulfil the tasks and I was some sort of buffer between 
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production and other departments. Because they were trying to find out reasons 
everywhere else, reasons for not fulfilling the goals: the goal was not acceptable, 
they were not getting the materials on time and so on. So they start to be proud 
about they have done and build themselves up (ibid). 
Four, and a related issue, was that it was hard to instil an understanding of a way of 
problem solving to trace the location of faults. 
A lot of people were not prepared to take sequencing activities to solve the 
problems. I explained many times how you use sequencing to fmd problems. It was 
very hard to put it into practice. There were barriers inside the mentality of the 
people. Everyone wanted to go with their solution rather than talking about it (ibid). 
In the hght of these difficulties the Production Manager saw it as his job to 'teach 
what was important and how they should act'. 
At the beginning we had a production meeting every day at 8.00 At that time we 
didn't have ISO or structures. We concentrated on three tasks. I said to them this is 
the most important, if you carmot fulfil delivery precision concentrate on quality, 
quality you have to do and delivery precision will follow later. So they were coming 
with a lot of questions for us, they were trymg to force a different way of working, a 
different way of looking at problems. I would say it took me a tremendous time 
convincing people because they had their own way of thinking m their previous 
jobs. They realised that the structure was not stable so we could do as we would 
like. So it took me a long time to convince people (ibid). 
The Production Manager explained how the framework of the Volvo concept of work 
organisation was established: 
We had a lot of good people but they did not have many of those experiences. So 
first we narrowed those parameters to the most important, which was first quality, 
second productivity. So time per truck is second. There was a third parameter which 
was delivery precision So we took these as the three parameters for the 
workers. We said that everyone is responsible for their own operations and also for 
the quality of that work. We didn't have controllers checking what is done. So we 
pick up the truck after they have got green OK and then we are measuring whether 
they come up to Volvo quality standards. If the product has a fault then we trace it 
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through the paperwork. This was a huge difference in terms of the companies that 
they came from. Before they worked in an atmosphere where the quaHty was 
belonging to the department, quaUty control. Now they have responsibility for 
quality and the quality department only measures and checks quality. So this was a 
big step and I would say it took half a year of one or two hours daily working with 
my foremen, my work leaders and the blue collars to understand, (ibid) 
However, this did not mean that working practices and concepts of team work could 
be transferred unproblematically from Sweden. The Production Manager explained; 
Originally it was plarmed to have a similar organisation to Gothenburg with a 
foreman and a team leader. We had half a year trial period and found that this was 
not a good solution for us because we only had five stations. Therefore, what was 
more important was vertical teams between assembly and preassembly and with 
logistics. Our teams now are based on the idea that each line station has two or one 
preassembly line stations which are delivering the materials for them, (ibid) 
The work organisation (within the three parameters) was a home grown system, not 
just in order to adapt to local culture but mainly to adjust to working in a low volume 
situation. 
We looked at what we could learn from Gothenburg and Gent but they are much 
more focused on productivity per operation. The operator has three or five 
operations in the truck so that he can really specialize in that. But because we have a 
small line our station time is one and half hours, in Gent it is 12 minutes. So we 
have to transfer some know how and how to work and the workers have to know 30 
or 40 operations so we have to support them with very good information (ibid). 
The details of work organisation evolved in a much more participatory and iterative 
way. 
I took my engineers and foremen and some blue collars for a big meeting. OK now 
we will use four hours to think what we should do to change production. So they 
did some brainstorming and put their ideas on yellow pages and we put them on the 
table. Out of this we started to do more brainstorming Later on those yellow 
pages were not important.. .they started to talk to each other and discuss their 
problems It was eight hours and we didn't finish. So we took one week's 
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break. I think it took six meetings to come to some real conclusions.. ..The initiative 
and guidelines were mine but really it was this team talking about how they wanted 
to work.. ..After the meetings they were going to their colleagues and talking and if 
they didn't succeed in selling this idea they were coming to the next meetings with 
questions or doubts (ibid). 
Semi autonomous work groups have been a constant feature of firms which have been 
influenced by the sociotechnical or human centred production tradition in Sweden. 
Commercial vehicles is typical of those industries where the relation between the 
person and a machine is being replaced by the relation between a team and an 
integrated production system. However, teamworking is not a fixed package and the 
problem with the concept is that it has been used generically to cover a variety of 
different concepts and practices. Issues such as the extent and nature of delegated 
powers, or whether the socialisation of team members plays any significant role, are 
contingent on a variety of national, corporate and local factors, hi Volvo Wroclaw the 
team played a vital role in socialising workers and training new workers in the team, 
with each team having one or two experienced (and usually older workers). This was 
designed to encourage the sharing of tacit knowledge. 
Small group activities are seen as offering a fi^amework for human growth, self 
development, sociability, participation and other classic ingredients of job enrichment 
(Thompson et al, op.cit.). However, there were constraints on autonomy and the 
intensification of work meant that it was managers who determined the definition of 
skills and the preconditions for using them. Workers had some autonomy but only in 
the context of a stringent quality system, where quality criteria were codified in 
documents produced by the quality department working with production engineers in 
the design department in Gothenburg. Measurements were specified down to the last 
detail such as distances (in millimetres) between screws, hiformation was published 
about the performance of all subsidiaries which were then compared and therefore 
factories competed with each other in terms of the scores achieved at product quality 
audits. The global manufacturing management team organised the rotation of auditors 
to get the same eyes on production in different countries. One person collated the 
information fi-om all factories and made one complete audit, and in this way tried to 
standardise quality across all operations in different countries. 
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Volvo's organisation of work in a general sense has been viewed as human centred 
work, although this has been rather tarnished after the closure of their innovative 
production plants at Uddevalla and Kalmar in 1992 due to the imperatives of cost 
reduction and competition. The details of work organisation, however, varied 
enormously both within Sweden and across national boundaries. The evolution of the 
production system at Wroclaw has been consistent with the relatively small scale of 
the operation but has also utilised the ideas and knowledge of the shopfloor workers. 
There was no attempt to impose a blueprint of work organisation that had been used 
elsewhere. However, the extent to which tacit knowledge fi-om the locality has 
informed work design should not be overstated in that management worked 
constantly to overturn institutional roadblocks to change. The young Polish 
Production Manager was a critical link and mediator between the company culture 
and the Swedish management, and the habits and norms of workers. 
Now I have a very good picture of my people. I recognise how they behave, how 
they are acting. (Production Manager Volvo) 
Work could also be viewed as more satisfying given that relationships were less 
hierarchical, all workers were known personally to the Production Manager. Christian 
names were used, unusual in the formal Polish culture, and workers and management 
used the same canteen. There were many initiatives such as badminton and football 
competitions to try and break down barriers between management and workers. 
However, the style of management was much more one of paternalistic leadership 
than participatory democracy or empowerment. Familial metaphors were constantly 
used, particularly the notion of the firm as family. Senior and middle management 
referred to employees as 'my' or 'our' people and saw themselves as father figures. In 
return for looking after their workers they expected them to reciprocate with a high 
degree of loyalty and adherence to a particular set of values. 
200 
6.5 IMPACTS OF C U L T U R A L AND COGNITIVE EMBEDDEDNESS 
This section explores the impacts of cultural and cognitive influences on the 
embeddedness of the two case study firms in the locality with regard to technological 
upgrading, labour markets, supply linkages and their impact on indigenous firms. 
6.5.1 Technological upgrading 
Previous sections discussed the way in which changes in corporate culture and 
establishing western style management practices were central to the change process in 
both firms. However, the restructuring process went further than this in terms of both 
organisational change and upgrading production and processes. In ABB Dolmel the 
traditional structure of the SOE was immediately changed into divisional (product 
oriented) structures, which had responsibility for supply, production, quality 
assurance, research and development, marketing and sales. Tight budget constraints 
and responsibility for economic performance was delegated down the hierarchical 
chain of the division. Physically the amount of space utilised was contracted as the 
firm concentrated on its core operation. The huge site on which the Dohnel SOE was 
located entailed a 1.5 kilometre walk between administrative buildings adjacent to the 
road and the production area at the back of the site. The large number of buildings 
which lay between were either empty and derelict, or had been occupied by a number 
of small firms which had moved onto the site. 
Two restructuring projects were introduced to upgrade the firm's technical 
performance, to transfer organisational know how and integrate the firm with other 
ABB centres which are summed up in Table 6.3. 
In terms of technology the new Wroclaw factory of Volvo Bus Poland was one of the 
most modem and ecological bus factories in Europe. It was the first factory to 
integrate bus chassis and body production which saved between 70 and 100 person 
hours per bus. 
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Table 6.3 Restructuring projects at ABB Dohnel (power transformers'). Wroclaw fi-om 
1991-1999 
AREA OF 
OPERATION 
DETAILS OF PROJECTS 
Technology technology transfer - air cooled generators, infrastructural investments integration 
process with other ABB technology centres, development of package for the local 
market. 
Production Investments in cooled generators, improvement and stabilization of the quality, 
reduction of production cycles, increase of work efficiency, increasing cost 
effectiveness, improvement of work conditions, introduction of new technologies. 
Organization development and implementation of the quality system consistent with ISO 9001, 
adjusting of internal structure to ABB organisation scheme, expanding the 
communication infrastructure, implementation of an integrated computer system 
supporting management of production, finance and trade activity. 
Employees broad range of vocational and supplementary training, intensive recruitment of 
highly qualified employees, training program, selective recruitment and promotion 
system, motivation systems 
Finance development and implementation of fmancial controlling procedures, installation of 
financial accoimting computer system, integration with ABB finance system, 
integration of finance system with production management system. 
Source: ABB 
Therefore both firms were operating with technology which was at least as good as 
their counterparts in other countries. 
6.5.2 Labour market effects 
The job contribution of Volvo was significant. In 1995 200 people were employed in 
the assembly of trucks and buses, however the decision to build buses on the site 
increased employment to 2,000 by the end of 2001. Further the relocation of the 
fi-ame builder, WeibuUs, fi-om Sweden onto an adjacent site created a further 600 jobs 
by the end of 2001. The employment effects of ABB were more complex. In 1990 
when ABB took over the Dolmel SOE the operation was split into ABB Dolmel 
Drives which employed 1200 workers and ABB Dolmel (power generators) which 
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employed 400 workers. Between 1990 and 1998 the number of workers at ABB 
Dohnel (power generators) had increased by approximately 25 per cent firom 400 to 
513 workers. However, employment at Dolmel Drives fell from 1200 in 1990 to 450 
by 1998 and was closed by 2000 with the loss of the remainder of the jobs (this is 
discussed in section 6.5.4. Consequently as a result of restructuring the former 
Dohnel SOE over the ten year period there has been a net loss of 1000 jobs. 
It is not only the quantity of jobs which measures the embeddedness of firms in a 
locality but qualitative aspects related to the level of skills and training. 
Table 6.4 Employees by education at ABB Dohnel (power transformers) in March 
1999 
Education Number of employees % of employees 
PhD 5 1.0 
Higher Technician 145 28.3 
Economist 23 4.5 
Engineer 10 1.9 
Total 183 35.7 
Secondary Technician 134 26.1 
Economist 19 3.7 
Engineer 28 5.5 
Total 181 35.3 
ZSZ 126 24.6 
Basic education 26 4.5 
Lower than secondary 149 29.0 
Total at Dolmel 513 100 
Source: ABB Dolmel 
Table 6.4 shows that the workforce at ABB Dolmel had a relatively high level of 
skills with over one third of the employees having a degree, usually from either the 
Krakow Academy of Economics or the Wroclaw Technical University. In 1992 ABB 
tapped into local expertise by recruiting fourteen lecturers with doctorates directly 
from the Wroclaw Technical University to work on research projects. This built on 
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links that had been established between the company and a department in the 
university which had worked on generators and energy producing machines since the 
late 1980s. These scientists were linked to Baaden in Switzerland by computer and by 
1998 twenty five engineers were working with people fi-om Baaden in research and 
development on a project investigating new technology for generators. These 
scientists at ABB Dolmel (power generators) were working as i f they were in the 
Swiss department, using German documentation and language and receiving their 
wages from Switzerland. 
In 1999 Volvo was in the process of starting to recruit 1800 additional workers. The 
local reputation of Volvo was such that the firm did not need to advertise, because 
there was a constant stream of applications. Volvo wanted people who were proactive 
and taking the initiative in applying for a job was viewed as the first step. Every 
candidate had at least two interviews. Although qualifications were required for 
particular jobs such as welding, electrical assembly or painting, the main criteria was 
attitudinal. The Human Resource Manager said, 
Our experience is that the most important thing is that people have the proper 
attitude. If people have high qualifications but we can see he is problematic then I 
would say that he would not be employed. (Human Resource Manager Volvo) 
Attitudes, flexibility and potential team working ability were teased out at an 
interview with a representative from HR, fiiture supervisors and other specialists 
where appropriate. The HRM department developed strong links with particular 
departments, such as welding in order to know their specific recruitment and fraining 
needs. 
What I have learned is that really the most important thing is to secure very good 
procedures for recruitment, because that will save a lot of problems in the future. If you 
have good staff, with good attitudes with good qualifications - this means much less 
problems. You should check the qualifications, check the references, check the 
knowledge, check the papers as much as possible. This is much better than having to 
have a lot of change programmes (Personnel Manager Volvo). 
A sign of Volvo's success in recruitment and training, according to the HR Manager, 
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was that during four year period that the company had been on the Wroclaw site, 
there were only been two disciplinary cases. This attribute of having an 'open mind' 
is specific to the recruitment strategy of Volvo and is not regarded with such 
importance by other firms in the vehicle producing sector. Thompson et al (1995) in a 
cross cultural firm survey found that German and Swiss producers, for example, 
prioritise formal engineering skills in their recruitment of workers. 
However, there was some dissonance between the rhetoric and reality of attitudes 
towards experienced, older workers. The Production Manager talked about the need 
to balance both youth and experience, but applications from older workers, especially 
from SOEs threatened with bankruptcy, were treated with apprehension. It was 
suggested that workers who had worked for the same SOE for thirty years would be 
less open to new ways of working and behaving, having had longer exposure to the 
norms and habits of the previous regime. In comparison younger people were seen as 
empty vessels for new ways of working and therefore more adaptable and malleable. 
The figures in Table 6.5 bear out this preference for youth over experience with 50 
per cent of blue collar workers under 30 and 77 per cent under 40, with broadly 
similar proportions for white collar workers. 
Table 6.5 Age structure of employees at Volvo in March 1999 
Age Percentage of Workforce 
19-29 
30-39 
40-49 
Over 50 
Blue collar 
50 
27 
20 
3 
White collar 
47 
34 
17 
2 
Source: Volvo 
While there was no shortage of well qualified blue collar workers, Volvo found 
recruitment for some white collar jobs a problem. These shortages reflected 
developments in the local market. Initially people in marketing and sales were in 
scarce supply because of an influx of foreign companies that were trying to establish 
sales and distribution. A lagged supply effect meant that universities had now started 
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teaching this subject to young graduates and training companies were reskilling 
existing white collar workers within firms. In 1997 they had experienced labour 
shortages in the area of financial management and logistics, fiinctions that had not 
existed under the previous regime. By 1999 Volvo faced difficulties in recruiting 
production engineers and designers because a shift to FDI in production had created 
an increase in demand for these skills in the region. 
In both ABB and Volvo information on wage levels was very hard to obtain, partly 
because of a reluctance to divulge what was regarded as confidential information, but 
primarily because of complicated pay scales associated with individualised 
performance related pay. In the case of ABB Dolmel an individual's remuneration 
was broken down into base pay (74 per cent) annual bonus (12 per cent), holiday 
money (6 per cent) and a variable element (8 per cent). The base pay is based on the 
job requirements, inflation and the going rate in the local labour market. Detailed 
information on the local labour market including rates of pay for a variety of jobs and 
grades was provided by the Neumann Institute, a group of German consultants. The 
variable element of the pay and aimual bonus was determined by a complex system of 
employee appraisal that had been transferred from the ABB Business Area via a 
manual and training sessions. 
Similarly, in Volvo workers receive additional remuneration on the basis of their 
work performance and additional training and education. The criteria included 
professional growth or knowledge, independence, cooperation, quality and work 
organisation. In contrast with ABB the Volvo reward system is more eclectic and 
locally adapted taking elements of the pay structure from the Swedish and Polish 
systems. One element of the pay structure which was (re)introduced at the begirming 
of 1997 was a Social Fund, which all firms were required to operate. This legislation 
obliged firms and their employees to put an amount of money into a Social Fund 
which was then used for individual loans, hardship payments or social grants such as 
vacations for children. 
The notion of being people centred (Sandberg, 1993) was central to the Volvo 
philosophy. The company professed three core values of quality, security and the 
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environment. Their view was that people who are well supported, secure in their 
employment and with good working conditions wil l be better (and more productive) 
employees. Therefore there was much emphasis on training, education and personal 
development. The current Volvo HR Manager was a young Polish woman in her late 
twenties who was initially recruited in 1993 as assistant to the Managing Director. 
Although she was fluent in English she had no formal qualifications and no previous 
business experience, and was trained by attending locally organised courses on labour 
law and was encouraged into the Volvo way of thinking by attendance at 
management meetings and coaching by the Managing Director. 
In line with its people centred approach Volvo placed great emphasis on the continual 
training and education of employees. The training needs of individuals were defined 
by the supervisor, although workers could request training in particular areas. There 
were four types of training. First, training which is required by law for example in 
health and safety or that which is necessary for particular jobs such as certificates for 
welders or those working with high voltage electricity and driving licences. Second, 
general training organised in languages (four different levels of English, French and 
German) or computers. Third, there was additional specialist training in logistics, 
finance and distribution. Four, 'soft training' which would include communications, 
personnel management, how to handle interviews (for supervisors) and negotiations 
(for purchasers). 
In the case of Volvo most of the training was supplied by educational institutions or 
training companies. The quality of courses was strictly monitored, which involved 
initially eliciting recommendations for courses and provider institutions fi-om other 
foreign firms, which was followed by evaluation by the HR Department. Every 
institution or college had a one year trial period and had to achieve a certain number 
of points to be used on a regular or permanent basis. Volvo aimed to develop long 
term cooperative relationships with key institutions. The HRM had a great deal of 
latitude in committing spending to training and development, although the Managing 
Director had to approve any exclusive or expensive training. By mid 1999 the HRM 
department was moving to producing costings for training to make supervisors and 
managers aware of the cost implications of their decisions. In the case of ABB 
207 
training was front loaded with a high budget allocated in the initial period of 
restructuring between 1990 and 1994, using in-company provision in Warsaw to 
effect a rapid change in attitudes and management culture. However, the transfer of 
expertise was a two way process. Although local managers had been intensively 
trained in the management practices of the market economy, the technological 
expertise of individual Polish workers was integrated in the global research and 
development networks of the company. 
By 2001 Volvo wil l have created 2000 jobs since its arrival in the region. In terms of 
the quality of employment workers at all levels have access to extensive ongoing 
training which went beyond the immediate demands of the job and was designed to 
be personally enriching. However, the labour market impacts of this flagship 
investment have to be tempered by the fact that Volvo exhibits a bias towards 
recruiting younger workers, reducing the opportunities for older skilled workers laid 
off from SOEs in the region. Further, job creation has to be offset against the 
competition effects Volvo has had on other firms in the region as we shall see in 
Section 6.5.4. 
Volvo had history of collaborative industrial relations and inclusive work 
organisation. However, whereas trade unions were cenfral to consultation in Sweden, 
their role was peripheral in Poland and no attempt was made to assign them a similar 
role to the one they had played in the home country. In 1999 the membership of 
Solidarity in the Wroclaw factory was 330 out of a work force of 1100, which had 
been built up from twenty when the plant started assembly in 1993. The President of 
Solidarity painted a picture of workplace relations that was at odds with the 
management's enabling myths of consensus and cooperation. A major cleavage in the 
rhetoric of management and the perception of the worker's representative centred on 
the lack of consultation and cooperation. In September 1999 the first major dispute 
had erupted over this issue in general, and a lack of negotiation over pay specifically. 
Further, it was suggested that there was an atmosphere of indirect hostility, and a 
'climate of discomfort', and this was very visible when workers promoted to team 
leaders invariably resigned from the union. The President of Solidarity (a man in his 
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late twenties) had been told directly that his role as a union activist was incompatible 
with progressing and promotion in the company. 
It is difficult to know how pervasive this view was among workers who were non 
union members, and the union representative's explanation of low union membership 
was that younger workers, who comprised the majority of the workforce, had a lack 
of awareness of unions and workplace rights. Although we should be cautious about 
viewing workers as homogenous in their attitudes, there was some evidence that 
management discourses while not actively resisted, were not necessarily absorbed. 
This was reflected in a survey carried out by regional Solidarity in order to give 
awards to top scoring 'worker friendly' workplaces. A sample of workers were 
surveyed in each of the firms who agreed to take part, and they were asked to award 
point in a number of categories such as communication, management culture, wages 
and fraining. The top three firms were PZU Insurance (Polish firm), Danfoss (Danish 
water pipes maker) and a Polish copper mine. In confidence, I was told that Volvo 
was not particularly well rated by the workers and came eighteenth out of the twenty 
seven firms in the survey. The President of Solidarity also pointed out that the 
reputation of Volvo as high paying was overstated and that the gross average monthly 
salary of 2000 zloty (£400) was inflated by including the salaries of higher paid white 
collar workers. He claimed that the starting salary (not adjusted for inflation) for 
incoming blue collar workers had fallen by 10 per cent in real terms between 1997 
and 1999. 
6.5.3 Supply linkages 
Decisions regarding sourcing had a significant impact on local economic linkages and 
the multiplier effect of an investment decision, and corporate culture had a strong 
impact on the relationship of the two case study firms with their suppliers. In Volvo 
the manager in charge of purchasing within the plant, also had the role of Volvo 
Global Sourcing Manager. His brief was to find suppliers inside the former CEE 
economies and in particular, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic with a view to 
sourcing bus, truck, marine and construction supplies. In the initial stages of Volvo's 
investment in assembly local supplies for the operation were very limited. In 1997 all 
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components were imported as kits from Finland ' (buses) and Ghent or Goteburg 
(trucks) apart from tyres that were bought from Michelin and Continental in Poland. 
Only second order supplies were bought locally, these included: the services of local 
construction companies, for example welding; maintenance equipment, computer 
parts and programmes; local consultants; English and computer courses; gardening 
and cleaning. 
Volvo's decision to expand and relocate complete bus production from other parts of 
Europe to Wroclaw had significant implications for sourcing. A decision was taken to 
start sourcing non sfrategic supplies related to body building (steel, sheet metal, glass, 
interior parts elecfronics) from Poland, while sfrategic supplies related to the chassis 
(axels, gearbox, engine, wheels) would continue to be produced in Goteberg. The 
argument was that higher value added products would continue to be produced in 
Sweden to achieve economies of scale, but the decision was also motivated by the 
desirability of keeping frill confrol of the technology and maintaining quality 
standards. 
In the case of Volvo proximity was viewed as an important criteria for suppliers, 
although the degree of proximity varied with particular products. In 1998 the frames 
for buses arrived in parts and were welded together on site. Weibulls, the firm that 
supplies building frames for the buses, was moving from Sweden to a site adjacent to 
the Wroclaw factory, employing between 500 and 600 workers by 2001. There was 
adegree of coercion from Volvo involved in this decision as Weibulls were told that 
failure to relocate would have led to Volvo looking for a new supplier. 
Volvo's policy was that bottleneck supplies (mirrors, fabrics, doors, glass, windows, 
seats) which the customer ordered late and where the lead time was fairly long should 
be located within a 300 kilometre radius. It should be noted that bottleneck supplies 
are fairly low skill, low value added operations in comparison with the production of 
engines and gearboxes for example. The implications of this 300 kilomefre policy 
were that it was possible to locate in areas in the West of Poland such as Katowice 
and Poznan but ruled out Warsaw and areas to the East of the coimtry. The reason 
given for the necessity of proximity was to keep the exchange of information and 
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communications easier, and this distance meant that face to face contact could be 
maintained by a one day car journey. It was suggested that the reduction of 
psychological distance increased control of, and obligation on the part of the supplier. 
The Manager for Global Sourcing explained this decision: 
It is not related to costs, it's related to getting flexibility in our production.. .because 
every bus is a unique individual this means that you need to have a high degree of 
flexibility, both from the suppher point of view as well as in your production. Every 
bus is a customer ordered product and that is the main reason we are asking 
suppliers to locate in this area. (Global Sourcing Manager, Volvo) 
Volvo preferred to retain flexibility in their use of suppliers and rejected any idea of 
moving to long term agreements with preferred suppliers: 
We are not going to do this because the world is changing so rapidly and I believe 
that competition is the only parameter to increase activity within the company in all 
areas such as quality, lead times, performance and prices. From that respect it seems 
to me strange to make long term arrangements. (Global Sourcing Manager Volvo) 
ABB'S policy on suppliers was much more arms length and by the book and 
proximity was only important in as much as it reduced costs, not because of any 
perceived value of face to face relationships. The classification of suppliers was 
consistent with ISO 9001 and internal ABB rules. First level suppliers produced less 
important items where lead times were short. Leverage items were those items with a 
higher complexity and level of technology, whereas bottleneck items were those with 
market complexity, that is where lead times tended to be long. Finally strategic items 
were those that had a higher technological complexity and longer lead times and were 
central to the production process. 
Suppliers themselves were then classified according to a number of criteria. Level 0 
comprised the entire potential pool of suppliers and Dolmel could not buy any goods 
or services fi-om this sector. A Level 1 supplier had to have a commercial and 
technical evaluation, which involved a visit to check the history of the firm, and the 
production arrangements. Level 2 is qualified supplier status. This was more 
complicated because the firm had to complete a Supplier Information Questionnaire 
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(SPIQ) and it was preferable, but not mandatory that the firm has ISO 9001. At 
Levels 3 and 4 ISO was mandatory and the Supplier Performance Rating (SPR) must 
be higher than 76 or 90 per cent respectively. The record of suppliers is constantly 
monitored and SPR is based on their performance in the last period measured by 
criteria such as flexibility, price and delivery dates. I f a supplier could get on ABB's 
list of qualified suppliers (kept by the Business Area in Switzerland) it could 
potentially supply any firm in the Business Area. 
Both ABB and Volvo worked with potential suppliers to help them achieve the 
necessary standard of production and/or quality. In the case of Volvo they would 
work within the designated radius for particular components, with firms who had the 
potential to become suppliers, and particularly those that had the 'right sort of 
management'. They would explore mutually beneficial developments such as the use 
of cadcam to transfer drawings and review production processes and quality 
procedures. ABB had been working with a potential strategic supplier since 1992 and 
were finally given permission to use them in 1998. The firm Bochnia, a spin off fi-om 
Huta Sendzhimira Steel Works, produced magnetic steel which constituted Dohnel's 
biggest volume of purchases. Bochnia was based 300 kilometres fi-om Wroclaw near 
Krakow, but the relationship with the company was motivated by the possibility of 
substantially reducing costs, through both transport and labour costs, rather than a 
preference for face to face contact and communication. 
There were several differences in the relationship between the two firms and their 
suppliers. First, ABB put much greater emphasis on the cost reduction of supplies and 
worked with suppliers to reduce costs on an annual basis. Volvo gave more weight to 
the notion of landed costs, which included the concept of quality and delivery 
precision. Landed costs are the cost of the product combined with the transport and 
handling from the suppher to landing at the site for production. Second, ABB had a 
(two way) open book philosophy whereby they showed their costs, order book, 
information about competitors to potential suppliers to explain their needs for the 
relevant period. Suppliers had to reciprocate by giving information about their 
financial position, how they would fiilfil production requirements, and their plans for 
the investment. A fiirther feature of this relationship was ongoing discussions about 
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continuous cost reduction. Volvo, however, rejected the notion of an open book 
system and preferred to have an open relationship system to build trust and 
confidence which they regarded as mutually beneficial. Third, whereas ABB 
prioritised cost reduction Volvo put emphasis on encouraging suppliers to have a 
diversified customer base rather than being solely dependent on them. 
Table 6.6 A comparison of the supplv strategies of ABB and Volvo in 1999 
Variable Volvo ABB 
Relationship 
Strategic supplier 
Open relationship 
Sweden 
Open book 
Poland (after 1998) 
Bottleneck/leverage suppliers Between 300 metres and 300 kilometres Anywhere 
Costs 
Working with suppliers 
Landed costs (quality & delivery 
precision) 
Encourage diversification 
Constant reduction targets 
Prioritise cost reduction 
Source: Author 
The status of being suppliers for prestigious western companies coupled with the 
transfer of expertise, technology and upgrading offered the possibility for supplier 
firms to develop in two ways. First, they could more easily become suppliers for other 
foreign investors in the Polish market which demanded similar quality standards. 
Second, they could go on the list of approved suppliers for ABB and Volvo. 
However, becoming an approved supplier for the industrial networks of both ABB 
and Volvo firms involved a long, demanding and costly evaluation process. In the 
case of Volvo potential supplier companies had to be measured by a nimiber of 
stringent criteria: financial, envirormiental, quality, management activities, and the 
education and training of the employees. The Global Sourcing Manager was keen that 
the new Polish companies that were dealing with should become approved suppliers 
for the Volvo industrial system.. In his view it would take Polish firms three of four 
years to achieve this status. 
Corporate strategy on suppliers and sourcing had a direct effect on the impact of 
embeddedness and local linkages. In the case of ABB proximity was not an issue and 
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the firms sourced over long distances with few connections in the locaUty. The impact 
of Volvo's policy on sourcing was more mixed in terms of local linkages. Strategic 
supplies were imported fi"om Sweden, and because they embodied a large degree of 
technology this limited technology transfer to the region. A range of bottleneck 
suppliers were located within 'a day's drive' that were largely in areas outside of the 
region. However, a significant multiplier effect was created by the supplier of metal 
panels moving onto the same site. 
6.5.4 Impacts on indigenous firms 
Previous sections have examined the generally favourable and positive impacts of 
ABB and Volvo in terms of the quantity and quality of jobs and upgrading of 
technology. Neoliberal assumptions about the role of foreign investment in 
transforming economies have assimied that a competition effect that would stimulate 
existing firms to restructure and become more efficient. Some evolutionary accounts 
have suggested that the recombination of incoming firms with local knowledge and 
skills could produce a propitious outcome. However, these sanguine views of the 
impact of foreign firms have to be counter balanced by their impact on indigenous 
firms and subsequent employment effects. This section examines two case study 
firms that have been adversely affected by the impact of foreign investment. The first 
firm is Jelcz, Poland's largest producer of trucks and buses, which was in direct 
competition with Volvo. It is argued that the accrued learning of international 
oligopolistic TNCs coupled with the inappropriate corporate culture and learning 
abilities of previous SOEs suggests that the playing field for indigenous firms is 
uneven. The second firm is ABB Dolmel Drives, one of the firms bought by ABB 
that was asset stripped and declared bankrupt after eight years. The main point here is 
to illustrate the use of enabling myths to gain ownership of firms and the 
acquiescence of the workforce, while disembedding local productive capacity. 
Jeclz: the 'wrong' corporate culture 
After the begiiming of transformation in 1990 the privatisation process at Jelcz was 
protracted. Negotiations with Volvo, who wanted to take a bigger share of the firm. 
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were blocked by Solidarity on the grounds of a reduction of employment. The shares 
were eventually sold to Sobieslaw Zasada Centrum (SZC), a firm owned by a Polish 
racing driver and backed by Mercedes in 1996. This foreign investor was seen as 
offering a better long term future and guaranteeing the necessary level of social 
provision ^ . 
Alongside the privatisation negotiations Jelcz began the process of restructuring in 
1990 by spirming of non-core activities such as social fiinctions and other small and 
medium production and service firms. In 1989 total employment stood at 10,000 and 
by 1999 it had fallen to 2,400 workers. According to senior management there were a 
series of investments to lower costs, increase efficiency and quality that included; 
changes in painting technology; technology to lower emissions; co-operation with 
Mercedes on a new design of city buses and; working with Iveco (Ford truck 
producers) to improve components. Quality controls have been exerted over suppliers 
with attempts to lower stocks through JIT and Jelcz have now been awarded ISO 
9001 through a German-Polish organisation. However, Business News fi"om Poland 
(1999) claims that despite frequent declarations to restructure, SZC has not launched 
any serious investment projects, and that the policies pursued to date have led to a 
decline in the sale of both lorries and buses as clients are unclear about the future 
plans of the company. By 1998 Jelcz's share of the domestic market had fallen to 
38.2 per cent, while Volvo's had increased to 14.3 per cent. 
The structural and cultural legacies of the previous regime such as over employment 
and outdated products and processes, limited Jelcz's ability to restructure in the face 
of intensified competitition. This was reflected in the fact that Jelcz vehicles, 
according to their own management and workers, had a poor reputation for quality 
and reliabiUty. Their traditional market to the East was severely affected by the 
Russian financial crisis in 1997. Diversification into western markets was severely 
constrained because it was already saturated and because Jelcz lacked established 
service networks to support sales, and crucially competitors were able to offer much 
better terms of payment through their own credit companies. 
Central to the problem Jelcz faced in competing with established western TNCs were 
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bounded cognitive abilities that produced a lock-in to old routines. This was related to 
a large degree to problems they faced in the labour rriarket. Jelcz had experienced a 
large turnover of yoimg management, which was partly due to the relative 
geographical isolation of the factory and its inaccessibility without a car (see Figure 
4.1). More importantly, however, Jelcz could not compete with the salaries offered 
by other foreign investors to attract high calibre well qualified young professionals. 
Most of the existing management were internally recruited and had worked for the 
firm for twenty years or more. One member of senior management had previously 
held a post in national government and was involved in the abortive JV negotiations 
with Volvo. Further Jelcz had a relatively old manual workforce with an average age 
of 43, which current management viewed as a barrier to flexibility and adapting to 
new technology. Solidarity, however, claimed that Volvo had been poaching workers 
in order to expand, the effect of which was to further deplete the quality of human 
capital in Jelcz . Thus the possibilities for innovation and breaking with old routines 
were constrained. 
In mid 1999 the prognosis for Jelcz was not good, only a contract to supply a large 
number of bus chassis to China ensured its survival in 1999. It is clear that this 
previous SOE had limited possibilities for competing in an open market, particularly 
against Volvo's extensive experience of operating in international markets, supported 
by tried and tested production methods and importantly the financial and after care 
facilities reflected in its corporate culture. Further, as we saw in the previous section 
part of Volvo's competitive advantage lay in its cognitive skills of shifting the mind 
set of workers associated with the previous regime and introducing more efficient 
ways of working linked to engendering a strong Volvo identity. The experience of 
Jelcz suggests that the economic impact of Volvo should be regarded in a rather 
different light, that is rather than adding to existing capacity it is in the process of 
supplanting existing firms in a situation where competition is not a level playing field. 
Dolmel Drives: Enabling myths and asset stripping 
The competition effect of ABB on the previous SOE Dolmel was of a different 
nature. In short, while ABB Dolmel (power transformers) was made internationally 
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competitive, any changes that took place in ABB Dolmel Drives fell far short of 
making it a serious contender either in the external market or the internal market of 
the ABB industrial group. ABB Dolmel Drives came fi-om the same parent SOE as 
ABB Dolmel and was established in 1990. Situated next door to each other the firms 
shared the same canteen and social facilities. Initially ABB had 20 per cent of the 
shares in the company with the other 80 per cent remaining with the State Treasury. 
The company made engines for railways, city transport, mining and shipbuilding. In 
1990 there was a willingness and enthusiasm fi-om Solidarity to 'open to the West' 
and have a foreign investor. After the agreement was signed with ABB the prospects 
for the firm were regarded as favourable. Employees wages were 50 per cent higher 
than the local average and it was believed that ABB had promised to develop the 
company and introduce new technology. In 1996 ABB purchased 80 per cent of the 
remaining shares (without informing or consulting with the employees) and the 
restructuring process was accelerated. By 1998 there had been six roimds of 
redundancies reducing the workforce fi-om 1,480 to 460, production space was 
reduced and production of the second most profitable product discontinued. There 
was disinvestment in capital equipment with machines simply being moved out of the 
factory. 
Solidarity realised that restructuring was necessary but at a meeting held in 1998, 
management from Ziuich argued that there had been no new investment because 
productivity was low. Solidarity feh that this was disingenuous because workers had 
not been given the resources or know how to improve productivity. The firm was 
operating with exactly the same equipment that had been there in 1990 and there has 
been no new technology or technology transfer. Rather, a process of asset stripping 
had gone on and I was shown a huge hall that used to employ 400 people in 1994 
which by 1998 was completely empty. The machinery had either been sold or gone to 
junkyards. In order to save good machines workers switched labels putting old labels 
on new machines in the hope that they would remain in the plant. A l l goodwill had 
dissipated and great bitterness was evident because Solidarity said that they had 
gradually realised that ABB had not bought the factory to improve it but as a way of 
gaining a foothold in the market. 
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Although the senior and middle management of ABB Dolmel Drives was Polish, 
fi-om 1996 onwards Solidarity felt that all decisions were taken in Zurich. Solidarity 
felt completely let down by the Polish senior management and middle management 
such as the 'young kids in marketing', who 'had been to Zurich to be indoctrinated 
with ABB culture with no particular loyalty to the company'. The workers said that 
they felt emotional about the company, they had fought for it (Uterally) ^ and wanted 
it to succeed. The significant wage increase in 1990 was now viewed as a sweetener, 
because although this meant that wages were 50 per cent higher than the average in 
1990, it was claimed that they had failed to keep pace with inflation and wage levels 
were below average in 1999. Social benefits have also been reduced with the two 
week holiday provided for the children of workers scrapped in 1996. 
Li 1992 a letter to the management of Dolmel Drives asked for a statement about the 
fiiture direction of the company and the way in which it was to be developed: 
So far the management has not presented a reliable plan for the Company 
Particularly we badly lack for a clear position of ABB (as shareholder) on and 
its commitment to the Company's fiiture (investment, new technology, licence 
dociunentation and marketing support). The continuation of this state is very 
distressing and may result in a decline of the technological potential of the company 
and a loss of highly qualified people, which in the future will make it impossible for 
the company to develop and increase production. (Letter to the Management of 
Dolmel Drives Ltd, 15 March 1993) 
After fixrther rounds of redundancies in 1998 Solidarity wroie to the Prime Minister to 
draw attention to what had happened but feU in a weak and hopeless position in terms 
of defending jobs. They want someone else to look at the books as they no longer 
trusted the information they had been given by ABB. 
Today, eight years after the foundation of ABB Dolmel Drives and eight years after 
ABB's management, the company is more technologically and technically 
impoverished than it was in 1990. With only 460 employees (in 1990 die company 
employed 1480 people) and the production space reduced, the company is at the 
brink of total disintegration. Our continuous intervention and warnings have always 
been categorically dismissed. The only explanation for the status quo is the 
company's too small ownership capital. Its growth we are told, is expected with the 
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purchase of Pafawag, the company which could have been our biggest 
client Solidamosc ABB Dohnel Drives considers these actions to be 
conscious acts aimed at the destruction of Polish market and the elimination of 
Polish companies. In view of this fact we ask the Polish government of the Republic 
of Poland to verify its policy contributing to the growing poverty and 
unemployment in Poland. How can we tolerate the situation where Polish 
companies are being sold for minimal sums and without any support plans. Agencja 
Rozwoju Przemyslu (Department of Industry) sold 80 per cent of Dolmel Drives 
secretly, not bothering to inform the company employees. The big question we ask 
is who really benefits from this kind of privatisation. It is certainly not our country 
and its citizens." (Letter to the Prime Minister of Poland from NSZZ Sohdamosc 
(Dohnel Drives), 7 April 1998) 
By September 1999 the firm was declared bankrupt and all workers were in the 
process of being made redimdant. Although requests to interview members of Senior 
Management at ABB Dohnel Drives were declined, three members of Senior 
Management in ABB Dohnel (power generators) suggested that in 1990 ABB had 
reluctantly been obliged to acquire Dolmel Drives by the govenmient in order to get 
the quarry of Dolmel, the power transformers firm. ABB had many other firms which 
made engines and ABB Dolmel Drives was surplus to the requirements of ABB's 
global operations from the begirming. 
Two points emerge from the experience of ABB Dolmel Drives. First the high 
dependence of indigenous firms on the transfer of technological and managerial know 
-how from western foreign investors for their survival. In this case the capacity for 
irmovation was reduced through roimds of redundancies and the disposal of 
machinery. Second, the use of enabling myths in acquiring the acquiescence of 
workers in the acquisition and subsequent restructuring of the firm. In this case 
workers had already absorbed the general enabling myth that Western firms would 
bring automatic benefits in terms of an infusion of capital and knowledge related to 
the market economy. Firm specific enabling myths were that redundancies were 
inevitable to increase efficiency and that the bankruptcy of the firm was due to market 
forces and a lack of competitiveness rather than the deliberate running down of 
productive capacity. 
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6.6 CONCLUSION 
Volvo and ABB are both global TNCs with the same national origin. The arrival of 
the firms, albeit by different routes, was related to building on and accessing, the 
industrial atmosphere and specifically the skilled labour force in engineering. The 
overall impact on the locality of the two firms has been very different. Volvo has 
moved from simple assembly to being an 'industrial centre' that produces buses for 
the European market. This has brought about significant multiplier effects in the local 
economy with skilled jobs and claims of higher than average wages and human 
centred employment. Volvo is embedded not only in economic structures but also the 
formal institutions of the locality that it has actively shaped. In contrast, ABB Dolmel 
(power generators) although a performance plant in terms of a production process 
which requires a high technological input, has restructured the original Dolmel SOE 
to fit in with its global networks. While ABB Dolmel (power generators) has 
expanded employment and upgraded the production and managerial processes, ABB 
Dolmel Drives has received no new investment and has been asset stripped with the 
loss of 1200 jobs. 
The corporate culture and cognitive processes in these two firms were reflected in 
different entry strategies, methods of restructuring and ways of instilling new 
behaviours, all of which had implications for their quantitative and qualitative 
linkages in the Wroclaw locality. First ABB's strategy of leasing land and buildings 
meant that it had only shallow roots in the area, and with few sunk costs production 
could be easily moved elsewhere. This reflected their strategy in CEE and Russia 
which was to acquire substantial assets and then review, i f and how, they would fit 
into their global network. Volvo's substantial investment in land, buildings and 
dedicated equipment, however, meant that they were much more deeply locked into 
the region. 
Second, in terms of restructuring Volvo's preference for greenfield production was 
motivated by the view that there was too much 'baggage' associated with buying into 
an existing firm such as Jelcz. A key strategy for getting workers to absorb and 
internalise the Volvo 'way of working' was to recruit young workers less tainted by 
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old work practices, through a process of highly selective interviewing which put great 
emphasis on attitudinal attributes. The corporate strategy of ABB was to buy existing 
production which had to be restructured in a much shorter time fi-ame by using a sort 
of cognitive shock therapy. This was accomplished by agents of change, that 
comprised a highly experienced group of ABB managers and consultants who arrived 
to implement change according to tried and tested recipes and which had no 
sensitivity to locality. Part of their task was to select Polish managers from within the 
firm who were more adaptable and then put them through a period of intense training 
outside the locality. 
Third, these firms used very different ways of instilling new collective understandings 
by replacing what were deemed to be the unsuitable work attitudes carried over fi-om 
the previous regime. In Volvo employees were subject to an ongoing process of 
engendering worker identification with the company which included close contact 
with senior management and the use of enabling myths that centred on teamworking, 
personal development and familial metaphors. In contrast rather than attempting to 
get employees to internalise company culture, ABB used blueprints and highly 
codified procedures to transfer practices relating to HRM, finance and supply 
management. Further, the Business Area played a supervisory role through 
sophisticated computer packages which monitored efficiency and costs. 
However, we should be cautious about counter posing Volvo and ABB as good and 
bad, embedded and disembedded examples of foreign investment. The enabling myth 
of Volvo being a good corporate neighbour was central to its corporate strategy on at 
least two counts. The Polish market for buses was significant and a good reputation in 
the country would enhance their ability to win contracts with municipalities. Further, 
good relationship with the Wroclaw municipality and voivodship was important to 
lobby for upgrading the local infi-astructure, and their policy of the long-term 
presence of a group of Swedish senior management in the area, for example, 
necessitated the establishment of an international school. 
In many accounts the concept of the learning firm and less hierarchical organisational 
structures have been interpreted as implying more rewarding employment and the 
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possibility of greater embeddedness in localities. However, the claim that Volvo has 
brought human centred, better quality jobs because of flatter hierarchies and more 
inclusive company culture needs to be treated critically. Although the two firms have 
used very different enabling myths to bring about change and introduce new ways of 
working, they could be regarded as different routes to the same end. Both ABB and 
Volvo constantly measured and monitored a range of different variables which were 
then compared with those of other plants or subsidiaries. Devolved responsibility and 
decentralisation rather than giving managers room for manoeuvre allowed constant 
comparison by a number of performance and quality targets and was a constant 
pressure to reduce costs and increase productivity. 
In the case of Volvo and ABB learning and autonomy have been central to 
organisational change, but related to coercive rather than liberatory processes. The 
pace and content of work and the permanence of these firms in the locality are subject 
to both the external coercion of the market and the internal coercion of inter-firm 
competition. The fiiture of ABB Dolmel (power generators) depends on its ability to 
compete and win contracts within ABB, which relates to its capacity for continual 
improvements in quality and maintaining low costs relative to other firms within the 
network. In the case of Volvo inter-firm competition was less explicit. However, in 
the context of new possible production sites opening up fiirther to the East, the 
viability of the Wroclaw factory within the firm's industrial network in the long term 
depends on it being able to constantly not only maintain but improve its performance. 
ENDNOTES 
1 Volvo Bus corporation and the Finnish producer of body work Carrus Oy created a joint venture 
company - the Volvo Bus Poland. 1998 Volvo finalised the purchase of shares in the company 
and became sole owner. 
2 A much coveted aspect of the social package was the opportunity for workers to take subsidised 
holidays in Monte Carlo. The connection with Monte Carlo was the racing driver owner of Jelcz, 
Zasada. By 1999 500 workers had taken advantage of this subsidised vacation. 
3 Dohnel along with Pafawag was a centre for Solidarity in the region in 1981 and the site of 
running battles with the army who used tanks to break the occupation of the factory. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION: FROM ENABLING MYTHS TO PROVISIONING 
INSTITUTIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The overall argument of this study is that the role of foreign investment in the Wroclaw 
regional economy has been much more complex than neoliberal or conventional accounts 
suggest, and more contested than the claims of evolutionists. Optimistic accounts suggesting 
that large amounts of private capital would flow into the previously planned economies of 
CEE has overestimated the degree to which Poland and its regions have been locked into the 
international economy. Further, the study of incoming firms in the Wroclaw region showed no 
justification for the view that recent organisational trends in TNCs offer better developmental 
possibilities for LDRs. However, neither did the research findings support the pessimistic 
predictions that regions such as Wroclaw bordering Germany, would become the new 
'maquiladora', on the periphery of economic activity, and integrated on the basis of low 
quality investments driven by low cost seeking firms. The impact of foreign direct investment 
has resulted in the deep restructuring of individual firms in terms of both material and 
discursive practices, the effects of which have been highly differential. Collectively these 
incoming foreign investments have also had a profound impact on the emerging governance of 
the region. 
The aim of this chapter is to reflect on the main themes of radical institutionalist analysis and 
the embeddededness of firms in the light of the research findings presented in the previous 
chapters. The second part of the chapter discusses future research avenues that emanate from 
this study and the final part of the chapter reflects on the implications for policy making. 
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7.2 PATH CONTINENCY, C U M U L A T I V E CAUSATION AND PATH SHAPERS 
Within the context of modest flows of foreign investment to CEE and Poland, the Wroclaw 
regional economy has been relatively successful in being able to build on positive continuities 
from the past. The legacy of a diversified local economy with a number of flagship SOEs had 
attracted foreign investment on the basis of brownfield entry through the privatisation process. 
The position of Wroclaw in the West of the country coupled with relatively high levels of 
educational provision and an established industrial fradition also made it attractive as a 
location for investment in greenfield developments. Foreign investment has been path 
contingent in the sense that it was manifest in an extension of strategies based on oligopolistic 
competition, driven in large part by market access, and to a lesser extent low cost seeking. 
Although multiplier effects through supplier linkages have been modest, the arrival of a 
handful of less risk averse flagship foreign investments in the early 1990s triggered a process 
of cumulative causation, as these firms provided an important demonsfration effect for other 
TNCs considering production in CEE. From the mid 1990s the next stage of cumulative 
causation was the arrival of further foreign manufacturing firms and an explosion of foreign 
investment in hypermarkets, supermarkets and other foreign retailers which have gravitated 
towards regions with higher levels of income. These previous stages were paralleled or closely 
followed by changes in the service sector to underpin productive investment. The arrival of 
foreign consultants and the stimulus to the growth of indigenous service firms, created a local 
arms of the transnational capitalist class which was crucial for ushering in a new set of ideas 
and business practices viewed as being more compatible with a market economy than the 
inherited stock of understandings and assumptions. 
Although change was path contingent agents of change were important in this process of 
virtuous cumulative causation. The formal institutions of regional government, however, 
played a peripheral role in the arrival and retention of foreign investment, and exhibited a 
limited ability to 'pin down the global'. Local governance was not only embryonic, but any 
consensus regarding local development was undermined by conflict between the entrenched 
interests that carried over from the previous regime and the new emerging agendas of SMEs, 
TNCs and individuals with different visions of local development. The persistence of 
inappropriate informal institutions was evident. Past behaviours were characterised by 
225 
kleptocracy and rent seeking and a culture of exculpation by local elites on the one hand, and 
passivity and a lack of participation by the majority of the local population on the other. 
Members of the nomenklatura and managers in SOEs had actively transformed social capital 
fi-om the command economy into financial capital or assets, either as new entrepreneurs or 
holders of positions in newly privatised firms with foreign investment. Therefore rather than 
emergent governance structures being directed towards the common purpose of regional 
development, groups and networks that had been powerfiil in the past were jostling for 
position in the new structures. 
Ambiguous and embryonic structures of local governance left gaps to be filled by other agents 
of change. Foreign investors contributed to formal institution building in the region, either by 
participating in existing organisations or by creating their own chambers of commerce and 
business clubs. Further, the managements of incoming firms played a major role in lobbying 
for an infi-astructure which could lock the region more tightly into the international economy, 
either through the establishment of international schools or campaigning for direct flights to 
reduce the travel time for the transnational capitalist class. 
Another challenge to the ability of local structures to harness the positive impacts of foreign 
investment was the research fmding that emphasised transnational firms as being highly 
reflexive, recursive and active, as they crossed national boundaries. Networking between firms 
was evident in terms of exchanging information relevant to opening up production and dealing 
with a new institutional set up. Intellectual capital therefore existed and was shared both 
within firms, between subsidiaries and HQ, and between firms at different spatial levels. 
Particularly strong links were evident between producer and supplier firms, and those sharing 
the same country of origin. 
Processes of restructuring and economic change were not smooth or uncontested and 'path 
shapers' were important in determining the nature of hybrid or recombined organisations as 
part of the privatisation process. Local privatisation processes and outcomes reflected those at 
a national level, where competing interests had produced various idiosyncratic outcomes of 
privatisation. The pace and form of privatisation, and subsequent restructuring was contested 
by Solidarity in several former SOEs. The trade union had a significant effect on countering 
some of the enabling myths of foreign investors, particularly those related to job reduction and 
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the contraction of social provision. 
Therefore rather than seeing local institutions as static and foreign investment and its 
institutions as juxtaposed and comprising a separate mode of governance, it is argued that 
foreign investment has changed the contours of existing institutions and become part of new 
networks of governance. The argument is that the endogenous input of foreign investment in 
the manufacturing sector acted as a catalyst for ftarther investment in both manufacturing and 
services. As a critical mass of investment was reached appropriate political arrangements and 
institutions were established. Important to this account are the way in which firms 'bent' 
habits, conventions and collective understanding through new discourses and enabling myths 
in the workplace and the locality. Therefore firms were not exogenous but were active agents 
of change that became endogenised in economic, political and social structures and networks. 
Critical to this process of cumulative causation has been the role of foreign investment, 
directly or indirectly, in attempting to instill a set of values, beliefs and expectations viewed 
more congruent with a market economy, while displacing or circumventing what were 
regarded as the inappropriate institutional legacies of the previous regime. 
7.3 ENABLING MYTHS AND CIRCUITS OF INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 
Central to the radical institutionalist analysis is the way in which certain informal institutions 
or enabling myths needed to predominate in order to create suitable ideological conditions for 
the market, and to convince people that a particular state of affairs is self-evident. Enabling 
myths at the level of the locality or the workplace have to be understood in a wider context of 
their operation and deployment at all spatial levels of economic activity. At a global level the 
WTO and the IMF have been in the forefront of trying to shift the rules of the game. Coercion 
through the conditionality of loans has been paralleled by the perpetuation of a set of powerful 
myths associated with globalisation, that relate to purported relationships between free frade 
and prosperity, deregulation and growth, and privatisation and efficiency all viewed as the 
benign results of the free and unhindered operation of the market. This in turn has led to a 
redefinition of the role and fimction of national and local states supported by another set of 
enabling myths, which relate to adapting to global markets. These have been used to justify 
the necessity of reducing public welfare provision, the introduction of 'flexible' labour 
markets and widespread privatisation. 
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In the case of the transforming economies of CEE and their localities such measures were 
presented as the only option for shaking off the dead hand of the planned economy. At a local 
level, integration with the global economy has been translated as a form of economic 
development based on the talismanic powers of foreign investment coupled with privatisation, 
overseen by a group of local agents with the right mind set. The whole of the opening up and 
restructuring of CEE has been based on the myth of the market. The market has been sold as 
the only alternative to the totalitarian and sclerotic communist economies, as an exogenous 
and impartial construct, which after some initially nasty medicine would deliver rising 
standards of living for all. However, this study has been underpinned by the assumption that 
markets are socially instituted and politically constructed in the interests of powerful social 
groups. 
The enthusiasm with which people have embraced these enabling myths, has depended in part, 
on the extent to which their material well being in terms of employment and social provision 
has been improved. The nomenklatura who have converted their symbolic into material 
capital, and the young and educated who have found employment in the middle management 
of foreign investments or the service sector have undoubtedly gained. The experience of 
manual workers is more mixed and Solidarity is a good illustration of schizophrenic thinking 
about the market. At a national level Solidarity was one of the greatest enthusiasts for the 
market, and this was reinforced by significant resources from US aid organisations which 
recruited the support of local leaders in Wroclaw (and other places) through all expenses trips 
to the US. However, the gap between the enabling myths and reality of the market in the 
workplace has led to conflict and contest. It is perhaps not surprising that workers should see 
something paradoxical in being told that the benefits of the market economy included 
redundancies and the contraction of employment in their workplaces. This explains why 
foreign direct investment has been most contested at the level of individual firms and why 
creating consensus in the workplace has been problematic and complex. 
At the level of workplace radical institutionalism problematises issues related to social control 
within firms where the establishment of control and hegemony is not automatic. 
As we saw in the previous section, in CEE a shift in collective understanding was necessary as 
the old legacies were deemed to be incompatible with the new industrial atmosphere, both at 
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the level of the local economy and within individual workplaces. Notions of worker 
participation, full employment, communalism and collective provision had to be eviscerated 
and replaced with a set of enabling myths that related to quality, individual responsibility, 
empowerment, and management prerogative and which were reinforced by individualised 
systems of remuneration. Although some representatives of Solidarity had shown a 
willingness to act as a conduit for this set of ideas, on the whole trade unions were viewed by 
managers as repositories of these unsuitable informal institutions which led to the view that 
workers organisations should be relegated to a peripheral role in the new institutional 
architecture. 
Circuits of intellectual capital were necessary across national boundaries to introduce and 
disseminate these enabling myths, and agents responsible for the transfer of these new 
discourses included participants in aid initiatives from foreign national and local governments, 
both foreign and domestic consultancies and senior managers of foreign firms. Some of these 
new workplace institutions were obtrusive and embedded in the transfer of packages relating 
to accounting, fmancial control and human resource management. Unobtrusive methods to 
instill particular collective understandings included the carefiil selection of Polish managers 
who were deemed to be more receptive to change, and inter-firm networking to reinforce a 
general set of ideas relating to competitive practices. 
Diverse methods of instilling new habits of thought and collective understandings were 
reflected in the different sets of enabling myths deployed by firms. Volvo identified local 
agents who were receptive to the new institutions and company culture and used their tacit 
knowledge from the locality to socialise shop floor employees. In this case the enabling myths 
of'people cenfred working', 'inclusion', 'teamworking' and the use of familial metaphors 
were not actively resisted, but neither were they absorbed by all workers. While Volvo 
attempted to get employees to internalise culture, ABB used a more obtrusive and coercive set 
of enabling myths, cenfred on 'internal competition', 'cost centres' and codified practices 
rather than attempting deeper socialisation. 
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7.4 RETHINKING T H E EMBEDDEDNESS OF FIRMS 
An important finding of the research was that while the transformation of the Wroclaw 
regional economy could be considered relatively successful in terms of inflows of foreign 
investment, privatisation processes and below average employment, the impacts of foreign 
firms were highly differentiated. There is nothing original about the suggestion that the 
collapse of communism in CEE has opened up new terrains on which TNCs could map their 
strategies in the context of an intensification of competition. However, in order to gain a more 
nuanced understanding of the qualitative and quantitative linkages of incoming firms, the 
study examined flagship investments through the lens of structural, cultiiral, cognitive and 
institutional influences on the embeddedness of firms. 
Evolutionary accounts were criticised for understating the importance of exogenous factors in 
firaming the context of local strategies. It was argued that influences on the structural 
embeddedness of firms needed to be imderstood in order to gauge the degree permanence of a 
firm's operation in a locality, for example. However, firms did not react passively to sectoral 
imperatives, because the corporate culture of individual firms included corporate strategies for 
dealing with the radical uncertainties of competition. One important finding that has far 
reaching implications for existing firms in CEE and former SOEs without foreign investment, 
is the way in which western TNCs have fimdamentally altered the competitive conditions for 
indigenous firms. 
One deeply embedded enabling myth was that foreign investment through the market 
mechanism would not only inject finance and know-how into recipient firms, but would 
provide a stimulus for other indigenous fums to become more competitive. One finding of this 
study was that SOEs that were national icons, were only able to restructure successfiiUy with 
an injection of the financial and managerial resources of foreign investors. While Rokita, Jelcz 
and Polar were able to make incremental changes they lacked the financial economies of scale 
and accrued learning of western firms that would make them competitive in comparison with 
established TNCs, and as consequence at the time of writing they all faced uncertain fiitures. 
hi contrast to the view that suggested that the new corporate strategies and trends in 
organisational change that characterised TNCs offered better development possibilities for 
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LDRs, the findings pointed to firms as being coercive by exerting both obtrusive or 
unobtrusive control. More sanguine accounts point to TNCs becoming less hierarchical 
thereby increasing the autonomy of subsidiaries and offering better opportunities for linkages 
in the locality. The research findings suggested a different interpretation of autonomy. 
Whatever the firm specific enabling myths the trend towards costs centres, internal markets 
and benchmarking, meant that the parameters for manoeuvre were reduced to cost reduction 
and increases in efficiency which resulted in inter-firm and inter regional competition. 
7.5 P O L I C Y CONCLUSIONS 
Providing an institutional fix for firms and regions in GEE has been a lucrative business for 
western consultancies and there is no intention here to reshuffle the pack of supply side 
solutions that have been exported fi-om the West. Although evidence that regional institutions 
that are coherent and congruent can mediate between the global and local by successfully 
attracting and retaining FDI is not strong, this is not to dismiss the importance of human 
agency in changing economic and political trajectories. Indeed history testifies that in Poland 
communities and workers had a dramatic impact on the institutional landscape by rising up 
against and eventually dismantling the communist regime. However, this does not represent 
the end of history, and in the face of globalising tendencies underpinned by neoliberal ideas, 
an alternative scenario is to build participatory structures at the level of the locality which can 
evolve a different agenda. In the light of a legacy of passivity with regard to formal 
institutions, ruling by elites and an embryonic civil society - this is a daimting task. In Polish 
workplaces trade unions need to be rebuilt to effectively defend wages and conditions of 
work. However, the role of OPZZ (the Al l Poland trade union organisation) is tainted and 
constrained by its stalininist past, while Solidarity is compromised by advocating the virtues 
of the market on the one hand at the same time as trying to mitigate its effects on the other. It 
was certainly not the case that workers were no longer interested in trade unions. Women 
cashiers in Tesco, for example, were vociferous in arguing the need for a vehicle through 
which to redress their grievances over wages and working conditions. 
Therefore it would be easy but disingenuous to add to the extensive list of institutional fixes 
that have been posited by consultants, European governments and academics. Stronger and 
more coherent local governance in Wroclaw and more proactive trade imion organisation may 
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be able to counter balance the degree to which foreign investment can bend institutions in the 
locality and the workplace. However, where conditions have been negotiated with incoming 
firms, foreign investors have shown themselves to be adept at complying nominally, but 
without having to deviate from their original agenda. While this is only one of many pieces of 
work that points to the immense leverage of TNCs, the contribution of these research findings 
is to provide a more detailed account of the 'institution bending' behaviour of firms as they 
enter and operate in new contexts. 
It is argued here that the developmental potential of fransforming regions ui CEE cannot be 
divorced from wider debates. Following Dugger (1989, 2000) the radical institutionalist 
rejection of the automatic benevolence and social equilibrium of the market imply support, not 
for minor institutional changes, but a radical break with the free market status quo. Recent 
suggestions of a 'third way' in this view are regarded as only a minor and incremental 
adjustment to the relationship between the private and public sector rather than offering a new 
paradigm. Therefore sliding between various configuration of the market and hierarchy 
spectrum does not constitute a sufficiently strong recipe for tempering the power of TNCs. 
Powerfiil enabling myths perpetuated at all levels, from the global to the workplace have 
appeared to close down serious consideration of other starting points about the organisation of 
economic activity. Economic agents are seen to be motivated by individual gain, therefore 
individuality is the order of the day and collectivism relegated to margins. Enabling myths 
have tried to encourage societal acceptance of unemployment, exclusion and inequality in 
CEE as well as elsewhere, as blips of economic change, rather than inevitable outcomes of 
markets. An encouraging sign, however, over the last two years has been a widespread 
questioning on a global scale of the enabling myths of the WTO and the World Bank, whose 
ideas are now seen by diverse groups in many different countries, as a fig leaf for the designs 
of powerfiil multinationals. 
There is no suggestion here of any return to the oppressive and distorted economies that 
existed pre-1990, neither is there much sympathy for the state led industrialisation view which 
is also top down and constructivist. However, to secure long term regional development, the 
community in Wroclaw need to go beyond a zero sum game, which pits localities against each 
other and where the only sfrategy is to compete for a slice of mobile capital. Similarly workers 
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need to take a much wider view of the corporate strategies of capital to reduce the power of 
TNCs in playing off subsidiaries against each other, and European Workers Councils may be a 
forum for such discussions. Further, the distributional effects of foreign investment need to be 
taken seriously in formulating local economic and social policy. As we have seen different 
social groups have had very varied experiences of transformation in general and foreign 
investment in particular, and therefore issues related to gender, yoxmg and old workers, and 
the sub-regions need to be central to the debate. Therefore local democracy needs to be 
inclusive and involve groups that are marginalised and/or demoralised by transformation. The 
growth of the far right (as well as groups to the left) in Eiu-ope reflects an increasing 
disillusionment with the ability and willingness of mainsfream politics and parties to address 
issues relating to some sections of the population. 
7.6 F U T U R E R E S E A R C H AGENDAS 
Such has been the velocity of change that examining the role of foreign investment in a 
transforming economy has been to research a moving target. While restructuring is always an 
ongoing process, the transformation of previously plaimed economies have seen broad 
changes that were implemented in western economies over several decades condensed into a 
much shorter time frame. In terms of research there are foiu- possible future agendas that 
emerge from this study. 
The first research area would be further tracking of SOEs in the Wroclaw region, that are in a 
fransitional stage of change, in that they are either part of a National Investment Fund (Rokita 
and Wrozamet), have minority investment by a foreign firm (Polar) or are wholly Polish 
owned (Jelcz). These firms are in a fransitional stage because ownership arrangements are 
hybrid and the privatisation process indirect. The purpose of the study would be to refute or 
support the strong claim made in the previous section, that the survival of such firms is only 
possible with unambiguous ownership by a foreign investor. Further, it would allow a deeper 
investigation of the extent to which restructuring processes have been helped or hindered by 
the persistence of informal institutions carried over from the previous regime. 
The second possible area of investigation would be to study the rebuilding of regional 
governance in the context of the new and enlarged Dolnoslaskie voivodship established in 
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January 1999. The particular focus would be to examine whether these new arrangements 
constitute a more successful recipe for coherent regional development, or whether they merely 
represent a new arena in which entrenched interests wi l l play out their agendas. The enlarged 
area would allow the comparison of sub-regions with different industrial bases and 
governance structures. Walbryzch and Legnica are monocultures based on declining heavy 
industries which present a greater challenge for restructuring and economic development than 
the diverse economy of the former Wroclaw voivodship. 
The third way in which this study could be built upon would be to open the 'black box' of a 
larger number of firms to examine the relationship between the specific enabling myths 
deployed through different corporate strategies and their impacts on qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of employment within the firm. This study focused on the two contrasting 
examples of Volvo and ABB and how they instilled a new set of collective understandings, a 
wider study may produce a richer variety of strategies with varying impacts in the workplace. 
The final area of research is perhaps the most important and certainly the most challenging 
and emanates fi-om Bugger's definition of radical institutionalism; 
Radical institutionalism is a processual paradigm focused on the changing direction of cultural evolution 
and changing the outcome of social provisioning in order to promote the foil participation of all 
(Dugger, 1989: 126) 
It has been argued here, in line with Weisskopf (2000), that the seeds of change should come 
fi-om below in workplaces, and in communities defending collective and non-marketised 
provisions and in participatory systems of local governance. The point of departure fi-om other 
accoimts that have advocated a resurgence of localism is a recognition that foreign investment 
offers very limited possibihties for regional development, and fiirther that even some very 
modest demands may bring communities into conflict with vested and powerfiil interests. 
Rather than perpetuating the enabling myths which justify the economic and political power of 
the few, central to the research agenda is the search for provisioning institutions which are 
emancipatory in both a material and ideological sense for the vast majority people. This 
suggests that the challenge for radical institutionalism is twofold. First, it needs to develop a 
non-teleological, but more coherent and all embracing theory that goes beyond the set of 
analytical concepts developed in this study. Secondly, radical institutionalism needs to focus 
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on the evolution of policy and participatory governance that provides a serious challenge to 
the enabling myth of the passivity and inevitability of the market. At the time of writing this 
study, an alternative analysis of and possible policies for economic change and development 
in Less Developed Regions is not an indulgence. Failure to engage with the increasing 
numbers of the population in Western and Eastern Europe, who are left disenfi-anchised and 
marginalised by the current economic arrangements leaves a vacuum that could be filled by 
dangerous and divisive ideas which are currently gaining credence in some quarters. 
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APPENDIX 1 
F I E L D W O R K 
This section discusses the formulation and execution of the fieldwork. The research for 
this thesis is also placed in the wider context of collaborative projects that were 
undertaken between 1993 and 1995 and those conducted in parallel to the interviews for 
this project which took place between 1997 and 2001. 
Extensive knowledge of the transformation process in general and the restructuring of 
localities and workplaces in particular had been gained between 1993 and 1995 during a 
study of the Polish city of Krakow. A visit ftmded by TEMPUS to facilitate exchange 
between academics in Western Europe and the newly transforming economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe led to initial contact with academics at the Krakow Academy of 
Economics. Between 1993 and 1995 a small Nuffield Grant (£5,000) fiinded 
collaborative research with colleagues from the Krakow Academy of Economics. This 
work involved documenting broad economic and institutional changes in the locality and 
critically examining policies that had been posited by consultants for its transformation. 
The work also involved case studies of three key workplaces: the giant Huta Senzhimira 
steel plant and its adaptation in the face of increased competition in the international 
market; the ZPT tobacco factory which had been bought by the US Philip Morris TNC; 
and the Wawel chocolate factory which had rejected offers by TNCs in favour of a 
worker-management route to privatisation. Insights gained in this period included the 
complexities and contested nature of the privatisation process and the key role of 
Solidarity as both a political party and a trade union in shaping transformation at national 
and workplace level, and the role of both formal and informal institutions. This research 
formed the basis of a book (with Dr A l Rainnie) 'Restructuring Krakow: Desperately 
Seeking Capitalism' which was pubUshed in 1996. 
In the course of researching the restructuring of the confectionary sector, which has been 
the focus of interest and intense activity by TNCs I had visited the Cadbury factory in 
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Wroclaw. The Managing Director was English but with Polish parents. He had a deep 
knowledge of the local economy and was very open about his perceptions of the 
transformation process and the restructuring of firms. This interview suggested that 
Wroclaw would be a suitable empirical focus for the thesis due to its diverse economy 
with flagship State Owned Enterprises and relatively high levels of foreign investment. 
The first stage of the fieldwork for the thesis in 1997 was to conduct preliminary 
interviews in several of the key foreign investments in Wroclaw on the basis of semi-
structured interviews in 1997. Additional interviews were conducted with key agents in 
institutions, particularly local government. While these interviews yielded usefiil 
information regarding the economic impacts of foreign investment informal discussions 
highlighted other issues regarding the way in which crossing borders was a highly 
political and negotiated process. Managers of foreign investment were concerned with 
bringing about a process of 'institution bending' first, in the sense of needing a set of 
formal institutions to support their activities, and second to bring about attitudinal 
changes in Polish managers and workers. 
As a consequence of the insights gained in the preliminary interviews the second stage of 
the fieldwork in 1998 was planned to reflect non-economic as well as economic aspects 
of embeddedness. The semi-structured interview schedule was designed to interrogate 
these aspects more thoroughly (see Appendix B). Interviews were also held in the UK 
where appropriate, which focused on managers responsible for negotiating the investment 
and overseeing the early stages of the process. These interviews at the level of top 
management, particularly in Cadbury, BOC and Tesco yielded rich insights. 
Preliminary analysis of transcribed tapes and fieldwork notes (where taping was not 
possible) provided extensive material on economic and institutional embeddedness. 
However, the material on the cultural and cognitive aspects of embeddedness was less 
satisfactory, because the richness and quality of information between firms was highly 
variable, particularly where only one interviewed had been agreed to. 
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The third stage of the fieldwork in September 1999 and April 2000 was therefore to 
investigate cultural and cognitive embeddedness more rigorously on the basis of two case 
studies. Volvo and ABB were selected on the basis that although emanating from the 
national origins, they represented a good contrast of corporate culture. The main 
criterion, however, was having excellent access to managers at both middle and senior 
levels of the companies, and also across a spread of different functions. In both firms 
interviews were carried out with the CEO, financial director, HRM manager, supply 
manager, production manager and trade union representatives. This yielded important 
information regarding key facets of the firms operations. Carrying out interviews with a 
larger number of workers and managers enabled an interrogation about the coherence of 
corporate culture, consensus and commitment and the mechanisms used to 'bend 
institutions'. 
Parallel to stages two and three of the research, interviews were carried out with 
institutional actors in the locality at various echelons of local government, development 
agencies and chambers of commerce. Interviews in State Owned Enterprises were 
generally carried out in Polish with a translator. While the translators had an excellent 
and nuanced grasp of English and the project aims, the translation of certain concepts and 
the filtering aspect meant that the material gathered was mainly used to elaborate the 
competition impacts of foreign investment. Reticence to stray from official information 
meant that it was hard to engage in discussions that related to cultural and cognitive 
embeddedness. 
During the period 1997 to 2001 1 was involved in three externally ftinded projects or 
initiatives which involved further visits to Poland and enabled me to deepen my 
understanding of the research questions and issues investigated in the thesis. 
First, I was responsible for the Polish fieldwork as part of a large comparative project 
(Poland, UK, Italy, Slovakia) with colleagues from the universities of Durham and 
Sussex, which was fianded under the ESRC's 'One Europe' initiative. The sectors studies 
in the project included vehicles, food retailing and chemicals, which enhanced my 
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knowledge and understanding of sectors fi-om which several of my key case study firms 
were drawn. The comparison of the Dolnoslaskie (of which Wroclaw was the capital) and 
Slaskie meant that further insights were gained regarding the specificity of governance in 
Wroclaw. Ongoing contacts with Polish collaborators and in particular Dr Bolek 
Domanski fi-om the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, a leading economic geographer 
specialising in foreign investment, was invaluable in developing and enriching some of 
the key ideas in the thesis. 
A second project on 'Women, Work and Transformation' fimded by a small Nuffield 
Grant and conducted with Dr Alison Stenning (University of Birmingham) focused on the 
contraction of women's jobs in SOEs and new employment opportunities that were 
opening up in foreign food retailers. Extensive interviews were carried out with women 
workers fi-om these two sectors which yielded rich information on the differentiated 
aspects of transformation and the quality of new 'flexible' jobs. A final set of interviews 
were carried out with teachers and nurses who had been involved in militant action (and 
in the case of nurses the formation of a new union) provided insights into the changing 
nature of workplace organisation, particularly in challenging the enabling 'myth of the 
market'. Collaboration with Professor Wieslaw Kozek (Warsaw University), a leading 
expert in Polish industiial relations helped me to develop a more nuanced understanding 
of the institutions of workplace organisation. 
Finally, fiinding fi-om the ESRC to run a seminar series on 'Changing Work and 
Employment in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia' with the universities of 
Nottingham, Sussex and Warwick provided good contextual and comparative material for 
understanding formal and informal aspects of work in a comparative setting. 
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APPENDIX 2 
L I S T OF INTERVIEWS 
FIRMS 
F O R E I G N INVESTMENTS 
ABB Dolmel (Drives) 
President of Solidarity 
Vice President of Solidarity 
ABB Instal 
President of Company 
Adtranz 
President of Company 
UK consultant on two-year contract 
Production Manager 
Representative of Solidarity 
Armstrong 
Managing Director 
BOG 
Vice President (UK) 
Business Development Manager - Central Europe (UK) 
Operations Manager 
Deputy Director Production and Distribution 
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Cadbury 
Regional Development Director (UK) 
Managing Director 
Cargill 
Operations Manager 
Managing Director 
Cussons 
Chief Executive Poland 
G K N 
Managing Director 
Human Resources Manager 
Tescos 
Director of International Devlopment (UK) 
CEO Poland 
Store Manager 
Supply Manager 
Human Resource Manager 
Vitapolymer 
Managing Director 
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CASE STUDY FIRMS: ABB AND V O L V O 
ABB Dolmel (power generators) 
General Affairs Manager 
Human Resource and Administration Manager 
Financial Controller 
Supply Manager 
General Plant Manager (Production) 
Volvo 
General Director 
Financial Manager 
Human Resources Manager 
Head of Purchasing and Sourcing CEE 
Production Manager 
Solidarity representative 
STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES 
Polar 
General Manager 
Marketing Director 
Human Resource Manager 
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Director of Production and Supplies (member of Board) 
President of Solidarity 
Member of Export Department 
Jelcz 
Director of Restructuring 
Human Resources Manager 
Financial Director 
President of Solidarity 
Rokita 
Strategic Planning and Development Director 
Business Development Manager 
Consultants 
Know How Fund (UK) 
Otrek 
Managing Director 
Vice President 
Arthur Andersen 
Manager 
Ernst and Young 
Director 
278 
INSTITUTIONS 
Wroclaw Municipality 
Director of 'Wroclaw 2000 Plan' 
Director of Economic Initiatives 
Voivode 
Governor of the Voivode 
Department of Privatisation 
Department of Foreign Investment 
Wroclaw Regional Development Agency 
Organisations 
British Honorary Consul 
German Consul 
British-Polish Chamber of Commerce 
(Information Officer) 
British-Polish Chamber of Commerce 
(ex-President) 
Lower Silesian Chamber of Commerce 
Solidarity Trade Union 
President of Regional Board 
(also member of National Commission) 
279 
APPENDIX 3 
INDICATIVE INTERVIEW S C H E D U L E -
SENIOR MANAGERS IN PARENT COMPANIES 
Introduction 
Purpose and parameters of research 
Confidentiality 
Establish time limit of interview 
Establish role of senior manager/s in organisation 
General background 
Confirm information regarding structure and history of company as set out in preparatory 
field notes drawn fi-om company publications and sources. 
Internationalisation and location 
How does the decision to locate in Poland fit with the intemationalisation strategies of the 
company? 
To what extent was the decision motivated by low costs/ market access/ international 
competition? 
Why was Poland chosen rather than other economies in Central and Eastern Europe? 
Why was Wroclaw chosen rather than another location in Poland? 
When, where and by whom was the decision taken to invest? 
Does this investment represent an addition to the firms capacity or a replacement to 
production elsewhere? 
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The process of acquisition (Brownfield) 
How did you find the firm you wanted to buy? Who was proactive (your firm, locality of 
Wroclaw, Polish national ministries)? 
Which individuals and departments were responsible for negotiating? 
Who were the key actors in Poland in negotiating the investment? (National ministries, 
individual national politicians, individual local politicians, bureaucrats, advisors) 
What were the key issues for the host country negotiators? (Price, competition in the 
sector, technology transfer, scale of investment and fiiture commitments, ecurity and 
conditions of employment) 
What difficulties, i f any, emerged in the process of the negotiations? 
What was the time scale between the start and the conclusion of the negotiations? 
How did the speed compare with other international acquisitions? 
The process of acquisition (Greenfield) 
Why was the greenfield rather than the brownfield investment route chosen? 
How did you find the land? 
Where does the responsibility lie within the firm for a) seeking greenfield sites b) 
executing the building of the factory c) the start of production? 
Which local agents helped or hindered bureaucratic procedures? 
Which local agents were most usefiil and how did you make contact with them? 
The role of the Wroclaw region 
What contacts have there been with the following institutions in the area? 
Formal institutions: voivode, municipality, gmina 
Other organisations: local or regional agencies, consultants, personal contacts 
Firms: international firms, State Owned Enterprises, SMEs 
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Acquisition (in the case of brownfield) 
What was the nature of the acquisition (capital privatisation or joint venture) 
Why brownfield? 
What was the scale of the acquisition? Value of investment? 
Ownership structure 
In negotiations what was the role of a) the Workers Coimcil and b) the incumbent 
management? 
Was there any agreement on employment levels, future investment levels, social 
provision 
Were Polish managers retained? I f so, why? Did they bring important information about 
the firms and the market? 
Clianges and restructuring after acquisition 
How would you describe the existing condition of the firm (technology, working 
practices, managerial skills, health and safety, quality)? 
What changes have taken place in: production methods, technology, work organisation, 
health and safety quality, marketing, HRM, accounting and logistics; 
What investment has there been in new plant and machinery (value and nature of 
investment)? 
What changes have there been in pay and conditions of work? 
How has the labour force changed (part time/fiill time, by function, turnover) 
What changes have taken place in social provision (nursery, health, leisure, housing) and 
what is the current social provision? 
What social provision is there in the firm? 
What have been the main changes to management structures? 
To what extent is there a company blueprint for restructuring acquisitions? 
How far are changes locally adapted? 
Was there a process of consultation with workers and incumbent management? 
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What aspects of the restructuring programme were difficult to implement? 
What has been the response of workers and incumbent management to the changes that 
have been implemented? 
Integration with parent company? 
What is the relationship between the subsidiary and the HQ? 
What is the relationship between country HQ and the Wroclaw subsidiary? 
Which functions does the subsidiary have responsibility for? Is this likely to change in 
the future? 
What information is reported to HQ and with what frequency? 
What elements of the firm's organisation are distinctly Pohsh. 
I f I walked into a plant in any other country what would be different? 
Which functions are decentralised and which does the firm have responsibiliy for? 
Where does Research and Development take place? 
What development and training takes place and where? What are the main ways in which 
Polish managers are inducted with the company 
What levels of personnel are trained? 
Supply chains 
What raw materials/ components are sourced locally/nationally/globally? (as a percentage 
of the value of inputs, i f possible) 
To what extent has the above changed since the firm's arrival in Poland? 
How might these arrangements change in the future? 
What do you perceive as the problems and advantages of sourcing locally? 
Where local suppliers have been used has assistance been given to improve the efficiency 
or quality of their operation? 
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The Wroclaw Locality 
Do you have contact with the voivode, gmina, development agency? 
What is the nature of these contacts? 
Do they provide anything in the way of information, eduation training 
Is there support that would be useful that is currently not being provided? 
Do you have contacts with business organisations in the region? Chambers of 
Commerce? 
What contact do you have with other foreign investors in the region? Are there issues that 
you cooperate over? 
General Assessment 
To what extent would you consider the investment to be a success? 
What aspects have proved between than anticipated? 
What do you regard as disappointments or ongoing problems? 
The Future 
How do you see the fiiture developing in Wroclaw? Poland? 
Is the company considering other 'emerging markets' as sites for investment? 
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